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hearing describing the jury as the last "link-in-the-chain-of-Iaw-enforcement."
Specifically, the prosecutor argued:
In closing let me just say that you are part of a very important chain called
the chain of law enforcement. And law enforcement and justice don't
work in our country unless you do your part. The police officers can be as
well trained as you want them and the forensic sciences can be as well
trained as you want in the sciences. And they can go out an[ d] investigate
crimes as competently and professionally as this group has done. And I
think that Officer Robinson and those associated with him have done an
excellent job. You can have the best prosecutors around. And I want to
tell you that I believe Mr. Moss is one of the best prosecutors in the State.
And they work together like this because they are part of the chain of law
enforcement that keeps our community safe. But the third link in that
chain is a jury, which when they're given the proper evidence and they are
given the proof beyond a reasonable doubt, they have the fortitude to be
able to act upon that and to preserve that chain unbroken. And the fourth
link in the chain, of course, is the judge who has the courage and also the
wisdom to impose the appropriate sentence. Now, none of this works
unless you do your job.
Id. at 834. The court found his argument trivialized the jury's importance because it

suggested the jury is only the last link in a long decision. It found "[t]his suggestion that
the jury is simply a link in a chain of law enforcement which includes the police, the
prosecutor, and the judge is just plain wrong. It minimizes the important role of the jury
and tends to align neutrals-judge and jury-with a party to the case-the state itself" !d.
(internal quotations omitted).
In this case, like in Leavitt, the comments made during closing arguments were

improper because they trivialized the jury's role by linking them to the prosecution and
taking the bulk of the weight of the decision to impose death off the jurors shoulders.
<,~;jjr~

Here is the argument in all its glory:

"

A last few thoughts: If your verdict for death, saves just one person in the future,
saves just one person in the future your sacrifice and your time will not have been
in vain.... It's been a long journey from September 24th to October 27th. By my
count it's almost 1500 days Dave Smith and Cory Stambaugh carried the ball for
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most of those 1500 days. They waited during that time. They themselves
gathered DNA from, I recollect, over 130 people, over two and a half years that
they waited to solve this crime. They tested those people. They tested half a
million people by running the DNA sample through CODIS. They never gave up.
They kept trying. And if it weren't for those strands of DNA that gave you the
insurance you need, Erick Hall would still be out there. He would still been out
there. No they carried the baton. They did their job. For the last year and a half
Mr. Bourne and I have done our job. And now it's time to end this and hand the
baton to you. How many times have you sat? How many times have you sat at
the breakfast table reading the newspaper and read about a horrible crime and
said to your suppose, "Why don't they do something about this? This is our town.
Why don't they do something about this?" Well the reversal of that is, now you
are they. You are they. There is in your hands. Trust each other. You've run a
long path together. Trust each other. Remember last week to. Take your
common sense and your skepticism back into the jury room with you. Don't forget
it. And finally the law is only as strong -- the law is only as strong as the weakest
part on this jury which is heart.

***

Well, for generations the citizens of our country have been asked to do
hard things .... We'll wait for you.
(Tr., p.5462, L.3 - p.5463, L.15; p.5512, L.24 - p.5513, L.14 (emphasis added).) The
prosecutor, by using a baton analogy to describe how the case had passed from law
enforcement, to the prosecutor, and now to the jury, improperly trivialized the jury's
importance and created a link-in-the-chain argument that destroyed the neutrality of the
jury and squarely aligned them on the side of the State. Further, this improper argument
took the sole burden of imposing death away from the sentencing jury by implying the
jury was working together with law enforcement and the prosecution; thus, the State
made it easier for the jury in this case to impose a death sentence. Finally, the prosecutor
applied the concept that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link, analogizing the
jury's heart, i.e., compassion and mercy, to the weakest link. Accordingly, this argument
further undermines the jury's ability to meaningfully consider mitigation. See section a,

supra.
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h.

The Prosecutor Expressed His Personal Belief And Opinion
That The Death Penalty Was The Proper Punishment For
Mr. Hall

Prosecutors can appropriately argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or
inadequacies of the defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the
evidence. Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (reversing death sentence for
prosecutorial misconduct in making improper arguments). However, prosecutors cannot
put forth their opinions as to credibility of a witness, guilt of a defendant, or
appropriateness of capital punishment. ld. (emphasis added). This is because "the
prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the
jury to trust the Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence." ld.
(quoting United States v. Young, 470 U.S. I, 18-19 (1985».
During closing arguments, Ada County Prosecutor, Greg Bower, an elected
official of Idaho State government, stated his opinion that the death penalty was the
appropriate punishment for Mr. Hall, arguing,
You said you could impose the death penalty in the right case, but what you
wanted was overwhelming proof. And I think that this is the right case. And I
think that you know this is the right case.
(Tr., p.5445, Ls.14-18.) This represents an improper personal opinion of the appropriate
punishment for this case, was improper, and warrants reversal on its own and in
conjunction with all other claims raised by Mr. Hall.
1.

The Prosecutor Argued That Lethal Injection Is Painless
And Humane

The State argued that executing Mr. Hall would be a humane form of death,
especially when compared to the asserted suffering of Ms. Henneman.
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Are those things the same? Is execution the same as what he did to Lynn
Henneman? It's not. It's not anything like it. It's nothing like it. Being
executed is like going into a surgery and getting put to sleep and not
waking up. Is that what happened the Lynn?
(Tr., p.5511, L.24 - p.5512, L. 4.)
Not only is this argument improper because it is not based any information in the
record and because it calls for comparative justice which results in the death penalty
regardless of mitigating circumstances, Mr. Hall further asserts that, rather than being a
humane form of execution, the drugs used to kill death row inmates can actually cause an
excruciatingly painful and protracted death. Indeed courts throughout the country are
currently entertaining challenges to lethal injection, including the United States Supreme
Court. See Claim AA. According to an April 2005 report by the British journal, "The
Lancet," as many as four of ten prisoners put to death by injection in the United States
may receive inadequate anesthesia, causing them to remain conscious in tremendous
pain. (Exhibit 81.) Therefore, Mr. Hall claims that the State's argument was improper in
three ways: 1) it was based upon an assertion of fact not supported by evidence in the
record; 2) it was based on the false assertion that Mr. Hall's execution will necessarily be
painless; and 3) it distracts the jury from its obligation to conduct an individualized
sentencing by urging the choice of punishment based on irrelevant considerations. This
argument violated Mr. Hall's rights to a due process, his right to a fair trial and his right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishments as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments.
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J.

The Prosecutor Argued That A Life Sentence Would Be
Too Lenient And Urged The Jury To Speculate As To
What Might Happen To Mr. Hall If A Death Sentence
Were Withheld

The State argued that a life sentence would be too lenient, in part by, speculating
as to what might happen to Mr. Hall if a death sentence were withheld, and by
speculating as to what the Court might impose for Mr. Hall's other crimes. The State
argued:
You heard the instructions and you know what the potential sentences are
for these cases. You know that the defendant's given life without parole
that he can be in general population in five years. You know that in
general population he'll have access to a number of things television, gym,
contact visits, he'll have access to sunshine. Remember the last picture
that -- go down. But the last picture that Mickey showed you of Lynn
sitting in the sunshine? She won't sit in the sunshine again. You give the
defendant life without parole, he will.
(Tr., p.5460, Ls.9-20.) This statement encourages the jury to discount a life sentence as
minimal punishment and violates the principle in capital cases that jurors must be able to
give legitimate consideration to life sentences. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538
(1987); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302
(1989), Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); Simmons v. South Carolina, 111 S.Ct.

2187 (1994).
The prosecutor went so far to argue that that imposing a life sentence was the
equivalent of imposing no punishment at all:
Counsel says give life. Here's the deal. You know that Judge Neville can
give the defendant life on the rape, a life on the kidnapping. You know
he's got one and so he's going to go to prison for life. He's got two rapes
now that one prior conviction, he's going to go to prison for life. And so
when Counsel says give him life, what he's really saying is give him
nothing. Because the Ada County Prosecutor could stand up right now
and say to Judge Neville, "We move to dismiss the murder charge.
Dismiss it, we're done." And Judge Neville could give the defendant a life
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sentence for rape and a life sentence for kidnapping and the dismissal of
the murder charge would not add a minute's time because he only has one
life. And so when Counsel says "give the defendant life." And what he's
really saying is give him nothing because he's already been -- going to get
life so don't do anything else to him. Let's just let that go. Give him
nothing. I think you ought to know that because that's the point of this. Is
Lynn's life worth nothing? Is a loss worth nothing? Did we go through all
this for nothing? What about retribution to her family? What about the
protection of society? What about deterrence of others? What about the
punishment for the defendant that he knows he deserves, that he earned,
that he worked on, that he knew he had coming when he talked to the
detectives back in March of 2003. What about those goals of society?
Are we just going to give him nothing? We have talked about the
minimum sentence and maximum sentence, but it isn't life. Giving him
life is nothing. It's Brere Rabbit don't throw me in the brier patch because
I'm already there. That's the deal.
(Tr., p.5510, L.l - p.5511, L.12.)
This was again, pure speculation. While the sentences for rape and kidnapping
have a maximum of life imprisonment, they do not carry mandatory minimums. For the
prosecutor to tell the jurors that the Court would impose life sentences for the rape and
kidnapping was not only outrageous, it fundamentally altered the only decision properly
before the jury-the proper sentence for murder, and only after finding at least one
statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. It focused the jury's attention on matters
not within their concern. The prosecutor in effect told each juror that his or her only
moral choice was death, when the law requires each juror to make a "reasoned moral
response." See Penry, supra; Mills, supra; Simmons, supra. Mr. Hall asserts that the
prosecutor's misconduct warrants reversal of his death sentence.
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k.

The Prosecutor Argued That Mr. Hall Committed PostMortem Acts To The Victim's Body In Arguing That The
Jury Should Find The "Especially Heinous, Atrocious And
Cruel" Aggravating Factor

During closing argument, the State suggested that Erick Hall committed unspecified,
depraved acts to Ms. Henneman's body. The argument was unsupported by the evidence,
authorized the jury to consider post-mortem conduct in finding the "heinous, atrocious
and cruel" aggravator, and the prosecutor's use of a picture of the body of Ms. Henneman
was designed to inflame the passions of the jury and to distort the jury's consideration of
the evidence supporting the aggravator. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference Claim Q.l,

infra.
L.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Object To Prosecutorial Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase Closing
Arguments

Trial counsel should have objected to the misconduct in the State's closing
arguments both in the guilt and the sentencing phases. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference
the facts and legal arguments from his previous claims, specifically, Claim K. Trial
counsels' failure to object, and alternatively request a mistrial, admonishment, and
curative instruction constitutes deficient performance.

Mr. Hall asserts that but for

counsels' deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have
been convicted of murder of the first degree or sentenced to death.
Based on professional standards of performance in addition to trial counsels'
years of experience with the prosecutors in this case, counsel was intimately familiar with
the State's tactics in closing arguments, or at least should have been. Trial counsel
should have anticipated the prosecutors' arguments and moved to preclude them by way
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of a motion in limine. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 (footnotes
and quotations omitted). 70
"Because '[p ]reserving all [possible] grounds can be very difficult in the heat of
battle during trial,' counsel should file written motions in limine prior to trial raising any
issues that counsel anticipate will arise at trial." ABA Guidelines, Commentary to
Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted).

See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 ("Counsel should also object to
and be prepared to rebut arguments that improperly minimize the significance of
mitigatin~ evidence315 or equate the standards for mitigation with those for a first-phase
defense. 3 6".) Footnote 315, written before Tennard, supra, provides:
70

Prosecutors will frequently try to argue, for example, that "not everybody"
who is abused as a child grows up to commit capital murder or that mental
illness did not "cause" the defendant to commit the crime. See Haney,
supra note 93, at 589-602. Both of these arguments are objectionable on
Eighth Amendment grounds because they nullify the effect of virtually all
mitigation. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 277-80. In any event,
counsel can seek to counter such arguments by emphasizing the unique
combination of factors at play in the client's life and demonstrating that
there are causal connections between, for example, childhood abuse,
neurological damage, and violent behavior. See, e.g., Phyllis L. Crocker,
Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: Implications for the Death Penalty,
77 N.C. L. REv. 1143, 1157-66 (1999) (reviewing psychological and
medical "research on the correlation between childhood abuse and adult
violence").
Footnote 316 provides:
Arguments confusing the standards for a first phase defense and mitigation
also violate the Eighth Amendment. See generally Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (finding unconstitutional trial judge's failure
to consider defendant's violent upbringing as a mitigating factor at
sentencing); see generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Concepts of CUlpability and
Deathworthiness: Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death
Penalty Cases, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 21 (1997).
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M.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Request A Pretrial Evidentiary Hearing For The Presentation Of Facts
Alleged In Support Of The Noticed Aggravating Circumstances

Trial counsel should have requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing for the State's
evidence in support of the noticed aggravating circumstances. The purpose of the hearing
would have been three-fold: (1) to provide notice to the defense so that they could
adequately prepare for sentencing; (2) to ensure that the evidence was reliable; and (3) to
ensure that the facts offered in support of the aggravating circumstances existed by a
preponderance of the evidence; and (4) that the noticed aggravating circumstances were
based on independent evidence. Trial counsel should have relied on grounds for the
motion including the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. As a result of trial counsel's failure, they were inadequately prepared
to defend Mr. Hall's case at sentencing. In support of this claim, Mr. Hall incorporates
herein by reference Claims D, E, F, H, I, J, P, and Q.
N.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Fully Preserve Sentencing-Phase Motions On Federal Grounds

Trial counsel must be diligent in protecting a defendant's constitutional claims
from future attacks by the government that the claims were not properly preserved
appellate and federal habeas corpus proceedings. See ABA Guidelines, Guideline
1O.8.A.3.c. As stated in part in the Commentary,
One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending a capital case
at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage
of appellate and post-conviction review. Failure to preserve an issue may
result in the client being executed even though reversible error occurred at
trial. For this reason, trial counsel in a death penalty case must be
especially aware not only of strategies for winning at trial, but also of the
heightened need to fully preserve all potential issues for later review.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 (footnotes and quotations omitted).

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

157

01?OQ

1.

Trial Counsel Failed To Fully Insulate Their "Motion To Declare
Idaho's Capital Sentencing Scheme Unconstitutional" From Future
Attacks By The Government That The Claim Was Not Sufficiently
Preserved

Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to fully protect
their challenges to the constitutionality of the new death penalty statute claims from
procedural default attacks from the government. While trial counsel did cite numerous
United States Supreme cases, because of the near certainty that the government will
assert some sort of procedural bar on nearly every claim in state appellate and federal
habeas corpus proceedings, trial counsel should have cited specific constitutional
provisions violated if for no other reason than to preserve the claim against future legal
challenges.
For instance, trial counsel complained that there are no definitions or explanations
of weighing, sufficiently compelling, unjust, mitigating circumstances, and that the
statute fails to explain the weighing process or define aggravating circumstances. (R., pp.
204-205.) It is a fair reading of the motion that trial counsel challenged these statutory
provisions based on the case law set forth elsewhere in the motion. To absolutely ensure
subsequent consideration of the claims on their merits, trial counsel should have rested
their motion on the following constitutional grounds:

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 71

Mr. Hall does not concede that the claims in this particular motion are not properly
preserved for future review, but makes this claim on the basis that counsel had a duty to
fully insulate their claims against future procedural attack. In light of the wealth of case
law in which condemned inmates have lost valid claims under severe default rules, trial
counsel took a short-sighted and even flippant approach trial counsel took to their motion
practice, at times captioning motions, "Yet Another Motion To ... " and often not citing to
a single constitutional provision in support. (R., pp. 142-44.)
71
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2.

Trial Counsel Failed To Raise Any Constitutional Grounds In
Support Of Their Objection To Dennis Dean's Testimony
Regarding Risk Assessment

Dennis Dean testified for the State regarding Mr. Hall's possible custody status if
convicted on the murder charge and sentenced. Trial counsel objected to Mr. Dean's
testimony as to risk assessment, and argued that the defense was precluded from
questioning Mr. Deen without risk of "opening the door" to evidence of the Hanlon
murder, and that there would be a denial of confrontation. (Tr., p.4924, L.18 - p.4936,
L.7.)

At no time did counsel state the federal constitutional bases for the objection.

Counsel should have rested the objection on the Constitutional grounds: the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
O.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge The Introduction Of Victim Impact Evidence

The jury was instructed to consider and weigh all evidence presented at
sentencing. The jury was also instructed that "victims" have a right to personally address
them regarding the victim's personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the
defendant's crimes. (Tr., p.4955, L.16 -p.4956, L.3.) The jury was never told that victim
impact is not evidence, or if it is evidence, how it should be used in the weighing process.
The instructions gave the jury absolutely no guidance on how to utilize such statements in
assessing the gravity of aggravating circumstances, the existence or weight of mitigation,
and the weighing of aggravators against the mitigation. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496 (1987) (holding Eighth Amended prohibits introduction of victim impact evidence);

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (modifying Booth in holding that Eighth
Amendment does not erect a per se bar against victim impact evidence, but leaving
prohibition of characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
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appropriate sentence intact, and noting that introduction of victim impact evidence could
violate due process under some circumstances).
It is reasonably likely that the jury, considered victim impact as non-statutory

aggravating circumstances. As such, without a proper limiting construction, the victim
impact is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment and violated
Mr. Hall's rights to due process and notice as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231,244 (1988) ("a capital
sentencing scheme must 'genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. ''')
It is also reasonably likely that the jury used the victim impact when weighing the

aggravators against the mitigation, even though victim impact is irrelevant to any of the
statutory aggravating circumstances. It is also reasonably likely that the jury used the
victim impact in a way that precluded or otherwise undermined their ability to give
meaningful consideration to Mr. Hall's mitigating evidence. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. at 604; State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 98, 774 P.2d 252, 268 (1989) ("The broadest of
views must be entertained in considering all potentially mitigating factors."). Finally, the
introduction of unsworn victim impact statements not subjected to cross-examination
violated Mr. Hall's right to confront witnesses against him. Thus, the introduction of
victim impact violated Mr. Hall's rights under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the Idaho
Constitution.
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P.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Challenge The Introduction Of Any Nonstatutory Aggravating
Circumstances.

Evidence of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances was introduced against Mr.
Hall including his convictions for Escape and Grand Theft, as well as evidence that he
committed a forcible rape against Nonna Jean Oliver, and other alleged bad conduct with
fonner girlfriends and acquaintances. With the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel
should have challenged the admissibility of non-statutory aggravating circumstances on
the following grounds:
•

That such evidence was not pled by way of Indictment or Infonnation in
violation of Mr. Hall's state statutory and constitutional rights;

•

That Mr. Hall was not given adequate notice as entitled by the state and
federal due process clauses;

•

That I.C. 19-2515, in its latest post-Ring incarnation, does not provide for
consideration of nonstatutory aggravating circumstances; and

•

That due to the lack of guidance available by Idaho law in the context of jury
sentencing, jury consideration of non-statutory aggravators violates the Eighth
Amendment.

If deemed admissible, then trial counsel should have made litigated the following:
•

That state and federal due process requires that the jury should be instructed
that the prosecution bore the burden of proving the existence of nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; and

•

That the jury should be instructed that they cannot consider nonstatutory
aggravating circumstances when making their determination of whether a
statutory aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt or when
weighing the statutory aggravators against the mitigation.

In conclusion, trial counsel should have objected to nonstatutory aggravating
circumstances based on Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland.
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Q.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To
Raise Challenges To The Statutory Aggravating Circumstances

Aggravating circumstances must "genuinely narrow the class of death-eligible
persons" in a way that reasonably ''justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S.
462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). Both on their face, and as applied, aggravating circumstances
must permit the sentencer to make a "principled distinction between those who deserve
the death penalty and those who do not." Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774 (1990);
Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988) ("[t]he construction or application of an

aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally broad or vague if it does not channel or
limit the sentencer's discretion in imposing the death penalty"). Even if an aggravating
circumstance is vague on its face, it can nevertheless support a death sentence if the state
courts have narrowed its scope to a constitutionally sufficient degree and if such a
narrowing construction actually guided the sentencer in the case under review. Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
Mr. Hall asserts, for at least a few of the claims below, that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to raise challenges that the Idaho Supreme Court, and even in one
case, the United States Supreme Court, have previously rejected. See ABA Guidelines,
Commentary to Guideline, 10.8 ("As described in the commentary to Guideline 1.1,
counsel also has a duty, pursuant to Subsection (A)(3)(a)-(c) of this Guideline, to
preserve issues calling for a change in existing precedent; the client's life may well
depend on how zealously counsel discharges this duty.") Indeed, the importance of
challenging existing precedent has been demonstrated over the past few years, where the
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Supreme Court has agreed to revisit issues and overrule precedent in capital cases.72
Especially in light of the advent of jury sentencing, trial counsel should have considered
raising all claims for reconsideration by the Idaho Supreme Court and federal courts. 73
The failure to raise a claim on the ground that it has been rejected may cost a capital
defendant his life. 74
1.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Especially Heinous,
Atrocious Or Cruel" Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And
Overbroad

The jury entered a special verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity."

See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that it is unconstitutional to
execute juveniles, overruling Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989»; Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (holding that it is unconstitutional to execute the mentally
retarded, overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989»; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002) (holding that a jury must find aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable
doubt, overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990».
72

Indeed, prior to Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court had relied on the "important
distinction" between judge and jury sentencing in upholding constitutional challenges to
various aspects of Idaho's death penalty scheme. See e.g., State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho
73, 81, 90 P.3d 298, 306 (2004) ("Although we have presumed that sentencing judges
were able to sort out truly relevant, admissible evidence presented in the form of victim
impact statements, to allow the introduction of victim testimony espousing the death
penalty for consideration by a jury is reversible error."); State v. Lanliford, 116 Idaho
860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing that Idaho's "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance may be unconstitutional if relied upon in a
jury sentencing).
73

For example, in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Supreme Court declined to
address the merits of a petitioner's claim that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated
by the testimony of a psychiatrist who had examined him without warning him that the
interview could be used against him. Appellate counsel failed to assert this claim because
the Virginia Supreme Court had rejected such claims. The Supreme Court subsequently
found such testimony unconstitutional in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). The
Court concluded that the claim was not deemed sufficiently novel to constitute cause for
the procedural default. Id., at 536-37. Mr. Smith was barred from raising the issue in
federal habeas proceedings, id., at 539, and later executed.
74
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(R. p.609.) This statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(e), is
unconstitutional on its face and as applied. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).

In Maynard, the Supreme Court held that a similar aggravating circumstance
under the Oklahoma death penalty statute was unconstitutionally vague pursuant to the
Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 363-365.

In State v.

Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 781 P.2d 197 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the
aggravator, distinguishing Maynard based on the Oklahoma statute at issue, stating,
There is, however, an important distinction between the Oklahoma and
Idaho aggravating circumstance statutes. The distinction is that Oklahoma
has jury sentencing while Idaho adheres to judicial sentencing in capital
murder cases. These aggravating circumstances are terms of art that are
commonly understood among the members of the jUdiciary. As a result,
the potential for inconsistent application that exists as a result of jury
sentencing is eliminated where the judge sentences.
Id. at 877, 781 P.2d at 214. Of course, this distinction no longer applies. Accordingly,

the question is whether an adequate limiting construction was given.
The Court's jury instruction no. 44, limiting the construction of the aggravator,
read as follows:
The terms especially "heinous," "atrocious," or "cruel," are
considered separately; but in combination with "manifesting exceptional
depravity." The terms heinous, atrocious or cruel are intended to refer to
those first-degree murders where the actual commission of the first-degree
murder was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart
from the norm of first-degree murders.
A murder is especially heinous if it is extremely wicked or
shockingly evil.
"Atrocious" means outrageously wicked and vile.
"Cruel" means designed to inflict a high degree of pain with utter
indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others.
The statutory aggravating factor does not exist unless the murder
was especially heinous, especially atrocious, or especially cruel, and such
heinousness, atrociousness or cruelty manifested exceptional depravity. It
might be thought that every murder involves depravity. However,
exceptional depravity exists only where depravity is apparent to such an
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extent as to obviously offend all standards of morality and intelligence.
The terms "especially heinous manifesting exceptional depravity,"
"especially atrocious manifesting exceptional depravity," or "especially
cruel manifesting exceptional depravity" focus upon a defendant's state of
mind at the time ofthe offense, as reflected by his words and acts.
(R. p.693 Jury Instruction No.5, filed 10/22/04); see also Tr., p.4726, L.12 - p.4727,
L.20.)
The limiting instruction given to the jury was inadequate. While the instruction
adds words, those words do not add meaning of constitutional significance. In short, the
limiting construction does not genuinely narrow the class of murderers eligible for the
death penalty and does not adequately guide the jury's discretion. But see Leavitt v.
Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 835-837 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that Idaho's aggravator has been
adequately defined by limiting instructions, while not condoning the actual choice of
words). In particular, and a point not addressed in Leavitt, the limiting instruction was
inadequate because it did not necessarily preclude the jury's consideration of
circumstances occurring after the victim's death when determining whether the
aggravator existed. Cf State v. Kingsley, 252 Kan. 761, 851 P.2d 370, 390 (1993)
(holding that in regard to the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" factor: "[t]he murder is
complete with the death of the victim. Subsequent abuse of the body would not constitute
the manner in which the murder was committed"); see also Robedeaux v. State, 866 P.2d
417,435 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993).
The error in the instruction was important, because of uncertainty about the order
and timing of the victim's wounds. See Claim C, supra. Reasonable jurors might have
concluded that some of these other injuries were incurred post mortem, or that the
evidence failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt when they were incurred. On such a
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record, an instruction which authorized consideration of post mortem injuries or other
treatment of the body was prejudicially erroneous.
Indeed, the State encouraged such an interpretation of the aggravator, stating:
Exceptional depravity. What do you think was going on the ri verbank for
a minimum of six hours while Lynn was tied up and dead and laying on a
flat surface so that her lividity could take? What was going on at that
time? The defendant had to be there with her, or he had to come back to
her because she had to get from that flat surface into the water. She didn1t
do that by herself The water didn't come up and go down and float her
away. That's exceptional depravity.
(Tr., p.5505, Ls.11 -20.) Here, the State is suggesting that Erick Hall committed some
unspecified depraved acts to Ms. Henneman's body.

Not only was this argument

unsupported by the evidence, it also authorized the jury to consider post-mortem conduct
in finding this aggravator. Indeed, the State relied on a highly prejudicial photograph
during their PowerPoint presentation which identified the body in its post-mortem state
after two weeks in tbe water.

(Exhibit 45.) This photograph is not an accurate reflection of the condition of the body
due to the murder, but rather reflects the deteriorating effects of being in the water for
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approximately two weeks. The prosecutor used this photograph to inflame the passions
of the jury and to distort the jury's consideration of the evidence supporting the
aggravator. See

Claim K.3.k and Claim L, supra.

Accordingly, Mr. Hall's death

sentence should be vacated.
2.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Utter Disregard For
Human Life" Aggravating Circumstances As Vague And
Overbroad

The jury entered a special verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that "by the
murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter
disregard for human life." (R. p.609.) This statutory aggravating circumstance, set forth
in I.C. § 19-2515(9)(f), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied.
The Court's jury instruction no. 45, limiting the construction of the aggravator,
read as follows:
"Exhibited utter disregard for human life," with regard to the murder or
the circumstances surrounding its commission, refers to acts or
circumstances surrounding the crime that exhibit the highest, the utmost,
callous disregard for human life, i.e., the cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.
"Cold-blooded" means marked by absence of warm feeling: without
consideration, compunction, or clemency, matter of fact, or emotionless.
"Pitiless" means devoid of or unmoved by mercy or compassion. A "coldblooded, pitiless slayer" refers to a slayer who kills without feeling or
sympathy. The utter disregard factor refers to the defendant's lack of
conscience regarding killing another human being.
(R. p.693 (Jury Instruction no. 5); see also Tr., p.4727, L.21 - p.4728, L.19.)
The Supreme Court has held that Idaho's limiting instruction is sufficient under
the Eighth Amendment. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 468 (1993).

The limiting

instruction was satisfactory because it defined a "state of mind that is ascertainable from
surrounding facts." Id. at 1541-1542. Because some murderers do exhibit feeling, the
Court also determined that the aggravator genuinely narrowed the class of persons
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eligible for the death penalty. Id. Nevertheless, trial counsel should have objected to this
instruction as inadequate to save the aggravating circumstance, thus at a minimum,
absolutely ensuring preservation ofthe issue, for a higher court.
The limiting instruction was also inadequate because it did not necessarily
preclude the jury's consideration of circumstances occurring after the victim's death
when determining whether the aggravator existed, by failing to define the language
"circumstances surrounding [the murder's] commission," to circumstances during the
commission of the murder. This point was not addressed by the Supreme Court in
Creech. But see State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 103-04, 967 P.2d 702, 717-18 (1998)

(permitting consideration of post-mortem conduct in consideration of the "utter
disregard" aggravator). The error in the instruction was important, because of the lack of
evidence regarding Mr. Hall's state of mind, the manner of Ms. Henneman's death, and
the order and timing of the victim's wounds.
3.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The "Propensity To Commit
Murder Which Will Probably Constitute A Continuing Threat To
Society'~ Aggravating Circumstances As Impermissibly Lessening
The State's Burden And As Vague And Overbroad

The jury entered a special verdict fmding beyond a reasonable doubt that "the
defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing
threat to society." (R. p.610 (emphasis added).)

Trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance of counsel in failing to challenge the "propensity" aggravating circumstances
on the grounds other grounds that asking a jury to find that a defendant "probably"
constitutes a continuing threat to society unconstitutionally lowers the State's burden of
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proving all aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. See Ring v. Arizona,
536 U.S. 584, 586-587 (2002); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
The Court's jury instruction no. 46, limiting the construction of the aggravator,
read as follows:
The phrase "exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will
probably constitute a continuing threat to society" means conduct showing
that the defendant is more likely than not to be a continuing threat to
society. Such finding cannot be based solely upon the fact that you found
the defendant guilty of murder. In order for a person to have a propensity
to commit murder, the person must be a willing, predisposed killer, a killer
who tends toward destroying the life of another, one who kills with less
than the normal amount of provocation. Propensity requires a proclivity, a
susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act of murder.
(R. p.693 (Jury Instruction no. 5); see also Tr., p.4728, L.20 - p.4729, L.8.) The jury

instruction does not save the aggravator because it simply defines "probably" as "more
likely than not," a preponderance of the evidence standard which unconstitutionally
diminishes the State's burden of proof. But see State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 04-905, 674
P.2d 396, 400-401 (1983) (rejecting the claim that the "probably" language diminished
the State's burden of proof).
Trial counsel also rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to
challenge the aggravating circumstance as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its
face and as applied, or otherwise inadequately defined by jury instructions.

The

instructions given by the Court were inadequate for three reasons.
First, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of prior conduct to prior
murders, or at minimum, to prior conduct showing a propensity to commit murder. This
is important because the jury was presented with evidence of prior bad acts that did not
involve murder, or even violent acts. See supra, Claims I and J.
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Second, the limiting instruction does not limit consideration of the defendant's
"continuing threat to society" to an incarcerated environment.

In other v/Ords, the

relevant "society" is left undefined by the statute or the instruction.

75

This is important

because the prosecution urged the jury to find this aggravator based solely on a: finding of
propensity, vvithout regard to any actual likelihood that he would commit another murder
while incarcerated in prison. (Tr., p.5459, Ls.18-21) ("If you"re tempted to give him
prison over this, remember prison only affect (sic) his ability to murder? He still has that
propensity to murder. He's still a threat.") (sic added).) This point was reinforced by the
prosecutor's PowerPoint presentation.

(Exhibit 45.)
Finally, the instruction does not distinguish this agi:,'Tavator from the "'especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravator (hereinafter "HAC"). The jury could determine
that both aggravating circumstances exist on the single determination that the defendant

Accordingly, trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to
the prison context. See Claim QA.
75
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enjoys to kill. Specifically, "cruel" as used in the "HAC" aggravator means murder ''with
utter indifference to, or even enjoyment of, the suffering of others." (emphasis added).)
This definition is sufficiently similar to "propensity," which is described a person with
"an affinity toward committing the act of murder," to render the "propensity" aggravator
unconstitutionally duplicative.
4.

Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Definition Of "Society"
Limiting It To The Prison Context

Trial counsel should have requested a definition of "society" limiting it to the
prison context. Mr. Hall incorporates by reference herein section Q.3, supra.
R.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Raise Legal Challenges To Idaho's Death Penalty Scheme

To render effective assistance of counsel, capital counsel must consider all legal
claims potentially available to protect the client's constitutional rights and stay abreast of
the latest developments in the law that might provide additional claims for the client.
ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 1O.8.A.l; 1O.8.C.1.
1.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Constitutionality Of
The Death Penalty Statute For Its Failure To Assign A
Burden Of Proof To The Jury's Weighing Findings

A defendant cannot be sentenced to death, even if aggravators are found, unless it
is also found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See e.g., State
v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989) ("We hold that the trial
court may sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court fmds that all the

I

mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating
circumstances found and make imposition of death unjust.") Unless this additional
finding is made, the maximum punishment is life without the possibility of parole.
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Accordingly, based on the rule of law set forth in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
this finding represents a finding that must be presented to a jury and found to exist
beyond a reasonable doubt. As the Supreme Court enunciated the rule of law:
[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice
and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 600 (citations omitted). Accordingly, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

of counsel in failing to challenge the Idaho death penalty scheme for removing from the
State the burden of proving this fact beyond a reasonable doubt.
In addition, by failing to assign the burden upon the State, the new death penalty
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of proof upon the defendant to disprove an
element, or functional equivalent of an element, or even just an essential fact. This
violates the defendant's rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975)
(addressing due process); but see State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 417, 631 P.2d 187, 199
(1981) (holding pre-Ring, that the scheme does not violate due process because the
weighing process is not part of an element of the offense).
2.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Constitutionality Of
The Death Penalty Statute For Its Failure To Define
"Sufficiently Compelling" In A Manner Requiring That
The Individual Aggravating Circumstances Outweigh The
Mitigation

Under well-established Idaho law, the rule is that a defendant cannot be sentenced
to death unless it found that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigation. See
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e.g., State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299,323 (1989) (holding that a

defendant can be sentenced to death, only if it is found "that all the mitigating
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances
found and make imposition of death unjust.") Accordingly, if the mitigation outweighs
the gravity of each of the aggravators, by any degree, then the defendant cannot be
sentenced to death. Under Idaho law, even where the mitigation is only of equal weight to
the gravity ofthe aggravation, the maximum punishment is fixed life.
Trial counsel should have challenged the new Idaho death penalty statute because
it does not provide that the individual aggravators must outweigh the mitigation. The
death penalty statute provides in relevant part that the jury shall return a special verdict
stating:
If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed
against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the
death penalty would be unjust.

I.e. § 19-2515 (8)(a)(ii). The statute does not define "sufficiently compelling" as
requiring the aggravation to "outweigh" the mitigation. The instructions likewise provide
no definition for "sufficiently compelling" and do not require that the jury find that
individual aggravators each "outweigh" the mitigation.
There is simply no way of knowing whether the jury imposed a death sentence
even if they believed the mitigation was of equal weight to the aggravation. Indeed, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury believed that the mitigation outweighed the
aggravation, but not in such a manner or degree as to make imposition of the death
penalty unjust. It may very well be that the jury believed that the mitigation must
substantially outweigh the aggravation for the imposition of the death penalty to be unjust
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under the facts of this case. The State advocated this unconstitutional interpretation of
the statute. In closing argument, the State argued:
And I believe that when we go back over these things you will agree that
these aggravating factors have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and
that the mitigation does not outweigh the aggravation in a manner that
would make the death penalty unjust ...
(Tr., p.5447, Ls.6-11.) It is worth repeating: the prosecutor tells the jury that the law
requires imposition ofthe death sentence so long as ''the mitigation does not outweigh the
aggravation in a manner that would make the death penalty unjust." What could that
mean other than that the jury could find that the mitigation outweighs the aggravation,
but perhaps not "in a manner" that would make the death penalty unjust? The prosecutor
played off the lack of guidance provided by the statute or the instructions, and, in the
course of doing so, violated Mr. Hall's rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Trial counsel, seemingly ignorant of the prosecutor's slight of
hand, failed to object, and moreover, failed to challenge the death penalty weighing
scheme as unconstitutional and in failed to request a jury instruction for the proper
weighing required as set forth in Charboneau and its progeny.
3.

Trial Counsel Failed To Challenge The Court's Instruction
That The Jurors Have A Duty To Consult With One
Another Regarding Their Findings

A capital defendant has a due process and Eighth Amendment right to the
individual opinion of each juror who exercises his or her own reasoned moral judgment,
regardless of the competing views or beliefs of the other jurors. See e.g., Simmons v.
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 172 (1994) (Souter, J. and Steven, J., concurring); Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 382 (1988).
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These rights were violated by the Court's Instruction No. 51 infonning the jurors
that they had a duty to consult with one another before making their own individual
decisions, and to deliberate with the goal of reaching an agreement as a group. (Tr.,
p.5439, L.1O - p.5440, L.5.) Further, the instruction suggested that even the juror's
individual beliefs about the existence of a mitigating fact, i.e., whether certain evidence
presented was actually mitigating, and the weight afforded to any mitigation found,
should be subjected to the views of the other jurors. Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsels'
failure to challenge this instruction satisfies both prongs of Strickland.
4.

Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Special Jury Instruction
Requiring The Jury To Provide Written Mitigation
Findings And Failed To Challenge The New Death Penalty
Statute On Grounds That It Forces A Defendant To Choose
Between Constitutional Rights

Prior to the new death penalty statute, a judge was required to make written
findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found and set forth in
writing any mitigating factors considered.

I.e.

§ 19-2515(f) (Michie 2000). The failure

to make such written findings constituted reversible error. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405,415-16,631 P.2d 187, 197-98 (1981).
A written findings requirement serves two purposes: (1) it helps to ensure that the
imposition of the sentence of death is reasoned and objective as constitutionally required,
and (2) it protects a capital defendant's right to meaningful appellate review.

See

Osborn, at 414-15; 631 P.2d at 196-97. Without the findings, the reviewing court cannot
detennine whether the fact-finder overlooked or ignored any mitigation that was
presented, whether the evidence supports the aggravating factors found, and whether the
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fact-finder properly weighed all factors. Id. at 415, 631 P.2d at 197; State v. Pratt, 125
Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993).
Pursuant to the current version of the statute, if a defendant waives the right to a
jury at his sentencing proceeding, the district court is still required to make written
findings of the aggravation, mitigation considered, and the weighing process. I.C. § 192515(8)(b). In contrast, when a defendant chooses not to waive his Sixth Amendment
right to a jury, he must forgo the written findings requirement; a jury is only required to
indicate on special verdict forms whether a statutory aggravating circumstance has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and ''whether all mitigating circumstances, when
weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death
penalty would be unjust." I.C. § 19-2515(8)(a).
Because the jury is not required to specify the mitigating circumstances it found, a
defendant who chooses to have a jury make the findings of fact at his sentencing
proceeding relinquishes his constitutional right to have his sentence meaningfully
reviewed by the district court and by the Idaho Supreme Court on direct appeal and as a
part of its mandatory sentencing review under I.C. § 19-2827.

Without a complete

record, the district court and the Idaho Supreme Court are precluded from conducting a
meaningful review which includes a determination whether imposition of the death
sentence was reasoned and objective or the result of arbitrariness and passion. See e.g.,
Osborn, at 415,631 P.2d at 197 ("If the findings of the lower court are not set forth with

reasonable exactitude, this court would be forced to make its review on an inadequate
record, and could not fulfill the function of 'meaningful appellate review' demanded by
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court."); see also State v. Lankford, 116
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Idaho 860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing the increased potential of
arbitrary and inconsistent imposition ofthe death penalty by juries).
Trial counsel should have requested a special verdict form requiring the jury to
delineate the mitigating circumstances it found and the weighing of such mitigation
against the individual aggravating circumstances when rendering its sentencing decision.
Mr. Hall has been deprived of his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to

have this Court and an appellate court make a meaningful determination of whether his
sentence was the product a reasoned and objective, as opposed to an arbitrary and
unguided, analysis.
Trial counsel should have requested special written findings from the jury, as
required of judges, on all the federal constitutional grounds stated above. In addition,
counsel should have asserted that the new death penalty statute is unconstitutional
because it forces a defendant to choose between his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
and his Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Because of trial counsel's
ineffectiveness, Mr. Hall has lost the necessary predicate for his right to a meaningful
review. Mr. Hall's sentence should thus be vacated and he should be afforded a new
sentencing proceeding where the sentencer is required to provide adequate written
findings.
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5.

Trial Counsel Failed To Request A Special Jury Instruction
Requiring Written Jury Findings Delineating The Evidence
Considered In Finding The Aggravating Circumstances
And Failed To Request An Instruction To The Jury That
The Same Evidence Can Be Used To Find Multiple
Only
If Additional
Aggravating
Circumstances
Aggravating Evidence Is Found To Support The Other
Aggravator Beyond A Reasonable Doubt

In detennining whether a certain aggravating circumstance exists, the jury may
consider the same evidence they considered in relation to a different aggravator so long
as the jury finds additional aggravating evidence to support a finding of that particular
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197,210, 731 P.2d 192,
205 (1986). Trial counsel should have requested written findings and an instruction to
prohibit improper duplication of evidence in support of multiple aggravating
circumstances. Without written findings, the record is insufficient to detennine whether
the jury properly considered additional aggravating evidence to support its finding of
each of the aggravating circumstances. The lack of findings violated Mr. Hall's rights
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Mr. Hall asserts that he has
satisfied both prongs of Strickland showing that trial counsels' failures denied him
effective assistance of counsel.
6.

Trial Counsel Failed To Object To The Court's Instruction
Regarding The Governor's Power To Commute Or Pardon

At the request of the State, and without objection by trial counsel, the Court gave
a jury instruction, not previously approved by Idaho appellate courts or contained in the
proposed Idaho Supreme Court death penalty instructions. (Tr., p.5420, Ls.I-4.) The
instruction stated,
The governor of the State of Idaho has the authority to grant a
commutation or pardon for any crime except treason, based upon a

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

178
n..fo,-,n

recommendation from the Idaho Department of Pardons and Parole. Such
a commutation or pardon could apply to either a life or death sentence.
(Tr., p.5438, L.25 - p.5439, L.5.) This instruction was constitutionally infirm for several
reasons including, but not limited to the following. First, the instruction has not been
approved by the Idaho Legislature or the Idaho Supreme Court. Second, the instruction is
not an accurate and complete statement of Idaho law. Third, the instruction failed to
instruct the jury not to speculate on what parole authorities will do in the future. Fourth,
the instruction diminishes the jury's sense of responsibility for the gravity of their
decision in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. But see California v.

Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1001-1005, 1014 (1983). Fifth, the instruction diverts the jury
from its individualized sentencing determination mandated by the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. But see Ramos, supra. Finally, Mr. Hall asserts that his federal right to due
process was violated because there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury utilized the
instruction in an unconstitutional manner.
While the Supreme Court decision in Ramos would seemingly approve this
instruction, the rationale of Ramos is called into question by Ring. Specifically, when
rejecting Ramos' Bece6 argument that the instruction diverts the sentencer's attention
from a "central focus," the Court distinguished Beck on the grounds that Beck involved
the guilt/innocence phase where the prosecution bore the burden of proving elements of
capital murder whereas Ramos' case involved an instruction at the penalty phase
involving no similar "central issue." Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1007-09. Mr. Hall asserts that

Ramos no longer controls since capital sentencing now involves a jury's determination of

76

Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
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elements, or at least the functional equivalent of elements, during the penalty phase.
Accordingly, the instruction is unconstitutional.
In addition to these specific grounds, Mr. Hall's counsel should have asserted that
the instruction violated Mr. Hall's federal constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the concomitant rights under the Idaho
Constitution providing greater, but not less, protection than the federal constitution. Each
of these constitutional violations was due to trial counsels' failure to object to the
instruction. Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland. Mr. Hall
requires additional time to research the factual and legal foundation for this claim.
7.

Trial Counsel Failed To Raise International Law Violations

Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to raise international law violations on
behalf of Mr. Hall, which prejudiced Mr. Hall under Strickland. The convictions and
sentences entered against Mr. Hall were obtained in violation of international law. Mr.
Hall's death sentence was obtained in violation of The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which prohibits death sentences where (a) the accused will
endure a prolonged incarceration on death row which violates Article 7, (b) the accused
does not have access to a meaningful clemency process, which violates Article 6, (c) the
accused is arbitrarily deprived of his life, which violates Article 6, and (d) the accused is
denied his rights to due process, which violates Article 14. Mr. Hall's death sentence was
also obtained in violation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,
Article XXVI (guaranteeing an "impartial" hearing to the accused), and the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
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(providing protection for the less culpable co-defendant who refuses to cooperate as
Damocles' Sword of the death penalty is held over his head).
The ICCPR, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment were signed and ratified by the United States. Idaho may not impose or
execute Mr. Hall's death sentence without violating the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, which states:
All Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. Const., Article VI, § 2.
Moreover, Mr. Hall's death sentence does and will violate (a) the American
Convention of Human Rights, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relation, which have not yet been signed by the United
States, but which inform Customary International Law. The United States is obligated to
pay heed to Customary International Law. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 670
(1900) ("[I]nternationallaw is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determinations.")

Mr. Hall's death

sentence further violates the principle ofjus cogens. Ajus cogens norm is an elementary
right of humanity, so basic as to be recognized by the international community as a norm
from which no derogation is permitted. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
Article 53; Restatement 3d of Foreign Relations Law, § 102. The execution of the
neurologically damaged, mentally ill and/or mentally retarded violates this principle.
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8.

Trial Counsel Failed To Raise The Ex-Post Facto
Application Of The Death Penalty Statute

Trial counsel should have raised the claim that the new death penalty statute that
required jury sentencing was an ex-post facto application of the statute to Mr. Hall's case.
Both the United States and Idaho Constitutions preclude the State from passing or
applying ex-post facto laws. See U.S. Const., art. I, § 10; Idaho Const., art. I, § 16.
Ms. Henneman was killed on or about September 24,2000. At that time, Idaho's
death penalty statute was unconstitutional. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
The new statute, requiring jury sentencing, did not take effect until February 13, 2003.

See § 19-2515 (historical and statutory notes).

The application of the new statute

therefore violated the ex-post facto provisions of the United States and Idaho
Constitutions. But see Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977); State v. Lovelace, 140
Idaho 73, 90 P.3d 298 (Idaho 2004).
S.

The State Violated Brady: Norma Jean Oliver77
1.

Introduction

The State is very familiar with Norma Jean Oliver. As a juvenile, Norma Jean
was arrested on numerous occasions for being a runaway. Although Payette County
prosecuted these cases, several of her arrests occurred in Ada County between 1990 and
1991. Between December 1991 and April 1992, she was the victim and main witness in
the Ada County prosecution of Erick Hall for two counts of rape. She was interviewed
by former Garden City Police Detective Daniel Hess and by Deputy Ada County

77Because the Court has denied Mr. Hall's motion to depose the prosecutors and Jay
Rosenthal and denied his motion to disclose the prosecutor's files, the Court has limited
Mr. Hall's ability to state this claim.

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

182

01?~L1

Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal. Both Detective Hess and Mr. Rosenthallearned a significant
amount about Nonna Jean's problems at home as well as her mental health problems.
Both were aware that Nonna Jean had previously been treated, and was currently being
treated for mental health issues at Intennountain Hospital in Boise. Nonna Jean testified
before an Ada County Grand Jury in the Hall case. Ultimately, Mr. Rosenthal negotiated
a favorably plea agreement in the Hall case based on her treatment providers' opinions
that she was too "fragile" to withstand cross-examination. The State was aware of the
fact that after the rape allegations, Nonna Jean was referred for in-patient, long-tenn
treatment at Intennountain Hospital.
Sometime in 2003 or 2004, the State identified Nonna Jean as a critical
prosecution witness for Erick Hall's capital sentencing. The State located her in West
Virginia and flew her to Boise. Nonna Jean consulted with the State's victim advocate
and was prepared for her testimony by either the prosecutors, their agents, or both. The
State was aware of Nonna Jean's mental problems, her problems at home, and her
problems with the law. The State, however, failed to disclose this favorable evidence to
trial counsel.
2.

Applicable Legal Standards

The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause guarantees a criminal defendant
the right to the production of exculpatory evidence. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963). Pursuant to Brady, prosecutors must turn over exculpatory evidence when the
prosecutors have knowledge of and access to such evidence. United States v. Santiago, 46
F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir.1995). Brady held "that the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
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material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution." Id. at 87.
The prosecutor is responsible for "any favorable evidence known to the others
acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514

u.s. 419, 437 (1995).

Idaho has recognized that the duty of disclosure extends not only

to all the government agents investigating and prosecuting the offense, but also "any
others who have participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case who either
regularly report, or with reference to the particular case have reported, to the office of the
prosecuting attorney." State v. Gardner, 126 Idaho 428, 433 885 P.2d 1144, 1149 (Ct.
App. 1994) (quoting I.C.R. 16 (a»; see also State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138, 149, n. 6, 832
P.2d 311, 322, n. 6 (Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a prosecutor's duty under the Due
Process Clause is coextensive with that under I.C.R. 16) (citation omitted).78
Favorable evidence includes evidence tending to eXCUlpate the accused as well as
any evidence adversely affecting the credibility of the government's witnesses. United

States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
Evidence is material "if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Kyles,
514 U.S. at 433. The "material" standard for establishing prejudice is the same as the
prejudice standard under Strickland. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,682 (1985).
3.

Analysis

Mr. Hall alleges that the state violated its obligations under Brady to disclose
favorable evidence. This claim parallels the Strickland claim above and is divided into

See also I.C. 19-2515 (6) ("Disclosure of evidence to be relied on in the sentencing
proceeding shall be made in accordance with Idaho criminal rule 16.")
78
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five subclaims: subclaim a addresses the State's failure to disclose the nature and extent
of Nonna Jean's mental health problems; subclaim b addresses the State's failure to
disclose inconsistencies in Nonna Jean's story, her motive to lie, and her motive to
retaliate against Mr. Hall; subclaim c addresses State's failure to disclose favorable
evidence of Nonna Jean's problems at home; subclaim d addresses State's failure to
disclose favorable evidence ofNonna Jean's prior misconduct; and subclaim e addresses
State's failure to disclose favorable evidence of inaccuracies in Detective Hess's report.
Each of these subclaims independently, and in conjunction with each other, establishes
both prongs of the Brady standard.
Unless otherwise noted herein, this claim, and its individual subclaims, parallel
Mr. Hall's Strickland claims. See supra, Claim D.79 To the extent that the Court finds

that trial counsel did not perfonn deficiently in failing to uncover favorable evidence, this
claim addresses the State's failure to disclose such favorable evidence. Because the
favorable nature of the evidence and the prejudice associated with trial counsel's failure
to obtain such evidence was established in the Strickland claim and the subclaims, those
factual and legal elements are incorporated herein by reference. Therefore, for purposes
of this claim, unless otherwise noted, Mr. Hall focuses on the State's possession or
knowledge of such evidence.

To the extent that the Court finds that trial counsel did not perfonn deficiently in
failing to uncover the favorable evidence, this claim (and its subclaims) addresses the
State's failure to disclose such favorable evidence known to the prosecution or within its
possession.
79
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a.

The State Failed To Disclose The Nature And Extent Of
Norma Jean Oliver's Mental Health Problems

This claim is similar to the Strickland claim above, in which Mr. Hall
demonstrated that Norma Jean Oliver suffers from various mental disorders, including
Borderline Personality Disorder and Bipolar Disorder, which could have been used to
undermine her credibility or call into question her competency to testify.80 See supra,
Claim D.3.a. The State had possession of documents, or otherwise had knowledge of
information, indicating the nature and extent of Norma Jean's compromised mental
health, or which at least would have caused trial counsel to further investigate and
uncover the nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental health problems.

i.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy Of
The Transcript Of The Grand Jury Proceedings In
The Case Of State v. Erick Hall. Ada County. Case
No. 18591. Held December 19.1991

The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991.
In fact, a copy was located in the State's file from the underlying capital case. The State

disclosed a copy of the transcript after requested by Mr. Hall during these post-conviction
proceedings. 81 The fact that the State possessed or had knowledge a copy of the
grand jury transcript should be specifically admitted or denied in the State's answer
to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b) ("A party shall state in short and plain terms the defenses to

80 Norma Jean disclosed during these post-conviction proceedings that she suffers from
these disorders. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p.5.»
81 This Court granted Mr. Hall's motion for a copy of the grand jury transcript in its
discovery order filed February 16, 2007.
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each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments upon which the adverse party
relies.")
The favorable evidence contained in this transcript was discussed in Mr. Hall's

Strickland claim. See supra, Claim D.3.a.{i).(b).. In short, the State possessed or had
knowledge evidence via the grand jury transcript that Norma Jean suffered from a
"chemical imbalance," had spoken at length to former Ada County Deputy Prosecutor
Jay Rosenthal about her history, and that Intermountain Hospital, a psychiatric hospital,
had expressed concerns about sending her home because of her history. (Exhibit 53.)

ii.

The State Had Knowledge O(Norma Jean's Mental
Health Problems Through Jay Rosenthal, A Former
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor And State's Witness
In Mr. Hall's Capital Case

The State had knowledge of Norma Jean's mental health problems through former
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor Jay Rosenthal who prosecuted the 1991 rape case.

Mr. Rosenthal testified that he was informed by Norma Jean's mental health treatment
providers at Intermountain Hospital that Norma Jean was suffering from mental health
problems and that she was too fragile to testify. (Tr., p.4953, L.12 - p.4954, L.9.) At a
minimum, the State had imputed knowledge of this exculpatory information through
Rosenthal due to his status as a former deputy prosecutor and as a current Idaho Deputy
Attorney General. In addition, the State had knowledge of his anticipated testimony due
to his status as a prosecution witness. Not only should such knowledge be presumed, but
in this particular case, it is clear through the State's leading questions that they had
knowledge of exculpatory information. {See e.g., Tr., p.4953, Ls.12-14 ("Q. Did you
discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals? A. I did.") The fact that
the State had knowledge of Norma Jean's mental health problems through Jay
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Rosenthal, should be specifically admitted or denied in the State's answer to this
petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b)
iii.

The State Had Knowledge O(Norma Jean's Mental
Health Problems Via Intermountain Hospital Based
On The Role Intermountain Hospital Took In
Assisting The Prosecution In The 1991 Norma Jean
Rape Case

The State had knowledge of exculpatory infonnation and documentation within
the possession of Intennountain Hospital.

Although Intennountain Hospital is not

typically considered an agent of the prosecution, in the 1991 rape case, Intennountain
Hospital personnel and treatment providers were potential witnesses for the prosecution
had the case proceeded to trial. (See e.g., Tr., p.4771, Ls.11-18 (indicating that Nonna
Jean reported the rape to Intennountain Hospital personnel); p.4786, LS.14-25 (indicating
that Detective Hess was briefed by Intennountain Hospital personnel).)

Moreover,

Intennountain Hospital provided counsel for the prosecutor, assisting him in his decision
to negotiate a settlement.
Q. Did you discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals?
A. I did. She was at Intennountain Hospital in the Adolescent Unit. She
was, as I recall, being treated by Lamar Heyrend who was a
psychiatrist, she had a case worker discussed it with those individuals.
And I spent a great deal of time, along with a victim witnesses
coordinator, with her trying to prepare her to testify.
Q. And ultimately did you decide that you could not proceed to trial with
her as a witness?
A. I did. It was my decision, as well as the recommendation of the those
people who were treating her.
Q. SO how did you proceed?
A. Proceeded with a reduction to a statutory rape and a negotiated
resolution.
Q. And that was because of the weakness in your case?
A. It was because of the inability of Nonna Jean to be able to sit in a
situation like this and in front of a jury and be SUbjected to cross
examination.
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(Tr., p.4953, L.12 - p.4954, L.9.) Thus, any favorable evidence known to Intermountain
Hospital or within its possession should be imputed to the State.
iv.

The State Had Knowledge O(The 1992 Presentence
Report From The Norma Jean Oliver Rape Case.

The 1992 presentence report from the rape case contains information that Norma
Jean had been admitted into Intermountain Hospital's long-term care unit, again
suggesting the presence of serious mental disorders.

The State, through its agents,

possessed or had knowledge the 1992 report even if acting in good faith in failing to
disclose it prior to the trial and sentencing. The fact that the State actually possessed
or had knowledge a copy of the presentence report should be specifically admitted
or denied in the State's answer to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b)
In this case, the presentence investigator, while technically appointed by the
district court, worked closely with the prosecution.

The report indicates that the

investigator relied heavily on governmental and prosecutorial contacts including the FBI,

cm,

Mr. Hall's probation officer, and significantly, the prosecutor's file material.

Further, at some point, the prosecutor was privy to the information in the PSI. See I.C.R.
32(g) (indicating that disclosure of the contents of the PSI "shall be made" available to
the prosecuting attorney). Further, a copy of the PSI was likely possessed by yet another
governmental agency which works closely with the prosecution, the Idaho Department of
Corrections. See I.C.R. 32(h)(1) (indicating that a copy of the PSI "shall be available to
the Idaho Department of Corrections" while the defendant is in their custody).
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v.

The State Had Knowledge Of Norma Jean Oliver's
Mental Health Condition Based On Her Status As A
Prosecution Witness

Because the Court has denied Mr. Hall's motion to depose the prosecutors and
denied his motion to disclose the prosecutor's files, the Court has limited Mr. Hall's
ability to state this claim. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall asserts that the State was aware of the
nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental health condition based on her status as a
former victim represented by the State and as a prosecution witness at Mr. Hall's capital
sentencing. The fact that the State had knowledge that Norma Jean Oliver suffered
from various mental disorders, including but not limited to Borderline Personality
Disorder and Bipolar disorder, or that she had taken antidepressants or
antipsychotic medications in the past should be specifically admitted or denied in
the State's answer to this petition. I.R.C.P. 8(b)
Based on Norma Jean's status alone, it is more likely than not that the State was
aware of the nature and extent of her mental problems.

The State's knowledge is

reflected in its opening statement, in which the prosecutor stated, "She didn't like living
with her parents.

She was having trouble there, she had some emotional trouble

besides and decided that the grass was greener in California ...." (Tr., p.4734, Ls.1720.) Thus, the State knew that Norma Jean was having "emotional trouble" beyond her
troubles at home. The State's knowledge is also reflected in the transcript of its State's
direct examination of Norma Jean:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Okay. Are you taking any medication right now?
No.
Okay. Have you taken some in the past but you don't take it now?
Yes.
Okay.
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(Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-8.) It is inconceivable that the prosecutor asked such potentially risky
questions unless he already knew the answers.82 Further, once the questions were asked,
it opened the door for the defense to ask follow-up questions. Thus, it is extremely
unlikely that the State would have opened the door to such questions without first
interviewing Norma Jean ahead of time about her medication history and her mental
health problems.
Regardless of how the prosecution gained knowledge of Norma Jean's mental
health problems, whether through various witnesses or reports, one thing is clear, this
case closely mirrors the facts in Freeman v. United States., 284 F.Supp.2d 217 (D. Mass.
2003). In Freeman, the prosecuting attorney received information (via a letter) from a
psychiatrist for the main and uncorroborated government witness in a criminal
prosecution.

Specifically, the psychiatrist informed the prosecutor that the witness

suffered from psychological problems and that she would likely decompensate under
cross-examination by defense attorneys. Id. at 225. The prosecutor failed to disclose this
information to the defendant.

The court recognized that the letter did not actually

identify the witness's disorder. Id. However, the. court noted that the information would
have at least allowed the defense lawyers to inquire directly of the psychiatrist or to
obtain other information as to the severity of the witness's disorder, i.e., Bipolar
Disorder. Id. at 224-225.

The court concluded that withholding the information

"foreclosed a promising avenue of investigation for the defense." Id. at 225. Further, the
withheld information was deemed material because it "it brought into question the
82 From a review of the transcript in its entirety, it is clear that the State prepped its
witnesses prior to putting her on the stand. Unlike trial counsel, the State erred on the
side of preparation as opposed to relying on a "run-and-gun" approach to preparing for
witness examinations.
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reliability of the government's main, and uncorroborated, witness" and "could reasonably
have been taken to put the whole case in [ ] a different light." Id. at 226 (quotations
omitted).
In this case, the jury had no reason to question Norma Jean's ability to accurately
perceive events at the time of the alleged forcible rape or to accurately testify regarding
such events at the sentencing hearing. Like the defense lawyers in the Freeman case, had
trial counsel been provided this information, they could have further investigated the
nature and extent of Norma Jean's mental condition prior to trial, discovering that she
suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder.

Had the jury heard evidence of Norma Jean's disorders and the

symptoms associated with them when untreated, there is a reasonable probability that the
outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

In conclusion, Mr. Hall

incorporates herein by reference the prejudice analysis set forth for his Strickland claim
involving the same evidence. See infra, Claim D.3.a.ii and D.4. 83 In addition, even if this
evidence is not material under Brady taken in isolation, this evidence in conjunction with
other favorable evidence noted in this claim and elsewhere in this petition, satisfies the
Brady standard.

b.

The State Failed To Disclose Favorable Evidence Of Norma
Jean's Inconsistent Statements And Motive To Lie And
Retaliate Against Mr. Hall

This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that
Norma Jean had made inconsistent statements about the events surrounding the alleged

The Supreme Court has adopted the prejudice test from Strickland for determining
whether withheld eXCUlpatory evidence is material. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667,682 (1985).
83
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forcible rape, and further, had a motive to lie and retaliate against Mr. Hall. See supra,
Claim D.3.b, supra.
i.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Copies Of
Boise Police Department Reports Detailing
Multiple Arrests Of Norma Jean Oliver Between
November 1990 And December 1991

The State was in possession of police reports indicating that Norma Jean was a
chronic runaway and that she was going to be returned to her home in Fruitland, Idaho,
where she would be prosecuted by Payette County authorities as a juvenile runaway.
(Exhibits 59-62.) The State disclosed these reports following litigation of Mr. Hall's
motion for discovery.

In addition, the State has filed an admission in a post-

conviction discovery response admitting that they possessed or had knowledge of
such reports but did not disclose them to trial counsel. (Exhibit 82.) Even without this
admission, it is clear that the State possessed or had knowledge this information through
their agents, the police. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (holding that the
prosecution is responsible for "any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police.") One of the withheld police
reports indicated that Erick Hall reported Norma Jean for being a runaway, thus
providing her a motive to retaliate against him. (Exhibit 61.)
ii.

The State Had Knowledge Of The 1992 Presentence
Report From The Norma Jean Oliver Rape Case

The State was in possession of the 1992 presentence report in the rape case. See
supra, section 3.a.iv, incorporated herein by reference. The report is relevant to this

claim because it indicates that once Norma Jean reported that she had been raped, rather
than being returned home, she was admitted to Intermountain Hospital's long-term care
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unit and may never have been returned home or even prosecuted for being a runaway.
(Exhibit 55.) In addition, this report indicates that Norma Jean initially joined Erick in
his bed that night, in contradiction with her grand jury and trial testimony. (Exhibit 55.)
Finally, the report indicates that Norma Jean told the investigator that at some point
during the rape Erick seemed to snap out of it, regain his composure, and apologize for
his actions. (Exhibit 55.) Norma Jean even told the investigator that she felt sorry for
Erick because he did not seem to know what he was doing.
iii.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Detective
Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews Of Norma
Jean Oliver And Erick Hall

The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews
of Norma Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 56B.)84 The tape recordings
were disclosed by the State during post-conviction proceedings.

It is not yet clear

whether the recordings were in the prosecutor's file or located at the Garden City Police

84 Mr. Hall is aware of the States' Response to Discovery, dated July 22,2003, contained
in trial counsel's files. (Exhibit 102.) (The State filed a response with the Court on July
23, 2003, (R., p.72), which does not reflect what was presumably disclosed to trial
counsel.)
In that Response, the State purports to be disclosing copies of audio tapes of Detective
Hess' interviews with Erick Hall and Norma Jean Oliver, regarding DR #91-2582.
(Exhibit 102.) However, the "Discovery Log" attached to the Response does not reflect
that the State disclosed those audios-the Discovery Log does not list the Hess audios.
Furthermore, trial counsel files did not contain the Hess audios, even though they did
contain other media that were referenced in the Discovery Log. For example, trial
counsel's files contained a videotape of the body recovery, a CD of autopsy photographs,
and a videotape of the interview of Erick Hall on March 29, 2003, all of which were
itemized in the Discovery Log. Furthermore, even if the tapes had been disclosed, it is
likely that they were of the same inaudible and unusable quality as the tapes initially
"disclosed" to SAPD during the post-conviction investigation and discovery process. See
note 84, infra. Mr. Hall asserts that the burden is on the State to prove they disclosed the
audios. However, even if the State is able to do so, i.e., the audios were in fact disclosed,
then it is further evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
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Department, in either event, they were known to the State. 8S These recordings were
withheld in violation of the prosecution's obligations under Brady and I.C.R. 16.
The tape recordings include infonnation that is not included in Detective Hess's
report, and which contradicts Detective Hess's testimony in two areas: 1) that he did not
discuss the nature and extent of Nonna Jean's problems at home during his interview
with her; and 2) that Erick made inconsistent statements to him during the interview. See

The State initially alleged that the tape recordings had either been destroyed or
misplaced. (See Exhibit 82 (State's Response to the Discovery Order, dated 3/15107,
pA.» If Mr. Hall had relied on the State's response, then the recordings would never
have been disclosed. Instead however, Mr. Hall moved to depose Detective Hess
regarding the lost recordings. Prior to a hearing on Mr. Hall's motion, the tapes turned
up. (See Exhibit 83 (State's Supplemental Response to the Discovery Order, dated
6/15107, p.1.» Had Mr. Hall relied on the copies disclosed by the State, then most of the
contents would have been inaudible. Instead however, Mr. Hall listened to the State's
copies and discovered that their copies were almost entirely audible. Whether this is an
example of gamesmanship or not, is irrelevant. The fact is that the State has not taken its
Brady obligations seriously either during the underlying criminal proceedings or during
these post-conviction proceedings. For example, elsewhere in this petition, Mr. Hall
submits the affidavit of Joi Reno. Ms. Reno states that Nonna Jean was not acting like
she had recently been raped, instead engaging in sexual activity with others at the Sands
Motel. Ms. Reno also states that she witnessed Nonna Jean using drugs in December
1991, including drinking alcohol at Mountain Billiards. Ms. Reno was contacted by an
agent of the State sometime in 2006. The time of the State's post-conviction interview
corresponds with Mr. Hall's post-conviction attempts to identify the names of individuals
that were staying with Nonna Jean at the Sands Motel. It seems clear that had Mr. Hall
not conducted his own investigation, the State would never have disclosed the
exculpatory evidence learned from their post-conviction interview of Ms. Reno. While it
is not necessary to show bad faith by the State to demonstrate a Brady violation, there is
evidence of it in this case. Yet another example of the State's laissez-faire approach to
discovering Brady infonnation is the State's minimal effort to obtain Nonna Jean's
juvenile records from Payette County. (Exhibit 82 (State's Response to the Discovery
Order, 3115107, pp.3-4 ("An inquiry has been made of Payette County and the
undersigned has been infonned that no records were immediately available to the clerk of
the court in Payette. The clerk advised the undersigned that if any records could be
found, the clerk would call. No call was received."» A simple follow-up call by the
SAPD's investigator yielded much more infonnation including an ROA that has been
submitted for the Court's review and detennination whether additional records should be
disclosed. All of this must be considered when assessing the State's anticipated answer
to this petition that they have complied with Brady.
85
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supra, Claim D.3.e. The tape also indicates that Nonna Jean stated that at some point
during the rape Erick seemed to snap out of it, regain his composure, and then apologize
for his actions. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.15.) Finally, the taped interview
indicates that contrary to her statements to Detective Hess and subsequent testimony, she
may have presented herself as eighteen years old and may have been drinking the night of
the purported forcible rape. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.20 (infonning Detective
Hess during her taped interview that she had sexual intercourse on two prior occasions,
one time she was drunk».)

iv.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy or
The Transcript or The Grand Jury Proceedings In
The Case OrState v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case
No. 18591, Held December 19, 1991

The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991.

See supra, section 1.i. In her grand jury testimony, Nonna Jean stated that she received a
ride back to the Sands Motel from a neighbor in the Garden City trailer park. Had the
State disclosed the grand jury transcript, trial counsel would have known to investigate
this story, including discussing it with Nonna Jean during their eleventh hour interview.

In a post-conviction interview, Nonna Jean stated that rather than having the neighbor
take her directly to the Sands Motel, she first returned to the trailer to get some clothes.
(Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p.25).)
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v.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Of Copies
Of Boise Police Department Reports Listing
Potential Witnesses To Norma Jean's Post-Rape
Behaviors

The State was in possession of a police report indicating that Norma Jean was
arrested at the Sands Motel on December 2, 1991, and then again on December 3, 1991,
both following the alleged forcible rape. (Exhibit 61; Exhibit 62.) One of the withheld
police reports contains the names of other individuals at the Sands Motel, including Joi
Reno. (Exhibit 62.)

Had trial counsel known Ms. Reno's name, they should have

interviewed her and would have learned that Ms. Reno witnessed Norma Jean engaging
in sexual activity with others at the Sands Motel.

Trial counsel would also have

discovered that Ms. Reno witnessed Norma Jean using drugs in December 1991,
including drinking alcohol at Mountain Billiards.
c.

The State Failed To Disclose Favorable Evidence Of
Norma Jean's Problems At Home

This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that
Norma Jean had been abused over a number of years by her father, that such abuse was
one of the reasons she ran away from home, and that the injuries from such abuse could
have provided an alternate explanation for the injuries observed by Detective Hess and
Dr. Vickman. See supra, Claim D.3.c.

i.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Detective
Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews Of Norma
Jean Oliver And Erick Hall

The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews
of Norma Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. See infra, section 3.iii. The taped interview of
Norma Jean indicates that her father abused her at home. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B.)
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The abuse had lasted from her childhood through her late teenage years, and was one
reason that Nonna Jean continually ran away from home. The abuse included beatings.
(Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.35 (describing being thrown across the room by her
father)).). This history is not reflected in Detective Hess's written report, and thus was
not uncovered by trial counsel's nominal preparation.

Had this infonnation been

presented to the jury, it would have appeared that the State was attempting to cover up
the alternate explanation for Nonna Jean's injuries and highlighted the lack of
investigation of the rape case.
ii.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge Of A Copy
Of The Transcript Of The Grand Jury Proceedings
In The Case Of State v. Erick Hall. Ada County.
Case No. 18591, Held December 19,1991

The State was in actual possession of a transcript of the grand jury proceedings in
the case of State v. Erick Hall, Ada County, Case No. 18591, held December 19, 1991.
See supra, section 3.iv. Nonna Jean's grand jury testimony reveals that her treatment

providers at Intennountain Hospital were concerned about her problems at home, and did
not want her to return. (Exhibit 53 (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-9 ("[T]they didn't want me to go
home, because they know my history."))
d.

The State Failed to Disclose Favorable Evidence of Nonna
Jean's Prior Misconduct

This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that
Nonna Jean had previously given a false name and date of birth to law enforcement. See
supra, Claim D.3.d.
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i.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge A Copy O(
A Boise Police Department Report Detailing Norma
Jean's Prior Misconduct

The State was in possession of a police report indicating that Nonna Jean was
arrested at the Sands Motel on December 2, 1991, and then again on December 3, 1991,
both following the alleged forcible rape. (Exhibit 61; Exhibit 62.) See supra, section
3.b.i. One of the withheld police reports detailed Nonna Jean's arrest approximately one
year prior to her allegations against Erick Hall. Specifically, on November 19, 1990,
Nonna Jean was arrested as a runaway and gave a false name and date of birth to police
officers during their criminal investigation. ((Exhibit 60.)
e.

The State Failed to Disclose Favorable Evidence of
Inaccuracies in Detective Hess's Report

This claim mirrors Mr. Hall's Strickland claim, in which he demonstrated that
Nonna Jean had previously given a false name and date of birth to law enforcement. See
supra, Claim D.3.d.
i.

The State Possessed Or Had Knowledge O(
Detective Daniel Hess's Tape-Recorded Interviews
O(Norma Jean Oliver And Erick Hall

The State was in possession of Detective Daniel Hess's tape-recorded interviews
of Nonna Jean Oliver and Erick Hall. See infra, section 3.b.iii. The taped interview of
Nonna Jean provides favorable infonnation including: 1) inconsistencies between
Detective Hess's testimony and his taped interview ofNonna Jean; and 2) inconsistencies
between Detective Hess's testimony and his taped interview of Erick Hall.
4.

The Cumulative Prejudice Due To The Prosecutor's Failure To
Disclose Favorable Evidence Of Nonna Jean Oliver's Allegations
Satisfies The Prejudice Prong Of Brady
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Because this claim virtually mirrors the Strickland claim, Mr. Hall incorporates
by reference the cumulative prejudice analysis from the Strickland claim. See supra,
ClaimD.4.
T.

The State Violated Brady: April Sebastian, Michelle Deen, And Wendy

1m
1.

The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding April
Sebastian86

April Sebastian testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing on October 23, 2004.
At the time of her testimony, she was actively represented by Mr. Hall's trial counsel,
Amil Myshin, in her upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State v. April Sebastian,
Ada County, case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp.4868-70; pp.4875-96.) (Exhibit 72.) Following
her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared in court with Mr. Myshin on November 19,2004,
and on November 30, 2004, for her "rider" hearing. (Exhibit 72.) The district court
presiding over the case granted her probation based on a recommendation from the
State. (Exhibit 72.) Mr. Hall has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered
Ms. Sebastian benefits in her other cases based on her willingness to give testimony
against Mr. Hall.

For instance, based on a review of court documents, Ms. Sebastian

was not a good candidate for probation, appearing to have failed on probation twice
previously. (Exhibit 72.)
2.

The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding Michelle Deen

The State used Michelle Deen for two reasons: 1) to portray Erick Hall as a
monster; and 2) to argue that Erick Hall was not using drugs in 2001. It is impossible to

Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting the Court's in camera
review of April Sebastian's presentence report and addendum to presentence report, and
any attached documentation, in State v. April Sebastian, Ada County, case no. H0400228.
See Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2/16/07.
86
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fully state this claim because the Court denied Mr. Hall's request for discovery. See
Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2/16/07. Accordingly, the analysis of this claim is
somewhat abbreviated. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall asserts that on the record before him the
State committed Brady violations for withholding favorable evidence including: 1)
evidence of an additional prior felony conviction; 2) evidence of attempts (at least in the
past) by Ms. Deen to negotiate favorable treatment by turning State's evidence; and 3)
evidence of Ms. Deen's compromised mental health.
a.

The State Withheld Evidence Of A Prior Felony Conviction

Michelle Deen testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing. (Tr., pp.4813-39.) It
was elicited during her testimony that Ms. Deen had a prior felony conviction. Mr. Hall
has discovered through his post-conviction investigation that Ms. Deen was convicted of
at least one other felony. The State had an obligation to disclose Ms. Deen's full criminal
record including both felony convictions stemming from the cases of State v. Michelle
Deen, Ada County, case no. H0301398, and State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County, case
no. H0200584. (Exhibit 70; Exhibit 71.) Both of these cases arise from drug use around
the timeframe in which she testified about incidents with Erick Hall. The jury should
have heard that Ms. Deen was using methamphetamine during the timeframe in which
she testified about events. The use of methamphetamine clearly would have called into
question Ms. Deen's ability to accurately perceive events at the time and then to recall
such events years later.
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b.

The State Withheld Evidence Of Michelle Deen's Past
Attempts To Broker Deals With The Police To Avoid
Prosecution

Michelle Deen has attempted in the past to seek favorable treatment from the
State by implicating others in criminal activity.

Specifically, Mr. Hall has located a

handwritten note among other court documents in Ms. Deen's court file which states:
2-9 - narc. arrest made by patrol. D arrested at 18.4 g meth (+). D wanted
to talk to police re: "deal." D said meth not hers & didn't want to go down
on someone elses dope. D then failed to contact cops after they spoke. 2
syringes found wi dope
This appears to be a note, reflecting the circumstances surrounding

(Exhibit 69.)

Ms. Deen's arrest on February 9, 2002, for multiple drug-related offenses, including
felony possession of a controlled substance, State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County, case
no. H0200584. Trial counsel could have used this note to further undermine Ms. Deen's
credibility.
c.

The State Withheld Evidence Of Michelle Deen's
Compromised Mental Health As Reflected In By CourtOrdered Substance Abuse And Psychological Examinations

Mr. Hall has discovered in his post-conviction investigation of the case that that
Ms. Deen underwent court-ordered substance abuse and psychological evaluations in the
case of State v. Deen, Ada County, case no. H0301398. Trial counsel could have used
this information to further undermine Ms. Deen's credibility.
3.

The State Withheld Favorable Evidence Regarding Wendy Levy

The State interviewed Wendy Levy in the course of investigating its case.
(Exhibit 2.) Ms. Levy provided evidence to the State that was eXCUlpatory. Accordingly,
the State found nothing helpful from Ms. Levy and chose not to call her as a witness.
However, the State withheld the exculpatory evidence from Mr. Hall.
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The evidence provided to the State included, but was not limited to, evidence
regarding Erick Hall's positive, non-violent relationships with previous girlfriends. This
evidence was exculpatory because it tended to mitigate against imposition of the death
sentence and it undercut the State's argument that Mr. Hall has a propensity to murder
based on a history of violent sex crimes against former girlfriends. The State had an
affirmative obligation to disclose this evidence to the defense. None of that evidence was
disclosed to trial counsel.
U.

The State Violated Brady By Failing to Disclose Evidence Of An
Alternate Perpetrator Of The Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of Rape

Mr. Hall raised two similar claims as ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to investigate the possible connection between Lynn Henneman's death and Patrick
Hoffert's suicide. Mr. Hall incorporates fully be reference herein Claim B.3.c, supra;
Claim D, infra; and Claim LL, infra).
One of the police reports that trial counsel failed to utilize in their investigation
was disclosed by the State; however, according to trial counsel, that report was withheld
until late in the proceedings, effectively precluding an adequate investigation. Moreover,
the State failed to disclose lead sheets indicating that Peggy Hill and Lisa Lewis had told
the police that Patrick Hoffert not only was seen with Lynn Henneman on the day she
disappeared, but on the following day he claimed that he had "raped the girl" prior to
committing suicide.
Trial counsel files only included 12 lead sheets. The police had over 500 lead
sheets, and multiple follow-up reports and documents of many of the lead sheets. There
were thousands of pages of information included with the lead sheets. It appears that the
State did not disclose exculpatory lead sheets involving the Patrick Hoffert-Lynn
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Henneman connection. Even if the trial team had full access to those lead sheets, the
State was still obligated to disclose exculpatory Brady infonnation. It is not enough to
have an open file policy and leave small bits of Brady infonnation buried amongst
thousands of pages of materials for trial counsel to uncover. Thus, the State withheld
material evidence corroborating both Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill's statements regarding
the connection between Patrick Hoffert's suicide and Lynn Henneman's rape and murder.
(Exhibit 34; Exhibit 35.)
Evidence tending to identify someone else as the perpetrator is obviously
exculpatory and material. Grube v. Blades, 2006 WL 297203 (D. Idaho 2006) (slip copy,
memorandum order). In this case, once the DNA evidence presented by the State is
challenged as it has been through post-conviction proceedings, i.e., by demonstrating that
the DNA sample contained more than one contributor; the evidence of guilt of murder is
far from overwhelming. While the jury may have still convicted Mr. Hall of rape, there
is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Hall of murder.
The value of this evidence applies not only to the guilt phase, but also to the
penalty phase. In this case, there were no eyewitnesses. Any doubt that the jury may
have had whether Erick murdered Lynn Henneman is mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase. The prejudice from this claim should be considered cumulatively with other
sentencing phase prejUdice.
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V.

The State Committed Misconduct By Dissuading Mitigation Witnesses
From Testifying Or Predisposing Them To Disregard Mitigating
Evidence87

During the course of Mr. Hall's reinvestigation of this case, he has learned that
the State, either acting through its prosecuting attorneys, or their agents, committed
misconduct when interviewing potential mitigation witnesses. Specifically,
•

Jean McCracken, Erick's mother, stated that on September 27,
2004, a man working with the prosecution contacted her. He told
her that the defense team was going to say at trial that Frank,
Erick's father, and her had raised Erick to be a killer and that they
were responsible for what Erick had become. The prosecution also
asked her if she thought Erick's drug use excused his behavior.
Jean did not testify at the sentencing. (Exhibit 6.)

•

Tamara McCracken, Erick's older half-sister, was also contacted
by the prosecution. She was asked whether she was a good
Christian and believed that if someone did something wrong
shouldn't they be held accountable for it. They asked if she had
ever killed anyone. They suggested that since she had the same
childhood but hadn't killed anyone that the defense team should
not based a defense upon Erick's childhood. Tamara resented the
insinuations and attempts to trivialize the trauma she and Erick had
experienced while growing up. Tamara testified at the sentencing.
(Exhibit 25.)

Based on these two incidents alone, Mr. Hall has reason to believe that the State
committed other acts of misconduct. Mr. Hall asserts that the State's conduct violated his
right to due process, right to present a defense at sentencing, and right to present
mitigation under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States' Constitution, and warrants reversal of his sentencing.

Further development of this claim has been precluded by the court's denial of
Petitioner's discovery requests. (See Order Regarding Discovery, p.15.)
87

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

205

01257

w.

The State Committed Numerous Napue Violations

The deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of evidence
known to be false violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the
government, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it
appears. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). In other words, the state cannot
create a materially false impression regarding the facts of the case or the credibility of the
witnesses. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935), the Supreme Court made
clear that deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false
evidence is incompatible with "rudimentary demands of justice." This was reaffirmed in

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), the
Court stated that, "[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears." Id., at 269; see also Giglio v.

United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972).
Prosecutor falsehoods alone do not automatically entitle a petitioner to relief.
Relief is compelled when the false impressions are "material," which means when "there
is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of
the jury." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 394 U.S. 103 (1935). The record must suggest a
reasonable likelihood that during deliberations the jurors could have considered the false
evidence or argument.

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

206
012::lR

1.

The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Dennis
Dean Regarding Idaho Department of Corrections Inmate
Classification System, Directives For Classification And
Conditions Of Confinement

During the sentencing trial, the State created a materially false impression of how
the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC) would determine Mr. Hall's custody status,
and the conditions of confinement to which Mr. Hall would be subjected. At sentencing,
the State called Dennis Dean, the Inmate Records Placement Manager with the IDOC.
(Tr., p.4904, Ls.9-11.) Mr. Dean described the initial classification process for offenders,
and explained that classification was a "risk assessment" done to determine how best to
house an inmate. (Tr., p.4906, L.24 - p.4907, L.6.) The State elicited testimony that the
IDOC system has three prison levels of "secured" facilities-maximum, medium, and
minimum-and other non-secured facilities such as work centers. (Tr., p.4905, L.17 p.4906, L.1.l 8
The prosecutor deliberately and repeatedly elicited materially misleading
information from Mr. Dean suggesting that Mr. Hall, if sentenced to life without the
possibility of parole, could be housed at a minimum custody facility:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.

Okay. So if a person were, say at the medium security facility and
they were misbehaving, showing disrespect to staff or breaking
things or doing a variety of other rule violations, they could get
more points and go to maximum security?
Yes.
Then, over time, if they behaved and did certain things, they could
lose points and ultimately go to minimum custody?
Yes, those points - detention points would fall off after a year.

This information alone is incorrect. According to IDOC, there are at least 5 levels of
custody. (Exhibit 84.) (IDOC Offender Classification). Furthermore, Mr. Dean's claims
or implications that classifications are based on purely "objective" criteria are false. (Tr.,
p. 4907, Ls. 9-10); (Exhibit 85.)
88
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(Tr., pA91l, Ls.6-15)

The prosecutor asked about conditions at minimum secured

facilities, and elicited that inmates at those facilities can work on "fire fighting crews []
that work out of that facility," can work on "road crews," "have the opportunity to work
outside," have access to "a therapeutic community," and can "attend classes." (Tr.,
pA915, Ls.9-25) This examination was designed to deliberately mislead the jury into

believing that Mr. Hall would be eligible for minimum security despite first degree
murder, rape, and kidnapping convictions, using the assumption that the Mr. Hall would
receive a life without parole sentence. (Tr., pA949, L.22- pA950, L.8.)
The State did finally elicit testimony on redirect examination that Mr. Hall would
not be eligible for minimum custody under the current IDOC classification system.
However, the State immediately pointed out that the classification system is not state law,
but merely IDOC policy, and that "from time to time points and classifications have to
change based on prison populations and crowding and various things like that." (Tr.,
p.4950, LsA-7.) It is improper to rely on speculative future housing policy changes to
obtain a sentence of death. Overall, the State left the jurors with the overwhelming, and
incorrect, impression that Mr. Hall could be eligible to live in a minimum secured facility
at some point, which is not the case. The prejudice was especially acute because the
State drew attention to the fact that Mr. Hall's escape in 1994 was from a minimum
secured facility. (Tr., pA920, Ls.18-25.)
The State also improperly and prejudicially implied that Mr. Hall would
eventually be housed in "country-club-like" conditions. Mr. Dean testified that the
medium secured facility was "like a little town," "something like a college campus," with
a gymnasium, dining room, chapel, where inmates could go to work, play at the ball field,
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earn wages, attend college classes, and live in a therapeutic environment. (Tr., p.4913,
L.IS - p.4915, L.6.)

According to the IDOC Directive 303.02.01.001, however,

"medium custody" offenders "shall be held within the confines of a secure perimeter,"
movement "shall be structured and monitored," and inmates "shall normally be under
continuous armed staff supervision and in restraints" whenever outside the facility. The
IDOC medium security facility is surrounded by mUltiple layers of razor wire, attack
dogs, and armed guards. The State's presentation of Mr. Hall's "conditions of
confinement" if sentenced to life without parole is extremely misleading, irrelevant to the
jury's sentencing determination, and highly prejudicial in that it encouraged the jury to
make its sentencing determination based on improper, irrelevant, and incorrect
information. There is a reasonable likelihood that the false and misleading testimony
could have affected the judgment ofthe jury.
2.

The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False
Impression That Mr. Hall Seriously Choked Evelyn Dunaway
While Engaging In Sexual Intercourse

The State argued at sentencing that Mr. Hall's history with girlfriends and other
women established his propensity to commit murder.

The State's questioning of

Ms. Dunaway was materially misleading and unduly prejudicial. Specifically, the State's
examination of Ms. Dunaway was designed to and did leave the impression that Mr. Hall
seriously choked Ms. Dunaway while having sexual intercourse with her:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Okay. Would that have been in March of2002?
Possibly.
All right. Was that the end of the relationship then?
It was.
Okay. Was there another time before that when Erick choked you with
his hands?
A. Yes.
Q. Where did that take place?
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A. In our bedroom.
Q. At that same trailer?
A. Yes.
Q. Why was he mad at you that day?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay. How serious was the choking? Was it -A. It was serious.
Q. Tell us what happened, that you remember?
A. There was a couple times -- I don't remember.
Q. Was it bad enough to scare you?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean did he come up from behind you, or sit on you, or how did it
work?
A. He would sit on me.
Q. I just need to ask you one other area, Evelyn, that I don't care to ask
you but I need to anyway. While you were living there with him in the
trailer for those months did you have a sexual relationship with him?
A. We did.
Q. I just need to know kind of in terms of frequency. Was -- how often
was there sexual intercourse between you?
A. Daily.
Q. Was it sometimes more than daily?
A. Yes.
Q. Was that of your -- of your instigation or his? Did he want sex -A. Sometimes both but more him.
(Tr., p.4846, L.l - p.4947, L.16 (emphasis added).) Given that Ms. Henneman was
purportedly raped and choked to death, the connection the State wished the jury to infer is
obvious: Mr. Hall has a propensity for choking women while having sex. As the State
argued in closing,
You know what he did to Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You
know what he did to Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only
killed once so far in that group. Now then does that mean that he has a
propensity? Does he have an appetite that he likes to hurt women? Is he
sadistic? Does he like to hunt them?
(Tr., p.5507, Ls.14-20.) However, Ms. Dunaway never testified that Mr. Hall choked her
while having sex. Indeed, Ms. Dunaway has subsequently provided an affidavit stating
that Mr. Hall never choked her while having sex. (Exhibit 40.)

Thus, the State
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deliberately asked questions in such a way that the jurors would naturally make the
connection between sexual intercourse and choking, without regard for the truth. The
State used Evelyn Dunaway to prove the propensity aggravator and to otherwise put nonstatutory aggravating evidence before the jury. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's death sentence
should be vacated.
3.

The Prosecutor Deliberately Created The Materially False
Impression That Mr. Hall Choked Michelle Deen While Engaging
In Forcible Sexual Intercourse

In further support of its propensity theory and other non-statutory aggravating
factors, the State called Mr. Hall's former girlfriend, Michelle Deen, to testify. As with
Ms. Dunaway, the State's questioning of Ms. Deen was materially misleading and highly
prejudicial. The State's examination of Ms. Deen was designed to and did leave the
impression that Mr. Hall choked her while raping her:
Q. Now, I hate to be indelicate and I -- but I told you I was going to have
to be some and so I need to ask you about your sexual relationship
with the defendant. Who decided when and where and how and such
as that in terms of when you were going to have sexual relations?
A. Erick did.
Q. And how did he decide that, I mean, and how did he convey that to
you?
A. It just pretty much when he wanted it, it was right then and there.
Q. Did it matter if you said no?
A. It didn't matter.
Q. If you did say no, what would happen?
A. It would still happen. It would be pretty much take my clothes off and
have sex.
Q. Did he ever have to use force on you to get you A. He's a very strong man. I couldn't fight Erick back if! wanted to.
Q. Did there come a point when, you know, August when he put you in a
headlock over something that had come up?
A. He put me in a headlock, and I can't remember the situation why he
put me in a headlock. He had me in a headlock on the couch and he
told me that if I yelled or moved that all he had to do was to twist my
neck and he could kill me. And he told me not to tell nobody about
this, about our situation or he'd kill me.
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Q. Okay. How hard did he squeeze?
A. It was very forceful. It hurt really bad. I couldn't move. I was too
scared.
Q. Did -- (brief delay.) Did it interfere with your breathing?
A. I couldn't breathe that well after he did it. You know, during the time
he did it it was hard for me to breathe and I didn't want to move or say
anything, because I didn't want to die.
Q. Okay, now. When you -- after this all happened, did you decide to
leave?
A. Yes, I did. Erick went to bed -- we went to bed one night, he got
sound to sleep and I snuck out and left.
(Tr., p. 4820, L. 22 - p. 4822, L.16). The prosecutor thus "linked" instances of sexual
intercourse with an incident not involving sex where Mr. Hall placed Ms. Deen in a head
lock. Ms. Deen never testified that Mr. Hall choked her during sex, yet the State's
questioning was designed to connect sex with force.

Given that the victim, Lynn

Henneman, was purportedly raped and choked prior to her death, the connection the State
wished the jury to infer is obvious. There can be no doubt that the erroneous conclusion
the prosecutor calculated jurors would draw was material, given the allegations about the
manner of Ms. Henneman's death.
4.

The Prosecutor Elicited Materially False Testimony From Norma
Jean Oliver89

Mr. Hall incorporates fully by reference herein Claims D and S. During crossexamination, trial counsel elicited evidence that Norma Jean was receiving social security
benefits and at some point had been prescribed medication for an unspecified mental
health condition that she described as a "chemical imbalance." (Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-7;
p.4780, Ls.3-18; p.4783, Ls.17-18.)

During re-direct examination, the State elicited

testimony suggesting that Norma Jean did not require medication for her condition. (Tr.,

89 Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is awaiting discovery of Norma Jean
Oliver's medical and psychiatric records. Additionally, Mr. Hall's discovery request for
prosecutor notes was denied.
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p.4777, Ls.5-7 ("Okay. Have you taken some [medication] in the past but you don't take
it now? A. Yes.").) However, the real reason Norma Jean was not taking medication at
the time of her testimony was not because it was unnecessary, but rather because she had
trouble finding the help of "good doctors."

Norma Jean stated, during the post-

conviction interview, that:
Q. So you pretty much told me what you were -- what your diagnosis
was and everything. And so are you on medication now? Did they give
you medications since you're on SSI?
A. Yeah.
Q. What-A. I wasn't -- I wasn't on anything there for the longest time, like during
the -Q. Trial?
A. Last hearing, I wasn't on any meds, because it's difficult to find
good doctors, I guess. And I've been on medication for the past three
months, I think.

(Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52, Tr., p.36, Ls.13-25 (emphasis added).) Because the Norma Jean
Oliver rape was central to the State's case in aggravation, her credibility and mental
health were at issue. Furthermore, the jury gave great weight to Ms. Oliver's testimony,
(see Exhibit 86 (including KTVB, Channel 7, juror interview).

Thus, the State's

questioning of Ms. Oliver was materially misleading and highly prejudicial.
5.

The State Elicited Materially Misleading Evidence Through
Leading Questions To Detective Daniel Hess And Allowed False
Or Materially Misleading Cross-Examination Testimony To Go
Uncorrected

Mr. Hall incorporates fully by reference herein Claims D.3.e and S. The State

elicited materially misleading and prejudicial testimony from Detective Hess, allowed
Hess' materially misleading and prejudicial testimony to go uncorrected, and
incorporated such testimony into its closing arguments to the jury.
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During cross-examination, Detective Hess testified that he did not know the
nature of Nonna Jean Oliver's troubles at home. (Tr., p.4806, Ls. 18-25 (Q. Did you
know what the nature of that [family] trouble was? A. I have no idea.).) This was false
testimony. Detective Hess's taped interview of Nonna Jean revealed that Hess spoke at
length with Nonna Jean about her history of family trouble. Nonna Jean told Hess that
she had been physically abused by her father for years up to the point of her interview
with Hess, and the abuse including having been thrown across the room. It was because
of the abuse that Nonna Jean so often ran away from home. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B
(Tr., p.34).)
On direct examination, Detective Hess suggested that Erick made inconsistent
statements to him. First, Hess testified that Erick initially stated that he believed Nonna
Jean was eighteen years old, but then later admitted that he knew she was a juvenile
runaway, as though Erick were "changing his story." (Tr., p.4797, Ls.14-22; p.4799,
Ls.4-8. (testifying that Erick first said he thought Nonna Jean was 18, but later said he
knew she was a runaway).) The State exploited this alleged inconsistency in argument.
(Tr., p.4738, Ls.I-4 ("The defendant said at first ... that he thought she was 18 but later
said he knew she was a run-away and shooed her away and run her off .... ").) However,
Erick was not inconsistent in his statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that he initially
believed Nonna Jean was eighteen years old based on what he was told and based on the
fact that she was drinking beer at Mountain Billiards. Later, when he heard her name
come across the police scanner, he realized that she was a juvenile runaway.
Accordingly, he told her that she had to leave. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 57A (Tr., p.22).)
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Thus, Erick was consistent in his statements. The jury should have been told the truth
rather than lies that tended to undermine Erick's version of events.
Second, Detective Hess testified that Erick changed his statement regarding how
he received scratches on his face. (Tr., p.4799, L.9 - p.4800, L.1 (testifying that Erick
first stated that a cat scratched him, but then said that Norma Jean clawed him).) The
State again exploited this alleged inconsistency in argument. (Tr., p.4738, Ls.6-8 ("When
asked how come he had a scratch under his eye he said that the cat had scratched him and
then that this Norma Jean had charged him . . . .").) However, Erick did not give
inconsistent statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that the scratches were a result of a
combination of being scratched by his cat and Norma Jean. Erick told Hess that Norma
Jean pulled the cat's tail and the cat scratched him. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 57A (Tr., p.8).)
Thus, Erick was consistent in his statements.
6.

The State Committed Misconduct By Misrepresenting Conclusions
That Could Be Drawn From The DNA Test Results Taken From
Christian Johnson

The prosecution misrepresented the test results by stating that DNA testing
excluded Christian Johnson as the killer. (Tr., p. 3423, Ls. 11-12.) The state made this
assertion knowing that trial counsel considered presenting Mr. Johnson as a potential
alternate perpetrator at trial. Further, the state made this assertion knowing it to be false;
at most, the lack of Christian Johnson's DNA found on the victim only established that he
did not leave any semen. Thus, he could have been a co-perpetrator of rape. Moreover,
the lack of DNA does not exclude Mr. Johnson as the actual killer. Trial counsel made
this very point outside the presence of the jury, but failed to object. (Tr., p.3682, Ls.510.)
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X.

The State Committed Misconduct By Indirectly Commenting On Mr.
Hall's Invocation Of His Right To Remain Silent During CrossExamination Of Dr. Mark Cunningham And In Closing Arguments

In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
violates due process when he uses a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence against
him either in examining witnesses or argument to the jury.
Q. Okay. I believe that you didn't ask the defendant anything about the
murder of Lynn Henneman when you spoke to him.
A. No, sir.
Q. SO you didn't hear any of the details about the murder from his lips.
A. That's correct.
(Tr., p.5387, Ls.I-17.) Here, it appears the State elicited Mr. Hall's post-arrest, postMiranda silence in an attempt to insinuate a lack of remorse and to undermine his

experts' opinions. This violated Doyle and requires, alone, and in conjunction with all
other claims of error listed herein, a new sentencing.
Further, the State impermissibly argued during closing argument that Mr. Hall's
silence at trial demonstrated an apparent lack of remorse that should be considered as a
non-statutory aggravating factor for the jury's consideration when weighing the
mitigation against the aggravation:
The family coming up here to give impact statements is enough to put a
bronze statue on its knees for sorrow. None of us even know Lynn and I
know the effect it had on me and what I could see from you. What effect
did it have on the defendant? Did he weep? Did he bury his face in his
hands and agonize over the things that he had done? Does he show you
remorse? Did he give you confidence to think that he won't do this again,
that he's learned his lesson, that he's repentant, that he's sorry, that he's
willing to change his life, that he wants to make amends to Lynn's family?
Does he do that? Is this letter that says "I'm going to offer myself as a
sacrifice for your loss". Is that a way of showing that he's repentant?
(Tr., p.5506, Ls.7-22) (emphasis added).
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Mr. Hall had the right to remam silent under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.

No negative inference from Mr. Hall's failure to testify is permitted.

Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329 (1999). This rule applies at sentencing as
well as the guilt phase. Id. Thus, just as a jury cannot infer guilt from a failure to testify,
it cannot infer lack of remorse as a non-statutory aggravating factor from a failure to
testify at sentencing.
Y.

The Admission Of Testimonial And Other Hearsay Statements Which
Violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment And Due Process Rights

Admission of testimonial statements without both unavailability and pnor
opportunity to cross-examine the hearsay declarant violates the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).

Among

statements considered testimonial are those statements obtained with the "involvement of
government officers in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial." Id. at 56
n.7. Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated
when the State presented hearsay through Dennis Deen and Detective Daniel Hess.
1.

Hearsay Introduced Through Detective Daniel Hess

Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was violated
when the State elicited testimonial hearsay statements attributed to Norma Jean through
the testimony of Detective Hess, without a showing that Norma Jean was unavailable,
and without prior opportunity for Mr. Hall to have cross-examined Norma Jean about
such statements. Without objection, the State elicited the following testimony:
Q. All right. And when you were speaking with Norma Jean, did she tell
you whether or not the defendant had tied her up with her clothing
during this rape?
A. Yes, she told me that.
Q. What did she tell you about that?
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A. She explained that she had been unconscious a couple of times and
woke up undressed and was bound with her clothing, her pants and her
shirt.
Q. Did she say whether or not she had been gaged [sic] with something?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. Did she say at some point that the defendant wanted her to perfonn
oral sex on him but she couldn't because she was gaged [sic]?
A. That's what she told me.
Q. And that she was able to spit the gag out and talk to him about what he
was doing to her?
A. Yes.
Q. Did she tell you whether or not she was frightened or that she thought
that he was going to kill her?
A. She told me that, yes.
Q. And at one point when she woke up did she tell you that, in so many
towards [sic] at least, that she thought she might be dead because she
couldn't feel anything?
A. Yes, that's what she said.

(Tr., p.481O, L.I2 - p.4811, L.I5). Nonna Jean's statements were inadmissible through
Detective Hess, and their admission violated Crawford and the Confrontation Clause of
the Sixth Amendment.
Admission of the statements was prejudicial.

The State had previously

unsuccessfully sought to obtain the same testimony from Nonna Jean; their failure to
obtain the testimony in a constitutionally pennissible fashion did not pennit them to
violate Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment rights by eliciting her testimonial statements
through Detective Hess. (See e.g., Tr., p.4766, Ls.4-9 ("Q. Okay. Did you have
something in your mouth? A. I can't remember. Q. Okay. Did you at one time have to
spit something out of your mouth?

A. I don't know. I'm sorry.").)

Accordingly,

Detective Hess's statements were necessary to the State's case, and therefore prejudicial
to Mr. Hall. The statements linked "facts" regarding the Nonna Jean Oliver rape to fact
alleged by the state regarding the Lynn Henneman rape-murder; namely, gagging and
tying the victim with her clothing, and the victim's fear of being killed.
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Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment rights were also violated when Detective Hess

testified about results of the rape kit conducted on Nonna Jean. (Tr., p.4804, L.1O p.4806, L.8.) Over trial counsel's objection, Detective Hess testified that a criminalist
with the Department of Law Enforcement Forensic Lab, Pamela Marcum, told him she
found spenn on the swabs taken from Ms. Oliver. This clearly violated Crawford and
should have been excluded. Moreover, the admission of this testimony prejudiced Mr.
Hall, because it implied that Nonna Jean Oliver's story was correct when, in fact, the
spenn could have come from a consensual sexual encounter with either Mr. Hall or any
other sexual partner.
2.

Hearsay Introduced Through Detective Dennis Dean

Without objection, the State introduced a "pen packet," through Dennis Dean, the
Inmate Records Placement Manager for the Idaho Department of Corrections. (Tr.,
p.4939, L.20 - p.4940, L4; R., p.699 (State's Exhibit 150).) The packet was prepared by
the Idaho Department of Correction and contains various legal documents including three
judgments of conviction, one for escape, one for statutory rape, and one for grand theft.
While judgments of conviction are generally admissible, the documents in this
case included statements that were not admissible because they were testimonial,
irrelevant, and their probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejUdice. See Crawford, supra, I.R.E. 401 - 403. The documents included
statements attributed to the district courts that Erick Hall stated that there was no legal
cause why the judgments should not be entered against him. In addition, the documents
suggest that Erick Hall had no mitigating evidence to present for those crimes. Finally,
the statutory rape judgment of conviction states that Amil Myshin represented Erick on
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that charge. This suggests to the jury that Amil Myshin would have been in the best
position to defend Norma Jean's allegations at the capital sentencing hearing if possible,
and also suggested that Jay Rosenthal's testimony should not be questioned on the matter
of the reason for the plea bargain.

Thus, the statements beyond the judgments of

convictions themselves were inadmissible, and their introduction prejudiced Erick Hall.
Z.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Object To The Admission Of Testimonial And Other Hearsay Statements
Which Violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment And Due Process Rights

Mr. Hall incorporates by reference Claim Y, supra. 90 Trial counsel's failure to
object to the testimonial and other hearsay statements constituted deficient performance
and resulted in prejUdice as discussed above. In addition, Mr. Hall notes Crawford v.

Washington was issued in March 2004. Mr. Hall's trial was not held until October 2004.
Trial counsel should have been familiar with this landmark opinion in Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence.
AA.

Lethal Injection

Idaho prescribes execution by lethal injection. 91 1.<;. § 19-2716 (" ... punishment of
death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of
an ultra-short-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent. ...")
Executing Mr. Hall by lethal injection is unconstitutional, however. See, e.g., Harbison v.

Mr. Hall acknowledges that trial counsel objected to Detective Hess' testimony
regarding the results of the sex crimes kit swabs on confrontation grounds, and claims
ineffective assistance of counsel only to the extent trial counsel did not cite to the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Crawford opinion.
90

91 Post-conviction counsel is unaware of any IDOC policy regarding the exact protocol
for execution by lethal injection. However, it is becoming readily apparent that lethal
injection is not the painless, "humane" manner of execution it was once portrayed, and
can cause excruciating pain, albeit sometimes masked by a paralytic agent.
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Little, _ F.Supp.2d _,2007 WL 2821230 (M.D.Tenn. 2007) (holding Tennessee's new
lethal injection procedures are cruel and unusual, because they present "a substantial risk
of unnecessary pain" violate death row inmate Edward Jerome Harbison's constitutional
protections under the Eighth Amendment, and noting that the protocols do not adequately
ensure that inmates are properly anesthetized during lethal injections, a problem that
could "result in a terrifying, excruciating death"); Baze v. Rees, _ S.Ct. _, 2007 WL
2075334 (mem.) (granting petition for writ of certiorari to review question of whether
Kentucky's lethal injection execution method violates the Eighth Amendment).
BB.

Mr. Hall's Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, And Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were
Violated When He Was Improperly Shackled During The Course Of His
Trial
1.

Introduction

Mr. Hall wore a "leg brace" during all court appearances. (Tr., p.592.) According
to the State, the brace was worn under clothing, but would lock whenever Mr. Hall stood
and his leg would remain stiff, unless he pressed a button to the side of the brace that
released it. (Tr., p.592, Ls.7-15.) Mr. Hall would have to push the button as he walked.
(Tr., p. 593, Ls. 4-6.)

This was a new device that the Court had never previously

employed. (Tr., p. 592, Ls. 23-24.) The Court made no findings whether the device was
detectable and no findings whether the device was necessary. Mr. Hall asserts that the
jurors were able to discern that he was wearing this device and thus knew he was
shackled. (See Affidavit of Erick Virgil Hall.)92

92

Mr. Hall's affidavit will be submitted under separate cover.
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2.

Applicable Legal Standard

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit using physical restraints visible to
the jury absent a trial court detennination that restraints are justified by a state interest
specific to the particular defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, _, 125 S.Ct.
2007, 2009 (2005) (citing Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986)). This basic rule
embodies notions of fundamental fairness. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2011; see also, Estelle v.
Williams, 425 U.S. 501,503,505 (1976) (making a defendant appear in prison garb poses

such a threat to the "fairness of the factfinding process" that it must be justified by an
"essential state policy"). Visible shackling undennines the presumption of innocence, the
related fairness of the factfinding process, the right to counsel and right to secure a
meaningful defense, and the maintenance of a dignified juridical process that includes
respectful treatment of the defendant. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2013 (citing Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895)) (presumption of innocence "lies at the foundation of

the administration of our criminal law"); Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 569 (restraint suggests
that the justice system itself sees "a need to separate a defendant from the community at
large"); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340-341 (1963) (holding the Sixth
Amendment guarantees the right to counsel in order to secure a meaningful defense);
Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970) (shackling affronts the "dignity and decorum

of judicial proceedings").

The prohibition against shackling applies with equal force

during the penalty phase of a capital trial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2010-2014. Given the
severity and fmality of a death sentence, jury accuracy in making the decision between
life and death is no less critical than the decision between guilt and innocence. Deck, 125
S.Ct. at 2014.
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Absent adequate justification and findings regarding the specific circumstances of
the case, visible shackling is inherently prejudicial. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014-2016 (citing

Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 568.) The effects cannot be shown from a trial transcript. Deck,
125 S.Ct. at 2015. Thus, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make
out a due process violation. Id. Rather, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Id.,
(citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24 (1967)).
3.

Analysis

The jurors were able to discern that Mr. Hall was shackled during the guilt phase
and penalty phase of his trial. First, the leg device made clicking noises which the jurors
would have been able to hear each time he stood up before the court. Second, in order to
return to a seated position, Mr. Hall had to press a button on the device, which also would
have been noticeable by the jurors. The jury was therefore aware that court authorities
considered him a danger to the community, inevitably affecting their perception of Mr.
Hall. Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014 (reasoning that shackling almost inevitably implies to a
jury, as a matter of common sense, that court authorities consider the offender a danger to
the community, and shackling almost inevitably affects adversely the jury's perception of
the character of the defendant). Mr. Hall relies on his affidavit, to be submitted, to
establish this matter, as the district court's refusal to allow post-conviction counsel to
interview jurors precludes Mr. Hall from otherwise fully developing this claim. (See Tr.,
12/8/06, deposition of D.C. Carr, p. 309 (explaining he would have missed any noises
made by the leg device because he has "high frequency loss" of hearing).)
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Here, because propensity was an aggravating factor, the use of shackles was
especially prejudicial at the sentencing phase of the trial. The State specifically argued in
closing that Mr. Hall was dangerous:
He kills her because he wants to, because he's sadistic and brutal towards
women. He doesn't have to kill her. What does the instruction tell you that
it's a person who likes to kill, who kills without the normal amount of
provocation who kills because they have an affinity. What's their affinity?
They like it. That's what it is. That's what we're talking about here. He
doesn't have to do that to her. He does it because he likes it.
(Tr., p.5508, L.19 -p.5509, LA.)
Even aside from the statutory aggravating factor, the dangerousness of the
defendant is nearly always a relevant factor in jury decision making even where the State
does not specifically argue the point, and thereby inevitably undermines the jury's ability
to weigh accurately all relevant considerations--considerations that are often
unquantifiable and elusive--when it determines whether a defendant deserves death.
Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2014. By forcing Mr. Hall to appear before the jury in shackles that

were discernable, there was a "thumb [on] death's side of the scale." Id., quoting Sochor
V.

Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 532 (1992).

4.

Conclusion

Absent written findings to the contrary, and because the leg restraint made
Mr. Hall's custody status and physical restraint apparent to the jurors, the use of the

restraining device, absent a determination that they were 'justified by a state interest
specific to [that] particular trial," violated "a basic element of the 'due process of law'
protected by" the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and violated the presumption of
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mnocence.

Deck, 125 S.Ct. at 2012. 93 Moreover, the shackling device impermissibly

affected the jury's determination of aggravating factors and the weighing of those factors,
in violation of the Eighth Amendment, as well as Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to
present a meaningful defense.
CC.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Suppress Evidence OfMr. Hall's Third Interrogation

The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in
Claim A.2, supra.

In this case, trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to

suppress the April 1, 2003, interrogation (herein "third interrogation") of Erick Hall
because Erick had already been formally charged and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had attached by the time the interrogation commenced. The introduction of the
third interrogation was highly prejudicial.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches the moment formal judicial
proceedings are initiated. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). The right is
triggered when judicial proceedings are initiated against the accused, ''whether by way of
formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." Brewer v.

Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977). Once the right attaches, the state, including the
police and their agents, may not interfere with the accused's right to counsel. Illinois v.

Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 299 (1990).
The formal complaint was filed against Erick Hall in the Henneman case at 3:50
p.m. on April 1, 2003. (Exhibit 87.) The third interrogation of Erick by Detectives Allen

93 The Court cannot now make the requisite factual findings based on its extra-record
recollection without making itself a witness in the instant post-conviction proceedings.
See Dyas, 317 F.3d 934, 936-937 (state court determination that jury could not have seen
the shackles was unreasonable in absence of any inquiry to establish facts concerning
what jury could see).
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and Mace did not take place until 5:00 p.m. on April 1,2003. (Tr., p.4177, L.23 - p.4178,
L.21). Thus, the interrogation violated Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland standard in failing to move to suppress
statements obtained from Mr. Hall in this interrogation.
Videotape of most of the third interrogation was played to the jury. (Tr., p.4178,
p.4180-4182.) The interrogation was captured on a set of three videotapes, which were all
played, with some short redactions. (Tr., pp.4197-4208; R., p.699, (State's Exhibits 132134).)

The interrogation included highly damaging statements from Mr. Hall, which

prejudiced both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. For example, Erick was
questioned about what might have triggered his anger the night ofthe Henneman murder:
Mace: What - what made that anger boil over that night? And why - why
did you take it out on her? I mean, why - why did it all get channeled
right there?
Hall: I don't know. I guess what they say, opportunity knocks, you
answer it. I don't know. Wrong place at the right time.
(R., p.695, (Suppression Hearing Exhibit 4, p.53 (transcript of April 1, 2003,

interrogation».) Erick's statement that "opportunity knocks" was highly damaging and
was incorporated into the State's closing argument at the guilt phase of trial to establish
that Erick had murdered Lynn Henneman, despite the fact that there was a possible·
alternate perpetrator, see Claim B.3.c, supra, and Claim LL, infra, and despite the fact
that Erick did not recall killing her:
The defendant made a statement that I think we need to focus on. Mace
says, "What made that anger boil over that night? And why did you take
it out on her? I mean why, why did it all get channeled right there?" And
you can see the defendant's words before you. He says, "I don't know. I
guess what they say, opportunity knocks, you know, answer, I don't know.
Wrong place at the right time."
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(Tr., p.4625, L.25 - p.4626, L.8.) The State also used the same statement in their closing
arguments at the sentencing phase in order to establish the propensity statutory
aggravating circumstance:
The fourth and final aggravator, the one we told you we would offer proof
on. Propensity to commit - that "The defendant, by prior conduct or
conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a
propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing
threat to society.

***

The Defense told you that opportunity knocks. And you know that he said
well, wrong place, right time. The opportunity that knocked for the
defendant, in addition to having a woman to rape, this is something -somebody to steal from. Walter told you about the ring, the beautiful
sapphire ring he gave her. Dr. Groben told you that it was gone. It wasn't
on the body when they found her. Do you know that the only thing, other
than what he hit her with, what he took from - the defendant took from the
scene was the wallet and the contents and he sure didn't leave the money.
The wrong place at the right time.
(Tr., p.5454, L.20 - p.5455, L.l, p.5458, L.22 - p.5459, L.9); (Exhibit 45.)
During the third interrogation, Detective Mace persuaded Erick to write a letter to
the family of Lynn Henneman. (R., p.695 (Suppression Hearing Exhibit 4, pp.91-92
(transcript of April 1, 2003 interrogation)).) The letter was introduced at Erick's trial.
(Tr., p.4211, Ls.l-ll; (R., p.699 (State's Exhibit 136).) The letter also was used by the
State to establish that Erick killed Lynn Henneman:
The defendant made a written statement, you got a chance to watch this,
and, of course, we tried to move this thing along for you, but it went
pretty fast because we fast forwarded it during the time that he was writing
that written statement out. But this is what he wrote during that time.
You've got the exhibit if you want to look at it again. But the most
important thing I think he said in there is "You probably hate me for
taking from you something so dear and closely cherished, the life is
something that no person has the right to take, no one but the one who
owns it." Signed Erick Hall.
Would you write a letter like that to the parents of a murdered woman if
you didn't kill her?
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(Tr., p.4625, Ls.6-19.)

Thus, because trial counsel failed to move suppress the

interrogation and its fruits on the basis that Erick's right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment had already attached, the State was again able to argue that Erick was Lynn
Henneman's killer -- even though, as discussed above, other evidence points to the fact
that another person could have been an alternate or co-perpetrator of the murder.
In sum, trial counsel should have moved to suppress the introduction of the third
interrogation of Erick Hall on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached prior to the interrogation. Had they done so, the jury would not have been
exposed to Erick's damaging statements and the letter to the Henneman family. Because
the evidence was highly inculpatory, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
both the guilt and the sentencing phases ofthe trial would have been different.
DD.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Move For Change Of Venue, Or, In The Alternative, Failing To Move To
Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled

Criminal defendants are entitled to a trial before an unbiased jury. This right is
guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, Article I, Sections 7 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, Idaho Code §§ 191902, -2019, and -2020, and Idaho Criminal Rule 24(b). "The bias or prejUdice of even a
single juror is enough to violate that guarantee." United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d
1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
The Supreme Court has long held that where a criminal case receives excessive
publicity, the defendant's rights to an unbiased jury and, consequently, a fair trial, may be
violated if the trial court does not take prophylactic measures, such as changing venue to
a place less saturated by pUblicity, to insulate the jury's decision-making process from the
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outside influences of the publicity. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310
(1959) (remanding case for a new trial where seven jurors had been exposed to news
accounts containing information which was not presented at trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961) (vacating the conviction of a prisoner sentenced to death based on the
saturation of the jury pool with pretrial pUblicity and the fact that eight out of twelve
jurors came into the trial with a preconceived opinion that the defendant was guilty);
Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963) (holding that the trial court had erred in

denying the defendant's motion for a change of venue where the media, prior to trial, had
broadcast a taped confession of the defendant).
Notwithstanding the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held that a
defendant's right to a fair trial can be violated without a particularized showing of
prejudice, see Rideau, 373 U.S. 723, Idaho's appellate courts have sometimes held that
the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate prejudice, i.e., that his own jury was
biased. 94 See, e.g., State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 687-88, 85 P.3d 656, 663-64 (2004);
State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170, 175, 857 P.2d 649, 654 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Fetterly,

109 Idaho 766, 769 & n.l, 710 P.2d 1202, 1205 & n.l (1985). However, they do not
always do so. In State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 1986), the Court
of Appeals noted that:
a defendant's inability to make a detailed and conclusive showing of
prejudice is not a proper ground for refusing to change venue. Prejudice
seldom can be established or disproved with certainty. Rather, it is
sufficient for the accused to show "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial

Even if this view were correct, Mr. Hall has been precluded from conducting juror
interviews, and therefore could not establish the prejudice sometimes erroneously
required by the Idaho appellate courts.
94
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news [coverage] prior to trial will prevent a fair trial."
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 ....

Sheppard v.

Hall, 111 Idaho at 829, 727 P.2d at 1257, (emphasis and alteration in original). See also
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003) (adopting the "reasonable
likelihood" standard set forth in Hall). Regardless of whether a showing of prejudice is a
strict requirement though, the Idaho appellate courts have said that there are certain basic
factors that should be considered in evaluating the question of whether pretrial publicity
had necessitated a change of venue below: (1) the nature and content of the pre-trial
pUblicity; (2) the amount of time elapsed between the pretrial publicity and the trial (and
sentencing); (3) whether there is evidence, e.g., affidavits, indicating prejudice, or a lack
thereof, in the community where the defendant is to be tried; (4) voir dire testimony by
actual jurors indicating whether or not they had pre-formed opinions as to the defendant's
guilt or innocence; and (5) whether the defendant moved to strike any of the jurors for
cause. Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258.
In the present case, the nature and volume of pretrial publicity that the case
received should have caused trial counsel to move for a change of venue. Trial counsel
should have aggressively investigated the above factors, and presented the results of the
investigation to the Court in support of the motion.
1.

Trial Counsel Failed To Obtain And Analyze Copies Of The
Articles And Television And Radio Broadcasts That Had Saturated
Ada County

Had trial counsel engaged in an adequate investigation and analysis, they would
have discovered that both quantity and the nature of the pUblicity in this case, and in the
other crimes for which Mr. Hall has been charged, rendered it impossible to find an
impartial jury composed of his peers.
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The first flurry of news coverage resulted from Lynn Henneman's disappearance.
That news coverage, stretching from September 26, 2000, through November 10, 2000,
which included near-daily stories in The Idaho Statesman,95 as well as extensive
television news coverage,96 is detailed, in part, below: 97
•

September 26, 2000. One day after she was reported missing, the Statesman
reported Ms. Henneman's disappearance in the banner headline of its "Local"
section. Patrick Orr, Woman missing since Sunday, police say, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Sept. 26, 2000, at IB. The article detailed the highly visible
efforts to find Ms. Henneman: a dive team, Life Flight flying over the Boise
river, and Idaho Mountain Search and Rescue team. Id. It also included a
picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.

•

September 28, 2000. The Statesman's front-page banner headline was that
some of Ms. Henneman's personal effects had been found. Patrick Orr, Boy

95 The Statesman, headquartered in Boise, and claiming Ada and Canyon Counties as its
primary markets, see The Idaho Statesman (visited Apr. 14, 2006)
<http://custserv.idahostatesman.comiCustSvc/advertising_services/adv-pdfs/marketprofile/2005BoiseMSASnapshot.pdf>, is, by far, the most widely circulated Idaho
newspaper.
The Idaho Newspaper Association reports the Statesman's circulation as
68,060 copies.
See Idaho Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12, 2006)
<http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. In comparison, the next most widely
circulated Idaho newspaper is the Post Register, at only 26,551 copies. See Idaho
Newspaper Association (visited Apr. 12,2006) http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html

It is interesting to note that undersigned counsel has searched for, but has been
unable to locate any articles regarding Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death, or Mr.
Hall, in either the Coeur D'Alene Press or the Idaho State Journal, two of the major
newspapers in north Idaho and east Idaho, respectively. See Idaho Newspaper
Association (visited Apr. 12,2006) <http:///www.idahopapers.comlmap.html>. Thus, the
chances of prejudice attributable to pretrial publicity in this case could have been cut
drastically by transferring venue to a court in north or east Idaho.

In response to Mr. Hall's requests for information, only one of four local network
affiliates voluntarily provided materials related to its coverage of Ms. Henneman's
disappearance and death, Ms. Hanlon's death, and Mr. Hall. Copies of the transcripts of
the coverage is submitted as Exhibit 86. The other three network affiliates refused to
cooperate.
96

All of the articles from the Statesman are marked as Exhibit 88 and are provided
herewith.
97
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finds missing woman's purse, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 28, 2000, at lA, 12A.
That article indicated that after the effects had been discovered, police
engaged in a throrough search of the immediate vicinity-in full view of the
public. Id. at 12A. In discussing Ms. Henneman's disappearance generally,
the article also indicated that "[t]he news media has really hit the airwaves
hard with her picture ...." Id. at 12A (quoting the spokeswoman for the
Garden City Detective Unit). It also indicated that the pUblicity was
apparently working as detectives had already received fifty different tips. Id.
It also included a picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.

•

September 29, 2000. Another banner headline about Ms. Henneman's
disappearance appeared in the "Local" section of the Statesman. Patrick Orr,
Henneman may have gone to comedy club, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 29,
2000, at IB. That article revealed that the pUblicity campaign had led to the
police receiving some 34 more tips in only 24 hours. See id. It also included
Ms. Henneman's picture. Id.

•

September 30, 2000. The Statesman ran a front-page story revealing that a
$20,000 reward was being offered for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of anyone involved in Ms. Henneman's disappearance. Emily
Simnitt & Patrick Orr, $20,000 reward offered, IDAHO STATESMAN, Sept. 30,
2000, at lA, 7A. That article also reported that a "tearful" press conference
had been given by Ms. Henneman's family, indicated that the community
offered tremendous support to the family, conveyed the family's gratitude to
the Boise community, and included emotional pictures of the family. Id. It
included Ms. Henneman's picture. Id.

•

October I, 2000. For the fourth day in a row, the Statesman reported on Ms.
Henneman's disappearance, but only to say that no new leads had developed.

•

October 4, 2000. In an article prominently displayed on the first page of its
"Local" section, the Statesman reported that Ada County residents were
feeling uneasy about using the "Crown Jewel" of their community, the Boise
River Greenbelt, in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance: "Henneman's
recent disappearance has many shaken up. 'Seeing those pictures [the missing
person fliers] everywhere is haunting. It really makes you apprehensive .... I
didn't really start worrying about it until this last incident. '" Patrick Orr,
Greenbelt incidents make users nervous, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 4, 200, at
IB, 5B (quoting a local resident). In discussing the public's unease, the article
highlighted two previous rape-killings on the Greenbelt in recent years-that
of Kay Lynn Jackson in 1998, and that of Samantha Maher earlier in 2000.
Id. at 5B. But, at the same time, it included a large photo of a bicycle police
patrol, id. at IB, and included numerous reassurances from officers that the
Greenbelt is relatively safe, id. at IB, 5B.

•

October 8,2000. The banner headline on the cover of the Statesman indicated
that Lynn Henneman's body had apparently been found. Jeff McKinni &
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Patrick Orr, Body Found in Boise River, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 8,2000, at
lA, 9A. This article included a timeline and an annotated map of the
Greenbelt and downtown Boise, showing, among other things, where Ms.
Henneman had last been seen and where her body was recovered; two photos
of officers, apparently at the scene of the body recovery; and yet another
photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 9A.
•

October 9, 2000. The day after reporting her body apparently found by a
fisherman, the Statesman reported, in another front-page banner headline, that
Ms. Henneman's body had been positively identified. Patrick Orr, Coroner
confirms body's identity, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 9, 2000, at lA, 9A. That
article quoted the Ada County Coroner, Erwin Sonnenberg, as asserting
unequivocally: "It was definitely a homicide." The article also discussed the
high-profile "massive search," which had included boats, divers, search-andrescue dogs, and helicopters, that had failed to uncover Ms. Henneman's
body. Id. Finally, the article included yet another picture of Ms. Henneman.
Id. at lA.

•

October 10, 2000. For the third day in a row, the Statesman carried a frontpage banner headline about Ms. Henneman. Patrick Orr, Searchers find items
from slain woman, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 10,2000, at lA, 8A. The article
reported that additional items belonging to Ms. Henneman had been found:
"Right now, we are not disclosing what those items are, but there are some
things we know are hers, Boise Police Spokesman Jim Tibbs said at the scene
Monday. "We need to look at all the evidence before we can release that
information." Id. (quoting police spokesman). It also included an annotated
Greenbelt/downtown map, two large photos of police officers' evidence
recovery efforts, and another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at lA, 8A.

•

October 11, 2000. In another front-page banner headline, the Statesman
again, for the second time in eight days, addressed the public's safety
concerns in light of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and apparent murder.
Patrick Orr, Boise to step up Greenbelt security, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 11,
2000, at lA, 7A. The article quoted then-police chief Don Pierce as saying: "I
think first and foremost it was a traumatic event for this community. The
Greenbelt is one of our most prized posses~ions, and when something like this
happens, it is like someone steals one of our possessions." Id. at 1A.
In a separate article, carrying its own banner headline, and appearing on the
first page of the Statesman's "Local" section, it was reported that the Ada
County Coroner was expected to reveal the cause of Ms. Henneman's death
later that day. Patrick Orr, Cause of woman 's death expected today, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Oct. 11, 2000, at IB, 6B. It went on to repeat the earlierreported "knowledge" that certain items found in or near the Boise River over
previous days "definitely" belonged to Ms. Henneman. Id. at lB. The article
included another photo of Ms. Henneman. Id. at 1B. It also reported that
Ms. Henneman's family had expressed gratitude to the citizens of Boise for all
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their support, but were also "fearful for the citizens of Boise, because there is
a killer on the loose." Id. at lB, 6B (quoting a Boise lawyer who had been in
contact with the family).
•

October 12, 2000. In its fifth Henneman-related front-page banner-headlined
article in a row, and again including a picture of Ms. Henneman, the
Statesman reported that, although the Ada County Coroner would not publicly
reveal his opinion as to the cause of Ms. Hennman's death, he had "ruled out
stabbing, shooting, and blunt head trauma," and another newspaper had
reported that she was "probably strangled" to death. Patrick Orr, N. Y.
newspaper: Henneman was 'probably strangled, 'IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12,
200, at lA, 6A. In addition, the article noted that the reward for information
about Ms. Henneman's death had been increased to $30,000 with the
anonymous $10,000 contribution ofa local businessman. !d. at 6A.
In the "Local" section of the Statesman, Ms. Henneman's obituary appeared.
Obituaries, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 12, 2000, at 7B. That obituary indicated
that Ms. Henneman had "become a part of the community" during the
previous two weeks, it asked that the "residents of the Treasure Valley" pray
for the Henneman family, and it urged "the residents of the Treasure Valley"
to attend a public memorial service to be held on October 19, 2000. Id. The
obituary also included another picture of Ms. Henneman. Id.

•

October 13, 2000. For the sixth day in a row, the Statesman reported on the
Henneman's, but only to say that no new no information had been released by
the police. No new info released in Henneman case, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct.
13, 2000, at Bl. That article indicated that police had, by then received in
excess of300 tips from members of the community. Id.

•

October 20,2000. [Officer tells women to trust instincts, stay safe]98

•

October 23, 2000. In a front-page banner headline, the Statesman again
discussed the community'S safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt in light of
Ms. Henneman's death. Emily Simnitt, Police to rethink Greenbelt safety
after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. That article
reported on an apparent attempted attack on a 20-year old woman which
garnered a "heightened [police] response [which] was due in part to a partially
implemented plan to beef up security around the Greenbelt after Henneman
was slain near the pathway on about Sept. 24." Id. at lA. Despite the
overwhelming police response, the article indicated that members of the
public were still greatly disturbed:

98 In some instances, Mr. Hall has provided the Court with only a date and an article title.
In such instances, Mr. Hall knows that an article was published, but he has not been able
to obtain a copy of that article.
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"It's outrageous (that) as women, we can't go out
walking any place after dark," said Sue Fellen, whose office is
near the Greenbelt. "The city is paying attention, but
obviously, it's not doing enough. They need to take this
seriously."
"We need to send the message to bad people: 'Don't
corne to our town because there are consequences to pay. '"

For Bryana Deits, the stronger officer presence and better
lighting discussed by police and the parks department can't
corne soon enough. Deits, who moved to Boise three weeks
ago from Seattle, says she's more scared here. On Sunday
afternoon, Deits carefully chose a spot in the open and close to
busy Broadway Avenue in which to picnic.
Id. at 7A. The article went on to detail measures that were being taken to
enhance Greenbelt security, including stepping up bike, horse, and motorcycle
patrols, increasing lighting, adding telephones, and moving transients out of
the area (even though police acknowledged that transients have as much of a
right to use the park system as do other residents, and that they had no reason
to believe that transients had been involved in the most recent attack). Id.

•

October 27, 2000. In a banner headline on the front page of its "Local"
section, the Statesman reported a new lead in the Henneman case. Emily
Sirnnitt, Taskforce investigates Henneman lead, IDAHO STATESMAN, Oct. 27,
2000, at 1B. That article indicated that Ms. Henneman was seen talking to
someone on the Greenbelt shortly before she disappeared, but it also reported
that the police still refused to disclose the cause of her death, and whether she
had been sexually assaulted, for tactical reasons: "'Hypothetically, let's say
she was sexually assaulted,' Boise Det. Dave Smith said. 'If we put that out,
the killer knows we know and might leave the area. '" Id. It also included
Ms. Henneman's picture again, as well as another plea from help from the
community, promising a $42,500 reward for information leading to an arrest
and conviction. Id.

•

November 10,2000. [Henneman task force loses members.]

This summary of the early news coverage of the Henneman case makes a number
of things clear: (1) not only was the media spreading information about the Henneman
case through traditional channels, but police, Ms. Henneman's family, and concerned
members of the community were actively reaching out to everyone in the community
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through pleas for information and missing person posters; (2) the net result of these
combined efforts was that Ms. Henneman's death was thrust to the forefront of Boise's
consciousness virtually every day for over a month; (3) Ms. Henneman's disappearance
and death were deeply emotional, not only for her family, whose personal suffering was
shared with the entire community, but also for the community as whole, many of whom
were able to empathize with the family's personal loss; (4) Ms. Henneman's
disappearance and death, which had come relatively soon after two prior rape/murders on
the Greenbelt, was a terrifying event not only for those Ada county residents who
regularly used the Greenbelt, but for all members of the local community who perceived
the Greenbelt to be a symbol of everything that is great about the Treasure Valley; and
(5) the police were completely in control of the information that was disseminated to the
public through the various media outlets, such that where police suspicions were
presented, they were given as fact, and where the police suspicions were in doubt, they
were presented as being withheld for tactical reasons. In the aggregate, this coverage
virtually guaranteed that all of Ada County's residents would have strong feelings about
whoever might eventually be charged with harming Ms. Henneman. They felt deep and
pain and fear, and they had been led to believe that everything the police said was fact.
After November 2000, although the specifics of the Henneman case were no
longer reported on a near-daily basis, the case never strayed far from people's minds.
Throughout 2001 and 2002, the major media outlets occasionally reported on the fact that
no progress had been made in the Henneman case, but were actually more likely to report
on the related issue of the public's safety concerns regarding the Greenbelt
•

April 4, 2001. [City to light Greenbelt tunnels]
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•

April 26, 2001. [Ada residents still worry about Greenbelt safety]

•

June 10,2001. [Guardians of the Greenbelt]

•

August 20,2001. [Group seeks to light Greenbelt]

•

September 25,2001. [Clues still sought in Henneman case]

•

October 20,2001. [Boise adds to Greenbelt trail security]

•

November 19, 2002. [Police chief tries to allay CIU fears]

•

April 11, 2002. [Boiseans to gather on birthday of flight attendant slain in
2000]

•

April 13, 2002. [Boiseans show their support for slain woman's family]

•

June 19,2002. [Boise council awards bid to light up the Greenbelt]

•

September 24,2002. [Murders, other crimes prompt Boise Police to increase
Greenbelt safety] [2 years later, detectives still search for killer]

These articles demonstrate that, although months had passed since the discovery
of Ms. Henneman's body, the residents of Ada County had not forgotten: they had a deep
sense of hurt over Ms. Henneman and her family's suffering; and they had a new-found
fear that their beloved Greenbelt was no longer a safe place to recreate.
On March 1, 2002, another tragic event greatly impacted the Henneman

investigation and, ultimately, Mr. Hall's prospects of getting a fair trial in the Henneman
case: Cheryl Ann Hanlon was found dead in the Boise foothills. That event led to more
saturation-style media coverage, and eventually led to Mr. Hall being labeled a "killer" in
the public's eye.
•

March 2, 2003. In a front-page banner-headlined article, the Statesman
reported that Cheryl Ann Hanlon had been found dead on a North End
hillside, the victim of an apparent ligature strangulation. Chereen Langrill,
Woman found strangled on North End hillside, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 2,
2003, at 1,8. The article contained a small map of the North End, two photos
of the body recovery scene, a photo of Ms. Hanlon, and pleas for citizens to
help the police by calling in all potential tips. Id. at 8.
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•

March 3, 2003. In a banner-headlined article on the first page of the
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper provided a sketch and a physical
description of a man supposedly seen with Ms. Hanlon shortly before she
turned up dead. Jonathon Brunt, Sketch of man released by police, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 3,2003, at 1, 7. The article also included another picture of
Ms. Hanlon, another map of the North End, another plea for help from the
community, and a photo of Ms. Hanlon's truck. Id. at 1, 7. Finally, the
article, intimated that Ms. Hanlon's apparent murder might be related to one
or more of the numerous other unsolved Boise murders, including those of
Kay Lynn Jackson and Lynn Henneman. Id. at 1, 7.

•

March 4, 2003. In another banner-headlined article on the first page of the
Statesman's "Local" section, the paper reported again on Ms. Hanlon's
apparent murder, providing another picture of her, another composite sketch
and physical description of the man she was supposedly seen with, and
another plea for information from the community. Jonathon Brunt, Police
following up tips in killing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 4, 2003, at 1, 3. The
article also included a number of safety tips for area residents. Id. at 3.

•

March 5, 2003. On the first page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that Ms. Hanlon had leisurely strolled into the foothills alone, had
stopped at some point, had struggled with her assailant, and then had been
dragged downhill to the place where her body was ultimately found. Chereen
LangrilI, Police: Murder victim walked into foothills, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Mar. 5,2003, at 1,3. That version of events, apparently derived from police
measurements of footprints at the scene, was presented by the police (through
the Statesman) as fact. See id. at 1. The article also provided another picture
of Ms. Hanlon, another composite sketch and physical description of the man
she was supposedly seen with, and another plea for information from the
community. Id. at 1,3.

•

March 15,2003. On its front page, the Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had
been charged with the murder of Ms. Hanlon. Patrick Orr, Transient charged
in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.15, 2003, at 1, 11. That article
prominently referred to Mr. Hall as a "transient," which was the same
negative label that had been used to describe the homeless people who were
assumed to present safety challenges on the Greenbelt after Ms. Henneman's
death. See Police to rethink Greenbelt safety after attack, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Oct. 23, 2000, at lA, 7A. It also offered a side-by-side comparison of the
composite sketch of the individual supposedly last seen with Ms. Hanlon, to
Mr. Hall's unflattering mug shot. Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon
IDAHO
STA TESMAN,
Mar.15,
2003,
at
1.
death,
It also made it appear that the police had, without doubt, found their man:
"The city of Boise can breathe a sigh of relief that Eric
Hall is off the streets," Boise Police Chief Don Pierce said
Friday morning.
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Pierce said Hall admitted to detectives late Thursday that
he killed Hanlon, 42, in the foothills near 5th and Alturas
streets in the early morning hours of March 1.

Pierce also said detectives had amassed a significant
amount of physical evidence tying Hall to the sexual assault
and murder but declined to specify the evidence.
Investigators believe Hall sexually assaulted Hanlon and
strangled her to death, then tried to conceal her body in a
shallow hole by covering her with grass and tree branches,
Pierce said.
Detectives say Hall then took Hanlon's car, eventually
abandoning it near 13th and Franklin streets.
Id. at 1, 11. The article then went on to detail what it called Mr. Hall's
"extensive" criminal history, highlighting his conviction for statutory rape
after having been accused of sexually assaulting and choking a 17-year old
girl, and his subsequent charge of failure to register as a sex offender. Id. at
11. It also indicated that Mr. Hall had been implicated based on tips from the
public: "'This is a very good example of how we rely on our community to
help us,' Pierce said, praising the more than 100 people who came forward
with tips on the case." Id. at 11. Finally, the article included yet another
picture of Ms. Hanlon, as well as a photograph of Boise Police Chief Don
Pierce. Id. at 1, 11.
In a separate article, the Statesman reported that a DNA sample taken from
Mr. Hall would be sent out-of-state for analysis. Chereen Langrill, DNA tests
in slaying may be delayed, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,2003, at Local 11.
•

March 18, 2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman ran
an article reiterating many of the inflammatory content of its March 15 article.
Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces hearing on March 28, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Mar. 18, 2003, at Local 1. It included Mr. Hall's unflattering
mugshot; it reported that prosecutors claimed he "used a belt to strangle
Hanlon," as if that allegation had already been established as fact; it asserted
that Mr. Hall had admitted to killing Ms. Hanlon; it stated that police had
categorized Mr. Hall as a ''transient''; it implied that Mr. Hall may have raped
and killed either Kay Lynn Jackson or Lynn Henneman; and it detailed his
criminal history, highlighting the unproven allegation that he had raped,
bound, and choked a 17year old girl. Id.

•

March 29, 2003. [Murder suspect also charged with rape]
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The intense media coverage surrounding Ms. Hanlon's death, while at first
playing to the community's fear for the safety of its young women and, perhaps, outrage
for having to be concerned with such matters, later offered the community an expedient
path to peace of mind: get rid of Erick Hall. The media coverage, driven by police
statements, portrayed Mr. Hall as a "transient" sexual deviant, with a penchant for
strangulation during rape, who has lived a life of crime. Thus, it dehumanized him.
Furthermore, it portrayed his guilt in the Hanlon case as having been already established,
and it implied that Mr. Hall may be guilty of other unsolved murders in Boise. And,
even if he is not guilty of other crimes, it implied that Mr. Hall was certainly guilty of
something and, therefore, should be removed from society: "The city of Boise can
breathe a sigh of relief that Eric Hall is off the streets .... " Patrick Orr, Transient
charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar.IS, 2003, at 1 (quoting the Boise

Police Chief).

Thus, it also made him a lightening rod for all of the community's

frustration about its crime problems.
On April 2, 2003, based on the DNA sample obtained from Mr. Hall in relation to
the Hanlon case, the State accused Mr. Hall of raping and murdering Lynn Henneman.
As detailed below, that charge only served to heighten the prejudicial reporting on
Mr. Hall.

•

April 3, 2003. In a prominent article on its front page, the Statesman reported
that Mr. Hall had been charged with Ms. Henneman's murder. Patrick Orr,
Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1,
6. That article included a sub-headline reading "DNA test shows Eric [sic]
Hall killed flight attendant in 2000, Boise police say," which appeared next to
the unflattering mugshot of Mr. Hall. Id. The article then went to great length
to report that in police officers' minds, trial would be nothing more than
technicality because Mr. Hall had already been "proven" guilty beyond all
doubt:
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Boise police say DNA evidence links the same man to
two brutal rape/murders, providing a major break in a 2~-year
old murder case that changed the way Boise residents view
safety on the Greenbelt.

Lead Detective Dave Smith and others in the department
took the case personally, Pierce said ....

Two and a half years later, Pierce said, Boise is a safer
place with the Henneman murder finally solved.
"Today, we know the man who killed her, Eric [sic]
Virgil Hall, is behind bars," Pierce said Wednesday during a
news conference. "We are 100 percent certain we have our
man."
Id. at 1, 6. After all of that, however, "Pierce declined further comment,
saying he wants to ensure Hall gets a fair trial." Id. at 6. Detective Smith,
however, picked up right where Chief Pierce had left off. According to the
Statesman, Detective Smith claimed that the "details at the Hanlon crime
scene ... immediately brought to mind the Henneman case.... 'Right at the
(scene), we had strong feelings there might be a match here,' Smith said.,,99
Id. at 6 (alteration in original).
The Statesman's lead article on April 3, 2003 also tugged at the public'
heartstrings. It was topped by a large picture of Ms. Henneman's relatives, at
taken at the previous day's City Hall news conference announcing that Mr.
Hall had been charged, showing them overcome with emotion. Id. at 1.
99 It should be noted that Detective Smith's claim on or about April 3, 2003, which was
reiterated by the Statesman on AprilS, 2003, and April 24, 2003, Jonathon Brunt,
Henneman suspect fell through cracks of DNA testing, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003,
at 8; Patrick Orr, Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman , IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24,
2003, at Local 6, is directly at-odds with statements made by Chief Pierce a few weeks
earlier. See Patrick Orr, Transient charged in Hanlon death, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 15,
2003, at 1 ("Pierce said a DNA sample has been taken from Hall and will be compared
against DNA evidence from other major unsolved crimes in Boise, likely including the
Lynn Henneman and the Kay Lynn Jackson rape/murder cases in 2000 and 1998 and last
year's serial rape attacks in the Winstead Park area. However, he said, there is no
suspected link to those cases at this point."); Patrick Orr, Suspect in Hanlon killing faces
hearing on March 28, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 18,2003, at Local 1 (same). Thus, one
has to wonder whether Detective Smith's statement is true or whether, perhaps, his
recollection was altered by the DNA testing results.
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Later, it had a large photo of Ms. Henneman's husband and sister hugging at
the conclusion of the press conference. Id. at 6. The article said that during
the news conference, Ms. Henneman's parents and sister stood behind Chief
Pierce, "at times holding each other for support," while Ms. Henneman's
husband stood quietly to the side. Id. It then quoted Ms. Henneman's
husband, Walter Us, as being just as convinced of Mr. Hall's guilt as Chief
Pierce and Detective Smith were, and printed his request that 'justice" be
done: "'I am sad another person had to die to catch this killer, but I am glad he
is behind bars and will have to face justice," Us said. Lynn deserves justice.
All we can do is pray and hope for the best and pray justice is carried out. '"
Id. at 1,6 (quoting Ms. Henneman's husband).
Finally, it is worth noting that the article touched on the psychological effects
of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death on the Boise community. It
noted that "Henneman's disappearance as she walked along the river to her
hotel frightened city residents and led to several safety improvements on
Boise's Greenbelt." Id. at 1, 6. It made it clear that Ms. Henneman's
disappearance and death had changed the way many Boiseans viewed their
community: See id. at 6.
In its April 3, 2003 edition, the Statesman devoted a full page (besides the
front-page coverage) to Mr. Hall's alleged crimes. At the top of the page was
an article detailing Ms. Henneman's family's two and a half year ordeal.
Patrick Orr, Henneman's family has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. In that article, it was noted that Mr. Hall's
arrest had "eased the minds" of the family, and had given them "some relief."
Id. Interestingly, the article appeared with a large photo of a tough- and
serious-looking Detective Smith posing next to an American flag. Id. In the
article, Ms. Henneman's family and Chief Pierce heaped praIse upon
Detective Smith, portraying him as a tireless advocate of justice:
"This guy is just fantastic," Micki Husienga said,
pointing at Smith.

"For the last two and a half years, Micki has been calling
and saying 'Dave, I love you, and I have been praying for you'
... " Smith said ....
Smith said he took the case personally, working on the
case at least once a week--chasing every lead, re-examining
old clues, scouring the Internet for similar cases and getting
DNA samples from people of interest while working on his
regular caseload.
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"These are the kinds of cases where good detectives
become intimately, personally involved in the case," Chief Don
Pierce said.

Id. at 6.
Also in the April 3, 2003, edition of the Statesman was an article largely
vilifying Mr. Hall. See Jonathon Brunt, Suspect in two slayings has lengthy
criminal record, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6. In that article, which
contained a second copy of Mr. Hall's unflattering mugshot, Mr. Hall's prior
criminal history was detailed, with particular attention paid to the fact that he
had been on probation for "assaulting a different woman when one of the
victims [Ms. Hanlon] was killed .... " Id. However, the article did finally
reveal some information that did not come directly from the police: it quoted a
friend as saying that Mr. Hall had cried and asserted his innocence, and that he
is actually a kind and gentle young man. Id.
•

April 4, 2003. The Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had been arraigned in the
Henneman case. Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges,
IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 4,2003, at Locall. The article then went on to offer
the police department's version of the facts without question: "he [Mr. Hall]
eventually confessed to [the Hanlon murder],,; and "[a] DNA sample taken
from Hall linked him with the two murders ...." Id. The article then went on
to quote a friend of Mr. Hall's who, despite her faith in him, had already been
persuaded by the State's evidence which had been reported in the media, and
her misperception of the strength of that evidence:
[Jillian] Stone said she first met Hall during the summer
of2000 at Julia Davis Park. "He was like a father figure to me,
so the first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie."
She added: "Now I think, 'What ifthat was me?'"

Id.
•

April 5, 2003. The Statesman, in a front-page article that provided yet another
copy of Mr. Hall's unflattering mugshot, as well as much more flattering
photos of his two alleged victims, reported that despite Mr. Hall's criminal
record, the State did not have a sample of Mr. Hall's DNA on-hand when it
started investigating the Henneman and Hanlon murders because he had been
released from prison before Idaho's DNA sampling law went into effect.
Jonathon Brunt, Henneman suspect fell through cracks ofDNA testing, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 5,2003, at 1, 8. The clear implication of this article is that
if the DNA sampling law had gone into effect sooner, then Mr. Hall would
have been apprehended sooner and Ms. Hanlon might never have been killed.
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See id. However, this implication pre-supposes the accuracy of the DNA
testing and interpretation, and Mr. Hall's guilt.
•

April 14, 2003. Lest there have been any confusion about whether the
Statesman had prematurely adjudged Mr. Hall guilty in its April 5, 2003,
article, the newspaper made its position clear in an April 14, 2003 editorial:
It's outrageous to think that Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, now
accused of killing two women in Boise, could sit in prison for
seven years without submitting to a DNA test. But it's
downright scary to think that other violent criminals may have
slipped by the DNA database because of lack of administrative
follow-up.
Editorial, DNA testing is a must, preferably at booking, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Apr. 14, 2003, at Local 8. Thus, the newspaper labeled Mr. Hall a violent
criminal and, by arguing that his alleged crimes had "slipped by the DNA
database," it presupposed that he is actually guilty of those crimes. It then
went on to argue that DNA matches are indisputable by quoting then-Ada
County Sheriff, Vaughn Killeen: '''DNA determines guilt or innocence,'
Killeen said. 'It's more reliable than eyewitness accounts. If I were falsely
accused of a crime, I'd want to have the DNA testing.'" Id. It should be
noted that the Statesman's editorial also featured Mr. Hall's unflattering
mugshot.

•

April 24, 2003. On the front-page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that Mr. Hall had been arraigned in the Henneman case. Patrick Orr,
Suspect to plead in rape, killing of woman , IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 24,2003,
at Local 1, 6. In that article, the Statesman, which referred to Mr. Hall not as
"the man" or "the person," but rather ''the transient" accused of killing
Ms. Henneman, reiterated: the details of Ms. Henneman's disappearance and
death; the fact that Mr. Hall stood accused of killing not only Ms. Henneman,
but also Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that Mr. Hall had confessed to killing
Ms. Hanlon; the allegation that "[a] DNA sample taken from Hall after his
arrest in the Hanlon killing linked him with the Henneman killing"; and
Detective Smith's questionable claim that the Hanlon crime scene
immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because it appeared to
involve a similar modus operandi. Id. at 1,6. In addition, the article indicated
that, in discussing supposedly secret grand jury proceedings, the Ada County
Prosecutor had selectively leaked information which he obviously felt would
help his chances of convicting Mr. Hall: the fact that multiple out-of-state
experts had testified ''that DNA taken from murder suspect Eric [sic] Hall
matched DNA taken from victim Lynn Henneman." Id. at 6.

•

May 6,2003. [Greenbelt patrols spring into action]

•

May 8, 2003. [Execution sought in Henneman slaying]
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•

May 20, 2003. [Plea in Henneman case delayed]

•

May 22, 2003. In an article on the front-page of the "Local" section, the
Statesman reported that Mr. Hall had been indicted in the Hanlon case.
Patrick Orr, Hall indicted in Hanlon murder, rape case, IDAHO STATESMAN,
May 22, 2003, at Local 1. The article contained cursory summaries of both
cases and highlighted what the police/Statesman saw as the damning
evidence: Mr. Hall's "extensive" criminal record; a DNA sample which
"linked him to the Henneman killing"; and the questionable claim that the
Hanlon crime scene bore such similarities to the Henneman case that that
crime scene immediately brought the Henneman case to mind for
investigators. Id. It should be noted that this article also once again
showcased the unflattering mugshot of Mr. Hall, and a smiling picture of
Ms. Hanlon. Id.

•

May 29,2003. [Recent rash of murders strains police, prosecutors]

•

June 7, 2003. [Not guilty pleas entered in two Ada County murder cases]

As the above news reports make clear, after Mr. Hall had been charged with
Ms. Henneman's death, the police began to use the press to begin conditioning the
community to internalizing the themes that it would later develop during voir dire and,
ultimately, at trial. The press portrayed Detective Smith, the lead investigator on the
Henneman case, as being a indefatigable proponent of justice: a tough, hardworking cop
on the outside, but a caring man on the inside whose only flaw is sometimes he took the
pursuit of "justice" too personally. See generally, e.g., Patrick Orr, Henneman's family
has mixed feelings about arrest, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 6. At the same
time, the press reported that the officers involved in the Henneman case, whose integrity
and professionalism had already been bolstered, could personally vouch for the "fact" of
Mr. Hall's guilt. See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in Henneman murder, IDAHO
STATESMAN, Apr. 3,2003, at 6 ("We are 100 percent certain we have our man.") (quoting
Police Chief Pierce). At the same time, the press characterized the police department's
evidence as being virtually incontrovertible.

First, it treated the police department's
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characterization of the DNA evidence as being the unquestionable truth.

Second, it

adopted Detective Smith's after-the-fact and highly suspect contention that once he saw
the Hanlon crime scene, it immediately brought the Henneman case to mind because of
an allegedly similar modus operandi. Third, it portrayed Mr. Hall as evil: it included a
sinister-looking mugshot with every article; it adopted the police department's
dehumanizing label of "transient"; and it highlighted what it repeatedly called Mr. Hall's
"extensive" criminal record at every turn while, at the same time, trying to draw
analogies between the pending rape/murder charges and his prior statutory rape
conviction and assault charge. Indeed, if there is any doubt about the degree to which the
police had shaped the public's preconceptions about the case through their use of the
media, one need turn no further than the statements given to the Statesman by lillian
Stone. Ms. Stone was a friend of Mr. Hall's who, at one time, had trusted him so much
that she though of him as a father-figure. But even Ms. Stone was quickly convinced of
Mr. Hall's guilt and the infallibility of the State's DNA evidence-not by evidence

adduced at trial or by a jury's verdict, but by the pretrial media publicity (as driven by the
statements of the police): "[T]he first time I heard about this, I didn't believe it-there
was no way he could have done it. But DNA doesn't lie. Now I think, 'What if that was
me?'" Patrick Orr, Suspect arraigned on rape, murder charges, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr.
4,2003, at Local! (quoting Ms.Stone).
Any time the press shows the police and, in particular, the lead investigator on a
case, such adoration, treating the individual officers as saviors of the community, and
also presents the State's evidence as categorically true, while at the same time denigrating
the defendant and treating him as sub-human, there is always going to be a risk that the
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public will develop a tremendous prejudice against the defendant. However, that risk
was heightened in this case because the messages offered to the public by the press were
the very types of messages that the public so wanted to embrace. In this case, the public
was so deeply saddened, angered, and terrified by the circumstances of Ms. Henneman
and Ms. Hanlon's deaths, that it must have been comforting to hear-and to believethat the cause of all the suffering had been removed from society and, therefore, that the
streets of Boise were once again safe.

See, e.g., Patrick Orr, Suspect charged in

Henneman murder, IDAHO STATESMAN, Apr. 3, 2003, at 1 ("Today, we know the man
who killed her, Eric [sic] Virgil Hall, is behind bars.") (quoting Chief Pierce).
While the intensity of the news coverage surrounding the Hanlon and Henneman
cases certainly diminished after Mr. Hall was indicted in those cases, it did not go away.
Consequently, neither case strayed far from the public consciousness. As detailed below,
from the winter of 2003 to the start of the Henneman trial in the fall of 2004, both cases
continued to be the subject of pUblicity.
•

November 30,2003. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that the $42,500 reward that had been offered for infonnation leading
to an arrest and conviction in the Henneman case would not be given to
anyone because the case was "solved" by police work, not a tip. Patrick Orr,
Reward won't be given for solving homicide, IDAHO STATESMAN, Nov. 30,
2004, at Local 1, 5. fu that article, besides proclaiming Mr. Hall's guilt in the
Henneman case by referring to it as having been "solved," the newspaper
reiterated a number of its previous prejudicial statements. It continued to refer
to Mr. Hall as "Boise transient"; it made it clear that Mr. Hall stood accused
of two crimes which the police now claimed involved a similar modus
operandi; and it repeated the police department's assertion that "[t]he DNA
samples matched Hall with both Hanlon and Henneman." Id.

•

January 17, 2004. [Trial put off in Henneman slaying]

•

January 24,2004. [October trial set in slaying ofLynn Henneman]

•

February 10, 2004. [Bill would require more criminals to have DNA test]

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

247
0"'000

•

February 23,2004. [Greenbelt seems safer-and stats say it is]

•

February 24,2004. [City is investing wisely in keeping Greenbelt safe]

•

February 26,2004. [Volunteers free up Garden City police for more time on
street]

•

March 24, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that during the previous afternoon another young woman had turned
up dead near the Boise Greenbelt. Kathleen Kreller & Patrick Orr, Passer-by
discovers body of woman in Boise pond, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 24,2004, at
Local 1. Later, this woman was identified as Amanda Stroud, an individual
who was listed as a potential State's witness in the Henneman case.

•

March 25, 2004. On the front page of its "Local" section, the Statesman
reported that the dead body found two days earlier near the Greenbelt was that
of Amanda Stroud. Patrick Orr, Police seek clues to where woman was living,
Idaho Statesman, Mar.25, 2004, at Local 1, 3. It further reported that the
cause of her death was unknown. Id.

•

March 27,2004. [Dead woman linked to murder suspect]

•

April 3, 2004. [Toxicology results pending in woman's death]

•

April 22, 2004. [Tests fail to show how woman, 21, died]

•

September 22, 2004. [Courthouse to host 2 big trials]

The above media coverage, while certainly not as intense as it had been at
previous times, undoubtedly kept the Hanlon and Henneman cases on the public's
collective mind. Moreover, since the coverage had been so persistent for so long (it was
just about four years between Ms. Henneman's disappearance and Mr. Hall's trial), the
State's message, as reported through the media, had no doubt become ingrained in
people's thinking about the cases. Indeed, as the Idaho Court of Appeals has already
recognized: "When prospective jurors are incessantly exposed to news stories selectively
packaged for mass consumption, they may become subtly conditioned to accept a certain
version of facts at trial. Such repetitive exposure may diminish the jurors' ability to
separate information absorbed before trial from information during trial." State v. Hall,
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111 Idaho 827, 830, 727 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussed favorably in State.v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 278, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003». This danger seems especially

insidious in cases such as this one--where some, but not a great deal, of time has passed
between the most frenzied media coverage and the actual trial. In this case, enough time
has passed (approximately a year and half between the time that the police, amid great
pomp and circumstance, announced that they had collared "their man," and the time that
Mr. Hall was actually tried) for potential jurors to forget the details of what they had

heard and seen in the news, such that their biases would not have been readily articulable
during jury selection, but an insufficient amount of time had passed for those potential
jurors to have forgotten their much more subtle biases about the police, the evidence, and
the defendant.
In light of both the quantity and the quality of the pretrial pUblicity in this case,

trial counsel should have, at the very least, thoroughly investigated and considered the
issue of whether it was possible for Mr. Hall to receive a fair trial before an unbiased jury
in Ada County.

ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("Counsel should

maintain copies of media reports about the case for various purposes, including to support
a motion for change of venue, if appropriate, to assist in the voir dire of the jury
regarding the effects of pretrial pUblicity, to monitor the public statements of potential
witnesses, and to facilitate the work of counsel who might be involved in later stages of
the case.") Because even a cursory review of the pretrial pUblicity that occurred in this
case reveals that there was "a reasonable likelihood that prejudicial news coverage
prevented a fair trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution," State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 77 P.3d 956, 967 (2003), it is likely that a
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change of venue would likely have been granted. Thus, trial counsel should have fully
developed and litigated a motion for a change of venue.
2.

Trial Counsel Failed To Poll The Community And/Or Obtain
Affidavits Demonstrating A Community Bias Against Erick
Hall lOO

Although the sheer volume and prejudicial nature of the pretrial publicity in this
case was sufficient to warrant a change of venue, see, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963), counsel should have done more than rely on the publicity itself; counsel was
required to develop a thorough motion to change venue, highlighting all possible grounds
for that motion to be granted. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8
("Whether raising an issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual,
sequestered voir dire on death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion
shaped by the capital aspect of the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of
publicity), counsel should be sure to litigate all of the possible legal and factual bases for
the request. This will increase the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also
fully preserve the issue for post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied.").
That means that counsel had an obligation to obtain evidence that the community was, in
fact, biased against Mr. Hall. See Hall, 111 Idaho at 830, 727 P.2d at 1258 ("Among the
factors considered [when reviewing a judge's denial of a motion to change venue] are the
existence of affidavits indicating prejudice, or lack of prejudice, in the community where

Post-conviction counsel has not polled the community, because any polling after the
fact, i.e., after the Henneman trial, would necessarily be tainted by the coverage of the
trial itself and by the fact that Mr. Hall was convicted and sentenced to death. Moreover,
following the Henneman trial, the State went forward on the Hanlon charges. The
community sentiment at the time of the Henneman trial, then, cannot be "reconstructed."
The Court must therefore rely heavily on the quantity and nature of the publicity prior to
the Henneman trial.
100
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the defendant was tried .... ") Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have made some
effort to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community, i.e., the
jury pool.
In the present case, every indication is that trial counsel made no effort
whatsoever to document, in a systematic and reliable way, the bias of the community.
(Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.287, Ls.2-10 (trial counsel did not conduct
any sort of community polling).) Because such an effort would likely have revealed an
overwhelming bias against Mr. Hall, and because such bias would likely have led to a
motion for change of venue being granted, Mr. Hall's trial counsel was ineffective.
3.

Trial Counsel Failed To Move For A Change Of Venue Or, In The
Alternative, To Have A Jury From Another County Impaneled

Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for a change of venue or,
in the alternative, a motion to impanel a jury from another county. As discussed above,
such a motion would have been extremely compelling, and would have been likely to
succeed based solely upon the prejudicial media coverage.
It appears that trial counsel never seriously considered moving for a change of

venue, despite the overwhelming quantity and prejudicial nature of the pre-trial pUblicity.
Although trial counsel briefly indicated they thought about filing such a motion, neither
could recall any discussions about moving for a change of venue. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition
of Ami I Myshin, p.125 Ls.6-19 (stating that he "considered" filing a motion for change of
venue, but did not recall why they did not file one); Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr,
p.262 ("Q. Was there any discussion amongst the trial members of moving for a change
of venue? A. "Yeah, I think Amil - I don't remember. I can't say. I'm just making
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things out of my head. I'm sure I thought about it, and I'm sure Amil thought about
it.").)
Trial counsel's complete lack of recollection about a change of venue motion suggests
that trial counsel did not seriously consider moving for one:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.

. .. do you remember if you filed for a change of venue in this case?
I don't. I don't remember. Did we?
No.
I don't recall."
Do you recall any - I suppose that you don't recall any decision
whether you should file one or not file one, then? If you don't
recall whether one was filed, I would be surprised if you recalled.
No. I don't recall.

(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.125, Ls.4-15.)

Trial counsel should have

seriously investigated filing a motion for change of venue. Trial counsel was aware of
the media coverage of Erick Hall and that the media had linked his name to both the
Henneman and Hanlon murders. (Tr., 911406 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.158, L.15 p.159, L.4; Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr ("Q. But you had concerns about the
publicity? A. Um-hmm. I think that was somewhat the nexus of the case of keeping
Hanlon out of Henneman and that whole thing, yeah.

Absolutely."); Tr., 9/13/06

deposition of D.C. Carr (recalling that he saw pUblicity about Erick sexually abusing a
seventeen year old).)
Trial counsel also did not consider impaneling a jury from another county. Trial
counsel stated his belief that the ''best'' juries or at least the "liberal" juries come from
Ada County. (Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.287, L.20 - p.288, L.2.)
However, this cannot be a legitimate strategic choice, as there is nothing to indicate that
trial counsel even considered impaneling a jury from another county, or that Ada county
seats "liberal" juries. Moreover, Mr. Myshin has spent his thirty years of practice in the
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Ada County, and his only criminal trial experience has been in Ada County-he's been
with the Ada County Defender's office for the past 22 years. (Tr., 11116106 deposition of
Amil Myshin, p.392, Ls.2-24.)
Due to the overwhelming quantity of media coverage of Erick Hall and the
Henneman and Hanlon murders, trial counsel should have moved for a change of venue
or, in the alternative, moved to impanel a jury from another county.

But for their

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that Erick Hall would have
received a life sentence from an unbiased jury. See section 1, supra; see Claim FF, infra.
4.

Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Question Potential Jurors
During Voir Dire As To The Amount, And Nature, Of The Pretrial
Publicity To Which They Had Been Exposed

As discussed above, the Idaho courts have been incorrect when they have said that
in order to obtain a change of venue based upon unfair pretrial publicity the defendant
must show that he was actually prejudiced by inclusion of a juror, specifically proven to
be biased, on his jury.

See, e.g., Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).101

Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that inclusion of a juror, specifically shown to be
biased, warrants vacation of the defendant's conviction. United States v. Gonzalez, 214
F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000). Thus, in this case, trial counsel should have thoroughly
examined all of the prospective jurors regarding the extent to which they had been
exposed to, and influenced by, pretrial publicity-whether to make a record to appeal a
denial of a motion for change of venue (had one been filed) or to ferret out instances of
actual bias. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8 ("Whether raising an
issue specific to a capital case (such as requesting individual, sequestered voir dire on

101 Not only is this approach incorrect, it is impossible to establish in this case, due to the
Court's prohibition on juror contact.
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death-qualification of the jury) or a more common motion shaped by the capital aspect of
the case (such as requesting a change of venue because of publicity), counsel should be
sure to litigate all of the possible legal and factual bases for the request. This will increase
the likelihood that the request will be granted and will also fully preserve the issue for
post-conviction review in the event the claim is denied."). However, as set forth in detail
below, trial counsel utterly failed to do so.
a.

Juror No.6

Juror No.6, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.850, Ls.22-24.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.850, L.25.)
Later, in response to a question from the prosecutor, Juror No.6 indicated that she had
seen "the media" before. (Tr., p.1060, Ls.17-I8.) But it is not clear whether the State
was talking about a news program or fictional television programming when it asked that
question. (See Tr., p.1060, Ls.5-23.)

Either way, it is obvious that these questions,

which were the only questions that could have gone anywhere toward delving into the
question of whether Juror No. 6 had come into contact with any of the extensive pretrial
publicity in this case, or had formed some type of opinions about the case based on that
publicity, were not well-crafted for that purpose.

Thus, trial counsel should have

followed up with questions of their own. However, they did not. They did not ask a
single question about pretrial publicity, or Juror No. 6's pre-conceptions about the case,
before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr., p.1067, L.I8 - p.1083, L.5.)
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b.

Juror No. 51

Juror No. 51, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1766, Ls.10-12.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1766, L.l3.)
The State asked Juror No. 51 if she was a Greenbelt user, and she answered
affirmatively.

(Tr., p.1829, L.15 - p.1830, L.3.)

Later, the State asked her if she

remembered the details of the Henneman case and whether she was a television news
watcher, and Juror No. 51 answered affirmatively again-to both questions. (Tr., p.1831,
Ls.9-18.) Thereafter, the State tried to elicit testimony along the lines of "but that's all I
can remember about the case," but she kept coming up with additional details that she
could recall-she volunteered that she remembered that Ms. Henneman's body was not
found for some time, that Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death ''was a huge story,"
that she was exposed to the details of the Henneman case through newspapers and
television news, and that Mr. Hall was [mally "caught" and arrested. (See Tr., p.1831,
L.9 - p.1832, L.10.)
Despite the fact that Juror No. 51 had said that she was a Greenbelt user, that she
had been exposed to the extensive (prejudicial) news coverage about the Henneman case,
and that she remembered that Mr. Hall had been "caught," trial counsel never asked any
worthwhile follow-up questions about the pUblicity issue. (See generally Tr., p.1832,
L.21 - p.1849, L.16.)

Instead, counsel asked cursorily whether she could recall

Mr. Hall's background or the circumstances of his being charged and, when she said no

to both questions, counsel tried to essentially rehabilitate her by asking, in a leading
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fashion, whether, when she said Mr. Hall had been "caught," she meant to imply that she
believed he was guilty. (Tr., p.1833, Ls.2-16.) Juror No. 51 answered this last question
with a "no." (Tr., p.1833, Ls.11-16.) Ultimately, trial counsel passed her for cause. (Tr.,
p.1849, L.16.)
An effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions about

what Juror No. 51 knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional fact
of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her family's
suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi between the
two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt.
c.

Juror No. 62

Juror No. 62, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.)
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 62 what she remembered about the Henneman
case, and she testified that she could recall little. (Tr., p.2074, L.20 - p.2076, L.5.) The
only follow-up to this line of questioning on the part of trial counsel was to ask whether
she had followed recent articles in the newspaper regarding capital juries in general. (Tr.,
p.2103, L.22 - p.2104, L.4.) Juror No. 62 responded negatively, indicating that she does
not like the Statesman, and that was it. (Tr., p.2104, Ls.5-16.)
Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deeper, more probing, questions
about what Juror No. 62 knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly emotional
fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of her
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family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt.
d.

Juror No. 63

Juror No. 63, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.)
The prosecutor asked Juror No. 63 if she could remember anything specific about
the Henneman case. (Tr., p.1211, L.24 - p.2112, L.2.) As she answered that question,
first saying that she could not remember any specifics, but then beginning to recite those
details that she did remember, the State cut her off "[t]hat suits us just fine." (Tr., p.2112,
Ls.3-6.) At that point, Juror No. 63, probably feeling that her knowledge of the case
actually wasn't important, stated simply: "Just from the paper, you know." (Tr., p.2112,
L.7.)
Trial counsel did not ask a single follow-up question about Juror No. 63's
exposure to pretrial pUblicity, or any pre-conceived opinions that she may have
developed based on that publicity, before passing her for cause. (See generally Tr.,
p.2121, L.22 - p.2136, L.22.) Again, an effective voir dire would have entailed deep,
probing, questions about what she knew about: the Henneman case, including the highly
emotional fact of her disappearance on the Greenbelt and the spectacle that was made of
her family's suffering; the Hanlon case and the allegations of a similar modus operandi
between the two cases; and the media's repeated assertions of Mr. Hall's guilt.
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e.

Juror No. 65

Juror No. 65, and the rest of a mini-panel of six prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.1985, Ls.17-19.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.1985, L.20.)
The State asked Juror No. 65 if he and his family used the Greenbelt, and he
explained that they had done so on a regular basis. (Tr., p.2146, Ls.12-16.) However, he
did not follow up with any questions about whether this case had alarmed him, or even
whether he knew anything about this case going into it. (See generally Tr., p.2140, L.3 p.2149, L.2.)
Even though Juror No. 65 had indicated that he and his family had used the Boise
Greenbelt and, therefore, he was a prime candidate for having been influenced by the
media's coverage of the Henneman case, trial counsel never questioned him further about
his feelings about the Greenbelt or about this case. (See generally Tr., p.2149, L.5 p.2169, L.22.)

Nor did counsel question him about pretrial pUblicity at all.

(See

generally Tr., p.2149, L.5 -p.2169, L.22.)

£

Juror No. 68

Juror No. 68, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2177, L.24 p.2178, L.l.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr.,

I
I

p.2178, L.2.)
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Neither the State nor trial counsel ever asked Juror No. 68 a single question about
the quantity and nature of the pretrial pUblicity to which he had been exposed, or whether
such publicity could have caused him to form preconceptions about this case. (See
generally Tr., p.2227, L.9 - p.2238, L.22 (prosecution's voir dire); p.2239, L.l - p.2268,

L.2 (defense's voir dire).)
g.

Juror No. 83

Juror No. 83, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2441, Ls.1O-12.)
The record indicates that none ofthejurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2441, L.B.)
In response to the State's questions, Juror No. 83 admitted that she remembered,

based on television and newspapers, that this case is "the case about the woman that was
the flight attendant .... It's just that the case on the Greenbelt, she was found murdered."
(Tr., p.2491, Ls.2-12.) Juror No. 83 indicated, however, that she did not know how Mr.
Hall came to be charged in the case. (Tr., p.2491 , Ls.15-17.) Later, Juror No. 83 told the
State that her strong pro-death penalty views were formed, at least in part, based on her
knowledge of criminal cases as reported in the newspaper and on television. (Tr., p.2497,
L.16 - p.2498, L.15.)
After all of that, trial counsel failed to follow up in any meaningful way. Counsel
did ask if she had ever talked about the Henneman case with her husband (who happens
to be a Deputy Attorney General) and, eventually, after twice denying that she had done
so, she grudgingly admitted that they may have discussed the case "in passing" because
"[i]t's odd to have murder cases in Boise." (Tr., p.2511, L.5 - p.2512, L.1.) However,
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trial counsel never sought to find out the details of what Juror No. 83 may have known
about the Henneman case, what she may have discussed with her husbands, and what
opinions, preconceptions, or biases she may have fonned. (See generally Tr., p.2507,
L.l2 - p.2534, L.4.)

I
I
I
I

Later, trial counsel asked Juror No. 83 about other high-profile criminal cases,
such as those of Scott Peterson and O.J. Simpson. (Tr., p.25l5, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) In
response to counsel's questions, she indicated that she had formed opinions as to both
defendants' guilt based on what she had heard through the media and, with regard to the
Scott Peterson case, which was ongoing at that time, she had adjudged the defendant
guilty at "day one." (Tr., p.2515, L.23 - p.2517, L.16.) Yet, trial counsel never tried to
relate these questions back to the Henneman case by asking why, if she was interested in
the Peterson and Simpson cases out of southern California, she was not interested in a
high-profile case right here at home. (See generally Tr., p.2507, L.12 - p.2534, L.4.) Nor

I
I
I

did counsel ever question her ability to remain neutral and unpersuaded by the pretrial
pUblicity where she readily admitted that she had formed steadfast opinions as to
defendants' guilt based on pretrial pUblicity in the past. (See generally Tr., p.2507, L.l2 p.2534, L.4.)
h.

Juror No. 85

Juror No. 85, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.244l, Ls.1O-l2.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr., p.2441 , L.l3.)
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The State asked Juror No. 85 what she could recall about the Hennemen case
from what she had read in the newspaper. (Tr., p.2562, Ls.17 -19.) She indicated that she
remembered that a flight attendant had gone missing and that Ms. Henneman's name had
"hooked" her, but that Mr. Hall's name did not, and that she could not recall the
circumstances of his being charged in this case. (Tr., p.2562', L.20 - p.2563, L.ll.)
However, trial counsel never followed up with these responses in any way.

(See

generally Tr., p.2567, L.20 - p.2594, L.17.) Counsel never sought to ferret out the

specific details of what she had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory about
individual news stories, and never sought to determine whether she had formed any
preconceptions about the case.
1.

I

Juror No. 89

Juror No. 89, and the rest of a mini-panel of five prospective jurors, was asked by
the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that the
defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2607, Ls.9-11.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2607, Ls.1213.)

The State asked Juror No. 89 what she knew about the Henneman case going into
it. (Tr., p.2693, Ls.5-6.) She responded by saying that she did not "know a whole lot."
(Tr., p.2693, Ls.7; 10-11.)

She indicated that she read about Ms. Henneman's

disappearance and death, but was not aware that a suspect had been found. (Tr., p.2693,
Ls.7-11; p.2693, L.21 - p.2694, L.4.)

She further indicated that she did not know

anything about the defendant or how he came to be implicated in the Henneman case.
(Tr., p.2693, Ls.15-20.)
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Trial counsel, once again, failed to adequately follow up on the publicity issue.
The only question counsel presented to Juror No. 89 was in leading form: "I understand
from what you said before, you haven't been following this case particularly closely?"
(Tr., p.2713, Ls.19-2l.) Not surprisingly, she responded in the negative. (Tr., p.2713,
L.22.) Thus, counsel once again utterly failed to ferret out the specific details of what
this juror had read and seen, never sought to jog her memory about individual news
stories, and never sought to determine whether she had formed any preconceptions about
the case.
J.

Juror No. 102

Juror No. 102, and the rest of a mini-panel of four prospective jurors, was asked
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2836, Ls.2123.) The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2836,
L.24.)

I
I

In response to the State's questions, Juror No. 102 indicated that he gets his local

news on the Statesman's website. (Tr., p.2858, L.25 - p.2859, L.ll.) However, the State
never asked whether he had read anything about this case on that website or had, in any
other way, obtained any information about this case. (See generally Tr., p.2847, L.17 p.2869, L.4.)
Although trial counsel followed up on the pUblicity, counsel did so in a cursory
and wholly inadequate way.

Counsel asked Juror No. 102 whether he remembered

anything reading about this case, and the juror responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2869,
L.24 - p.2870, L.3.) Counsel then asked if him remembered reading anything about the
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case other than that infonnation which was contained in the juror questionnaire, and he
responded negatively. (Tr., p.2870, LsA-9.) Finally, counsel asked if Juror No. 102
knew anything about Mr. Hall, and he again responded negatively. (Tr., p.2870, Ls.IO11.) Without ferreting out the specific details of what this juror had read and seen,
without jogging his memory as to what he had been exposed to, and without seeking to
detennine whether he had fonned any preconceptions about the case, counsel moved on
to other topics and, ultimately, passed Juror No. 102 for cause.

(See generally Tr.,

p.2870, L.12 - p.2892, L.15.)
k.

Juror No. 110

Juror No. 110, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked

I

by the Court whether any of them had "fonned or expressed an unqualified opinion that
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.2951, Ls.6-8.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affinnatively. (Tr., p.2951, Ls.89.)
The State asked Juror No. 110 simply: "And it looks like you have heard that the
Lynn Henneman's body was-well, she disappeared and then her body was found. Have

I
I

you heard much beyond that? (Tr., p.3021, Ls.I8-21.) In response, Juror No. 110 said
no, he works a lot and does not have time to watch much television. (Tr., p.3021, Ls.2224.)

At that point, the State positively reinforced the juror's downplaying of his

knowledge of the case, explaining: "That suits us fine.... The less you know before you
walk in here the easier it is for you to make decisions." (Tr., p.3021, L.25 - p.3022, LA.)
Trial counsel did follow up on the pretrial pUblicity issue, but not in a meaningful
way. Counsel started by mischaracterizing and downplaying Juror No. 11O's knowledge
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of the case: "you say that you haven't heard anything about this case?" (Tr., p.3069, L.24
- p.3070, L.1.) Juror No. 110 clarified the facts, while at the same time apparently taking
the cue of both attorneys: "Not very much. Heard a little bit, yeah." (Tr., p.3070, L.2.)
At that point, the follow-up question from counsel was a leading query confirming that
Juror No. 110 had not heard how Mr. Hall came to be implicated in the case, again
conveying a subtle message that counsel really did not want to hear what he knew about
the case. (Tr., p.3070, L.3-4.) Moreover, when Juror No. IIO's answer indicated that he
did not understand the question ("Mr. Hall's what-the defendant. Yeah, we read the
charges and stuff."), counsel almost immediately abandoned the inquiry and passed him
for cause. (Tr., p.3070, Ls.3-8.) Thus, not only did counsel generally fail to ask relevant
questions, but the few questions that counsel did ask were terrible because they were not
calculated to determine what Juror No. 110 had actually heard or what preconceptions he
might actually have and, in fact, conveyed to him that the "correct" response was to say
"no, I don't know anything about the case."
1.

Juror No. 111

Juror No. 111, and the rest of a mini-panel of eight prospective jurors, was asked
by the Court whether any of them had "formed or expressed an unqualified opinion that
the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the offense charged." (Tr., p.295I, Ls.6-8.)
The record indicates that none of the jurors responded affirmatively. (Tr., p.2951, Ls.89.)

The State asked Juror No. 111 about the fact that she knew Dave Smith, the lead
detective in the Henneman case. (Tr., p.3075, Ls.2-12.) However, he never asked her if
she had seen the extremely favorable media coverage of Mr. Smith during the pendency
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of the Henneman case. (See generally Tr., p.3073, L.23 - p.3086, L.S.) In fact, he never
asked ifshe had seen any pretrial coverage of the case. (See generally Tr., p.3073, L.23 p.3086, L.S.)
Again, trial counsel utterly failed to follow up in a productive manner. Counsel
again raised the issue of pretrial publicity with a leading question conveying the message
that the "correct" was to say "no, I know nothing about this case:" "You have indicated
you know something about this case, and I don't know that you know anything other than
what we've already told you. But do you know anything about?" (Tr. Vol. IT, p.3086,
Ls.17-21.) Not surprisingly, Juror No. 111 parroted back many of the same words used
by counsel in his leading question: "I know nothing about it, other than what's been
reported in the Statesman early on." (Tr., p.3086, Ls.22-23.) At that point, counsel
confirmed that she believed that her memory of the case was constrained to
Ms. Henneman's disappearance and death in the 2000 time frame, not Mr. Hall's
becoming a suspect in the 2003 timeframe, and was content to move on to other matters.
(Tr., p.3086, L.24 - p.3087, L.S.)

Counsel never sought to investigate the issue of

whether Juror No. 111 had been traumatized by the event or preconditioned to look
favorably upon the State's evidence; counsel was concerned only with the issue of
whether she knew that Mr. Hall stood accused of murder in the Hanlon case as well, but
did not even examine that issue carefully.
In sum, trial counsel's failure to adequately question jurors about exposure to
pretrial pUblicity violated Mr. Hall's right to an unbiased jury.l02 (See Exhibits 13-16

102 Again, Mr. Hall cannot fully develop this claim because of the Court's order
prohibiting juror contact. However, it is reasonable to believe that the jury pool had been
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(juror questionnaires admitted during depositions of Amil Myshin and D.C. Carr,
indicating juror exposure to media).)
EE.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Stipulating
To A Deviation Of Proper Jury Selection Procedures

Both Idaho statutory authority and rule require that alternate jurors be selected by
lot. Idaho Code § 19-1904 states that jurors in excess of the number required must be
removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial:
A court may direct that one (1) or more jurors in addition to the regular
panel be called and impaneled to sit as alternate jurors. All jurors shall be
drawn in the same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be
subject to the same examination and challenges, shall take the same oath,
and shall have the same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges prior
to deliberations. At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors
exceeding the number required of a regular panel shall be removed by
lot. Those removed by lot may be discharged after the jury retires to
consider its verdict. If more than one (1) additional juror is called, each
party is entitled to two (2) peremptory challenges in addition to those
otherwise allowed by law; provided however, that if only one (1)
additional juror is called, each party shall be entitled to one (1) peremptory
challenge in addition to those otherwise provided by law.
I.e. § 19-1904 (emphasis added). Likewise, Idaho Criminal Rule 24 requires that all
excess jurors be removed by lot at the conclusion of the trial:
... At the conclusion of closing arguments, jurors exceeding the number
required of a regular panel shall be removed by lot. Those removed by lot
may be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict, unless the
court otherwise directs as provided below.
I.C.R. 24(d). There is no discretionary component to the selection of alternate jurors jurors exceeding the number of required jurors "shall be removed by lot." When a state
implements procedures designed to ensure a fair trial, including a fair jury selection

saturated with media exposure, and that trial counsel's failure to ask appropriate
questions could not possibly have weeded out bias.
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process, it must follow that process or violate a defendant's due process rights. Hicks v.

Oklahoma, supra. Trial counsel was therefore ineffective in stipulating to an alternate
procedure wherein the above prescribed procedure was abandoned:
MR. MYSHIN: And the other thing that has always given me heartburn is
this notion that alternate jurors are selected by lot and THE COURT: I agree with you, sir. I think I am coming at this -- you
and I and Mr. Bower and Mr. Bourne and the Court have always agreed in
the past that this was a solution in search of a problem. I respect former
Justice Walters' committee and the work he did. He was motivated by an
effort, sincere effort to improve the system, but there wasn't a problem
here to fix. And I was hoping that by stipulation we would just agree to
do it the way we've always done it, which is the persons that end up sitting
in -- I will have a chart for you, seating chart that I'll show you. This is
the way we've done it before, the way we did it in State versus Payne in
fact. The persons that end up sitting in Boxes 13, 14 and 15 are alternates
No.1, No.2 and No.3 respectfully, but we don't tell them. We don't tell
them that they're alternates unless and until their services are no longer
needed when the jury is sent out to deliberate, so that human nature being
what it is, these folks will pay careful attention to every single thing that
happens in the trial and will only get the disappointing news when it is
necessary to tell them. I think you and I are on the same page.
MR. MYSHIN: We are, Judge, entirely on the same page. I just would
like to add fuel to the fire and tell you that it is my information that the
civil lawyers are the ones that cooked up this dismissal by lot idea. So it's
not us fine criminal lawyers. I think it's more the subject THE COURT: Sometimes they don't understand the differences in nature
between civil and criminal cases. I think the whole pwpose of the struck
jury system is to know who you have coming and to know who's there and
to know, for example, that the person in Box 13 is Alternate No. 1 and the
person in Box 14 is Alternate No.2 and Box 15 is Alternate No.3, and
that that means something and we all know who they are in advance, but
we don't tell them that. Mr. Bourne, are you -- this is the way we've
always -- are you okay with it?
MR. BOURNE: We'll stipulate.
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Myshin subject ofa stipulation?
MR. MYSHIN: Yes, sir.
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(Tr., p. 607, L.21 - p.609, L. 18.) Trial counsel's performance was clearly deficient, as
they had an obligation to challenge any irregular jury selection procedures. See ABA
Criminal Justice Section Standards: Defense Function, Standard 4-7.2(a) ("Defense
counsel should prepare himself or herself prior to trial to discharge effectively his or her
function in the selection of the jury, including the raising of any appropriate issues
concerning the method by which the jury panel was selected .... ")
Trial counsel's stipulation prejudiced Mr. Hall under Strickland because, by
failing to guarantee that Mr. Hall receive all of the procedural protections he was
afforded by the statutory requirement that jurors be selected by lot, they effectively
changed the jury that would have sat, and instead seated the jury which convicted and
sentenced Mr. Hall to death. In the penalty trial, this was particularly prejudicial because
if even one alternate juror would have voted for life and had sat on the jury, Mr. Hall
would have been guaranteed a life sentence. Moreover, biased jurors did site on the jury.
See Claim FF, infra. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different.
FF.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Conduct An Adeguate Voir Dire, Failing To Move To Strike For Cause,
And Failing To Utilize A Preemptory Challenge To Strike Biased Jurors
1.

Introduction

Trial counsel attempted to utilize a nationally recognized technique for effective
assistance of counsel in jury selection known as the "Colorado Method," based on
techniques designed to ensure that a capitally-charged defendant is tried by an impartial
jury, as set forth in United States Supreme Court capital jury selection jurisprudence.
However, as discussed below, trial counsel's efforts were premised upon a complete lack
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of understanding of the Colorado Method, or of general principles of capital juryselection generally.

As a result of trial counsel's woefully inadequate voir dire,

Mr. Hall's jury consisted of many jurors who should have been excused for cause, either
because the juror would automatically vote for the death penalty or because the juror was
substantially impaired in his or her ability to give meaningful consideration to mitigating
evidence, thus depriving him of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
Because trial counsel purported to use the Colorado Method, Mr. Hall retained a
well-known expert in the Colorado Method of capital jury selection, Mr. David Lane.
Mr. Lane has provided several highly instructive declarations, which set forth the
principles of the method, and critique trial counsel's use of the method. (Exhibit 89
(Declaration of David Lane, dated April 16, 2006); Exhibit 90 (Second Declaration of
David Lane, dated June 14,2007).)
2.

Applicable Legal Standards

The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in
Claim A.2, supra. The Sixth Amendment further guarantees the right to an impartial
jury. Under Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) anything which bears upon the record,
background and history of the defendant, or circumstances of the crime and lessens the
perpetrator's moral culpability is per se mitigation and must be considered by the jury. If
a juror is substantially impaired in his or her ability to consider and give effect to
anything which Lockett permits them to consider and give effect to in defense counsel's
actual case, the juror must be challenged for cause as being substantially impaired in his
or her ability to follow the law.
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The "Colorado Method" is a nationally recognized technique for effective
assistance of counsel in jury selection, which trial counsel attempted to utilize. The
method is based on capital jury selection jurisprudence as set forth in Morgan v. Illinois,
504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992) (holding 'juror[s] who will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case" or are unwilling or unable to give meaningful consideration to
mitigating evidence must be disqualified from service); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 424-26 (1985) (holding that trial judges may exclude jurors whose ''views on
[capital punishment] would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their]
duties .... "'); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 42, 49 (1980) (invalidating statute
disqualifying any juror who would not swear "that the mandatory penalty of death or
imprisonment for life would not affect his deliberations on any issue of fact");
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-23 (1968) (holding that the exclusion in

capital cases of jurors conscientiously scrupled about capital punishment, without
inquiring whether they could consider the imposition of the death penalty in the
appropriate case, violated a defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury).)
3.

Analysis
a.

Deficient Performance

Because the defendant must demonstrate that a juror lacks impartiality, voir dire
must be adequate to uncover such bias. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. at 733-34. It is not
enough simply to ask the jurors if they could be fair and follow the law. Id., at 734-36.
The defendant must be able to ascertain whether the prospective jurors find mitigating
evidence irrelevant or even not worth their consideration. Id., at 735.
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The ABA Guidelines, pertaining to the effective assistance of counsel in a capital
jury selection, state that:
Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and
challenging of potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding
"death qualification" concerning any potential juror's beliefs about the
death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with techniques: (1) for
exposing those prospective jurors who would automatically impose the
death penalty following a murder conviction or finding that the defendant
is death-eligible, regardless of the individual circumstances of the case; (2)
for uncovering those prospective jurors who are unable to give meaningful
consideration to mitigating evidence; and (3) for rehabilitating potential
jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the death penalty make
them possibly excludable.
Guideline 10.1 0.2.B. Counsel should devote substantial time to detennining the
makeup of the venire, preparing a case-specific set of voir dire questions, planning a
strategy for voir dire, and choosing a jury most favorable to the theories of mitigation that
will be presented. Guideline 10.10.2, Commentary. Given the intricacy of the process
and the sheer amount of data to be managed, counsel should consider obtaining the
assistance of an expert jury consultant. Guideline 1O.1O.2.C.
In this case, trial counsel was shockingly inadequate in preparing for and in

conducting voir dire. Trial counsel admitted they were learning the Colorado Method as
they were conducting jury selection. (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.77,
Ls.13-14 ("We were trying to learn the Colorado method, and trying to use it."); Tr.,
p.79, Ls.20-25 ("So this is all new. There has to be a way to relate to lay people what this
all means. And it's incredibly complicated. I really felt, I guess at that point, that this
was all new ground for us, to try and do all of this for the first time."); Tr., 80, Ls.9-14
("So, although - I mean, it was - I don't know how to say it, except that I was doing
something outside my realm of experience. And I was taking all the experience that I had

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

271

01323

and virtually disregarding it.

And I found that very, very difficult.,,).)103

This is

confinned by the fact that they retained another attorney, Rolf Kehne, to consult with
them about the method, when Mr. Kehne happened to show up to watch the voir dire.
The use of Mr. Kehne was completely happenstance:
A.
He - Rolf showed up at voir dire, unsolicited. He was in the back
of the courtroom, and on breaks I would approach him and say - and at
that time I didn't even know that he taught it [the Colorado Method].
Well, I did, because he taught us right before that. He taught us that
before that, but I didn't know the extent that he taught it. I guess he taught
it a lot, I've learned, later.
Q.
The Colorado method?
A.
Yeah. But I knew that he did that seminar with us at the office and
stuff.
And so I was like, "Tell me, you know, what?" And he would give
me suggestions, and I would relate those to Ami!.
And from that - it was interesting, because he sat in the very back
of the courtroom, and he'd edge his way up toward the front.
And it was like, finally it was like we were - at our breaks we were
all talking together. It was like, you know, I don't know whether I made
the suggestion to Amil, or whether we talked. I don't know how it came
about. But Amil was like, "Well, let's get him on." We decided to bring
him on.
So Amil went ex parte back to the judge and talked to him and
said, "Hey, I need to get him paid. We'd like to bring him on."
And during that time - and I think that was early on; and then we
would consult, and then I landed up - and this was all my doing. I landed
up consulting with him on a couple right during the voir dire, because
that's how frustrated I was getting. Like, "Feed me, tell me where I'm
going with this."
(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.171, L.12 - p.172, L.2l.) The fact that trial
counsel relied upon someone who happened to wander into the courtroom evidences the
defense team's lack of preparation to conduct voir dire. (See Exhibit 90, p.2 ("It was

103 Although trial counsel indicates they had some limited training regarding the Colorado
Method, it is unclear what quality and quantity of training they received. See Exhibit 90,
p.2 n.2 (explaining that "various manifestations of the 'Colorado Method' [are] taught in
places throughout the country, often times having nothing whatsoever to do with the
actual 'Colorado Method"').
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apparent from reading the trial transcript that there was very little preparation, if any, put
into this by the trial team. Relying upon Mr. Kehne shows that trial counsel was doing
jury selection 'by the seat of their pants' which is wholly inadequate.").) "Rolfs
involvement is irrefutable evidence that the defense team was floundering badly with the
Colorado Method. Grabbing people who wander into and out of the courtroom to assist
in one of the most critical aspects of trial is hardly the level of planning and skill
envisioned by the Sixth Amendment's right to the effective assistance of counsel."
(Exhibit 90, p.6.)
Mr. Kehne's tenure as a jury selection consultant was as short-lived as it was
random. Just one day after the court authorized trial counsel to use Mr. Kehne to assist
with jury selection, the court objected to using Mr. Kehne to provide briefing on critical
jury selection issues, namely the meaning of "mitigation impaired." (Tr., p. 2032, Ls.1224; p.2060, L.9 - p. 2062, L.17.) Trial counsel agreed to provide the briefing following
the weekend break, but never did so, despite the fact that the court stated "I don't know
anything about Whitt [sic]." (Tr., p.2063, Ls.1l-17; p.2032, Ls.21-22.) Wainwright v.

Witt is a seminal case is death penalty jury selection jurisprudence and holds that jurors
whose "views on [capital punishment] would 'prevent or substantially impair the
performance of [their] duties ... .' are excludable for cause. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26
(1985).

For trial counsel not to educate the court on this seminal case is

incomprehensible. In any case, by Monday morning, Mr. Kehne was no longer on the
case, and trial counsel informed the court it did not intend to file briefing. (Tr., p.2067,
Ls.1O-21.) Trial counsel were once again left to their own inadequate understanding of
capital jury selection, and never again mentioned Witt.
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The failure to brief the Witt issue illustrates trial counsel's utter unfamiliarity with
the constitutional underpinnings of capital jury selection. Mr. Carr testified that, after
speaking to Mr. Kehne, he could not find "anything meaningful regarding meaningful
consideration to present to the judge." (Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.176,
Ls.1O-l4.) This is black-letter law. Mr. Myshin testified that proponents ofthe Colorado
Method people use the phrase "mitigation impaired," but Morgan does not use that
terminology. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Ami! Myshin, 9114/06, p.107, Ls.16-2l.) While
technically correct that the case law does not use the precise term "mitigation impaired,"
the phrase is well known shorthand for the concept that a juror who cannot give
meaningful consideration to mitigation should be challenged for cause under Morgan.
(Exhibit 90, p.12.) Mr. Myshin also testified that he had not read any cases dealing with
the "mitigation impairment" upon which the Colorado Method is based, even though, of
course, any method of capital jury selection is dependent upon United States Supreme
Court precedent dealing with that concept, and Morgan and its progeny deal with the
concept without necessarily using that precise phrase. (Tr., 9114/06 of deposition of Amil
Myshin, pp.107-108; Exhibit 90, pp.12-13.)
Trial counsel failed to understand or implement the most basic principles of the
Colorado Method. The structure of the Colorado Method is extremely simple. It includes
the identification of potential jurors in death penalty cases through a ranking system,
based solely upon their responses regarding the death penalty, with ranking of one
through seven, seven being automatic death penalty jurors who should always be
challenged for cause. (Exhibit 90, p.3, pp.7-9.) At the end of the process, picking the
jury is purely a matter of ranking where the only criteria for selection is based upon the
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lowest number in the ranking system. (Exhibit 90, p.16.) A higher ranked juror will
never be selected over a lower ranked juror regardless of other characteristics. (Exhibit
90, p.16.)
Trial counsel acknowledged that he did not prepare a strategy gomg into
individual voir dire. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.155.)

The lack of

preparation, in addition to lack of understanding of the legal principles of capital jury
selection and their application, led to that trial counsel's voir dire in every instance was
ineffective in identifying and ranking jurors, in stripping jurors to help in the
identification process, and in insulating or isolating jurors, or in challenging mitigationimpaired jurors for cause. (Exhibit 90, p.17.) Mr. Hall relies on and incorporates herein
by reference the entirety ofMr~ Lane's analysis of trial counsel's questioning of jurors, as
set forth in Exhibits 89 and 90. Mr. Lane's concluded that:
The voir dire conducted in this matter was among the worst examples
of capital voir dire undersigned counsel has ever read. Defense counsel
failed repeatedly to challenge jurors for cause even in the face of the juror
telling the court and counsel that they would automatically vote for the
death penalty or that they were substantially impaired in their ability to
give meaningful consideration to mitigating evidence. Defense counsel
was unable to intelligently rank almost all of the jurors, except those who
indicated that they were a virtual certain vote for death and even then,
many of those jurors ultimately sat on the case. Defense counsel did
virtually nothing to insulate potential life-giving jurors from feeling
pressure in the deliberative process to have to justify their personal moral
judgments. Defense counsel did virtually nothing to isolate strong death
penalty proponents on the jury who would demand explanations from
lifegivers. Defense counsel never discussed the differences between factbased decision making at the guilt phase and the normative personal
decision making process based upon personal morality at the penalty
phase with any juror.
(Exhibit 90, pp.39-40 (emphasis added).)
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Trial counsel also failed to realize that the Colorado Method did not preclude
them from inquiring into traditional areas of voir dire, including jurors' exposure to pretrial pUblicity. For example, a juror who has been tainted by extensive pretrial publicity
who has been rated a number 4 juror for death penalty beliefs should be challenged
before a number 4 rated juror who has not been so tainted. (Exhibit 90, p.S.); see Claim
DD,supra.
In addition to those grounds set forth in the affidavit, Mr. Hall asserts that trial

counsel should have moved to strike the following jurors for cause for the reasons set
forth below.104
Juror No.6 indicated she would have great difficulty with sequestration beyond a

"few days." (Tr., p.lOS6, Ls. 8-11.) Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.
Juror No. 51 indicated that she is a regular Greenbelt user. (Tr., p.l829, Ls.1S-

24.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's familiarity with the Greenbelt biased her views of
the crime and the Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.
Juror No. 62 knew Angie Abdullah, attended the same church, and knew "a lot

of information about her." (Tr., p.2074, Ls.12-19.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's
relationship with Angie Abdullah, the alleged victim in a near-simultaneous capital
murder trial, biased her views of the crime and Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have
moved to strike for cause.
Juror No. 63 had hearing impediments, had to wear hearing aids, and suffered

from hearing loss most of her life. (Tr., p.2117, L.22 - p.2118, L.3, p.2123, Ls.7-21.)
Given the poor quality of the police interrogation tapes played to the jury, Mr. Hall
104 Petitioner cannot further develop this claim due to the Court's refusal to allow
Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel to interview jurors.
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asserts that this juror was unable to hear critical evidence offered at trial. Trial counsel
should have moved to strike for cause.
Juror No. 68 previously worked for

moc, including at the maximum security

prison. (Tr., p.22S1 - p.22S2.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's dealings with the
correctional system, inmates, and death row inmates biased his views of the crime and
Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.

Juror No. 83 is married to a Deputy Attorney General for the State of Idaho. Her
husband is specifically assigned to the

moc. His job includes defending against

conditions of confinement lawsuits, including those brought by death-sentenced inmates.
(See Exhibit 92, Gomez v. Spalding, D. Idaho, Civ. 91-0299-S-LMB.) Conditions of

confinement were referenced during the sentencing phase of Mr. Hall's trial. (See, e.g.,
Tr., p.4904 et seq. (testimony of Dennis Dean).) Her husband was sanctioned by the
federal district court for opening prisoner mail during a conditions lawsuit, and possibly
faced or faces bar sanctions. (Exhibits 91-93.) Mr. Hall asserts that trial counsel should
have moved to strike this juror for cause. She ultimately served as the foreperson. It is
hardly reasonable to assume that the wife of an advocate for the State in defending
against death-sentences would not be affected by her husband's employment when
determining whether to impose the death sentence. Further, Mr. Hall served a IO-year
term in the

moc during the period that this juror's husband served as the Deputy

Attorney General. It is likely that her husband was familiar with Erick Hall and there is a
reasonable probability that he shared discussions about inmates, possibly including
Mr. Hall, as well as information about conditions of confinement and other matters that a

juror might consider, appropriately or not, during the sentencing process with his wife.
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In addition to the above, because a key State witness-Jay Rosenthal-also worked for
the Attorney General's office, this juror was not able to objectively weigh his testimony.
Furthermore, this juror worked for IDOC, which biased her views of the crime and
Mr. Hall. Moreover, the juror's cousin was raped and murdered. It is unreasonable to

assume that event did not color her views of crime and punishment. Mr. Hall asserts that
event biased her views of the crime and Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to
strike for cause.

Juror No. 85 husband was an investigator for the U.S. Investigative Services.
(Tr., pp.2547-2548.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror was unable to objectively weigh law
enforcement testimony and had biased views toward the crime and Mr. Hall.

Juror No. 102 admitted that his mind wanders in the afternoon. (Tr., p.2863,
L.25-p.2864, L.3.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror was unable to hear evidence at trial
and sentencing.

Juror No. 110 works for the Department of Transportation and works with a
Deputy Attorney General. (Tr., p.3020, Ls.19-20.) The juror works, with his son, with
the Ada County Court. (Tr., p.3022, Ls.1 0-16.) The juror worked at the penitentiary for
several years, and managed Correction Industries, and had inmates working for him.
(Tr., p.3044, Ls.13-16, p.3045, Ls.5-6.) The juror worked for the Department of Law
Enforcement. (Tr., p.3051, Ls.1-2.) Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's background biased
his views against the crime and Mr. Hall.

Juror No. 111 works for the Sheriff's Office and was a former neighbor of
Detective Dave Smith, a key prosecution witness. (Tr., p.3074, Ls.6-7, p.3075, Ls.3-9.)
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Mr. Hall asserts that this juror's background biased her views against the crime and
Mr. Hall. Trial counsel should have moved to strike for cause.

In sum, trial counsel's attempt to use the Colorado Method was an abysmal
failure, based on a lack of understanding of the principles underlying the method. Trial
counsel further compounded the problem by not inquiring into specific areas of potential
bias of individual jurors, all to Mr. Hall's prejudice.
b.

Prejudice

As a result of trial counsel's utter failure to effectively employ the Colorado
Method or its constitutional underpinnings, the jury consisted of many 7-rated jurors who
should have been excused for cause or jurors who should have been rated 7, had they
been properly examined during voir dire. The jurors who would have been inclined to
give a life sentence were never adequately identified and given the tools to insulate their
personal moral decision making from others on the jury who would demand explanations,
justifications, or defenses to those moral judgments.
There is a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors that "defy analysis by
'harmless error' standards." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7 (1999). "Errors of this
type are so intrinsically harmful as to require automatic reversal i.e., affect substantial
rights, without regard to their effect on the outcome. Id.

As explained by the Supreme

Court:
Those cases, we have explained, contain a "defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself" ... Such errors" infect the entire trial process," .... and
" necessarily render a trial fundamentally unfair." ... Put another way,
these errors deprive defendants of "basic protections" without which "a
criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for
determination of guilt or innocence ... and no criminal punishment may be
regarded as fundamentally fair."
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!d. at 8-9. See also, James v. State,222 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. App. 2007) (presuming
prejudice where one juror biased). Trial counsel is ineffective when he fails to
question a prospective juror about information disclosed by the juror on a
questionnaire, where the answers "raise[ ] legitimate questions about [the juror's]
impartiality." State v. Lamere, 112 P.3d 1005 (Mont. 2005).
Trial by a biased jury is structural error, and prejudice is presumed. Because
impartiality goes to "the fundamental integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional
concept of trial by jury," Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472 (1965), whenever it is
threatened, "the probability of deleterious effects on fundamental rights calls for close
judicial scrutiny." Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504 (1976). See Ristaino v. Ross,
424 U.S. 589, 596 (1973) (holding prejudice must be presumed with respect to potential
bias under circumstances such that "impermissible threat to the fair trial guaranteed by
due process is posed"); see also, James v. State, supra (holding error is structural).
If ever a case called for a presumption of prejudice, this is the one.

Trial

counsel's failure to ask even elementary questions, challenge for cause, or exercise
peremptory challenges in anything more than a random manner, left Erick Hall with a
jury that must be presumed biased. Even if bias is not presumed, there is enough record
evidence to support Mr. Hall's claim that, but for the deficient performance of trial
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a life sentence.105 .

105 Even if Mr. Hall had the burden of showing actual juror bias, he has been precluded
from developing it because of the Court's order prohibiting juror contact.
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Juror No. 83
As summarized by David Lane:
The juror tells defense counsel that if the crime was premeditated, "then I
think it should be the death penalty." (2518). There is no effort to strip the
juror, however, by this answer she has pegged herself as an automatic
death penalty juror. There is no effort by defense counsel to elicit
responses from this juror regarding any other mitigation and shockingly,
defense counsel never challenges her (or any other jurors who actually
served) for cause, even though she is substantially impaired in her ability
to give meaningful consideration to mitigation.
(Exhibit 89, p.32.)106
Of particular note, counsel inexplicably excused lower numbered jurors than Juror
No. 83, which is a cardinal violation of the Colorado Method. (Exhibit 90, pAO.) This
juror, Juror No. 83, was ranked a 7 on her questionnaire and a 6 in her voir dire, for a
total numerical score of 13. She was never challenged by the defense even though based
upon her numerical score, she was a virtual certain vote for death. Based upon the
defense ratings, there were only four jurors peremptorily challenged by them who were
rated either equally unfavorably or worse than juror number 83. Jurors numbered 60 and
94 were challenged with questionnaire scores of 6 and a voir dire score of 7 for a 13
composite score. This made sense as the voir dire score of 7 is usually given more weight
than questionnaire scores. Jurors numbered 77 and 104 were 7 rated jurors in both
categories and should have been a granted challenge for cause if made. The defense used
peremptory challenges appropriately for those two jurors even though a complete record
should have been made that those jurors were substantially impaired in their ability to
give meaningful consideration to mitigation. In every other instance, however, the
defense permitted juror number 83 to sit with a composite score of 13 yet used nine

106 Mr. Lane's references transcript page citations in parentheses in his declaration.
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peremptory challenges for lower rated jurors. The defense challenged juror number 1
(composite score of 11); number 5 (composite 12); number 13 (composite 12) number 22
(composite 11); number 30 (composite 11); number 41 (composite 10); number 54
(composite 11); number 73 (composite 9) and; number 90 (composite 12).

Juror No. 102
Again, there was no effort by trial counsel to determine under what circumstances
this juror would find the death penalty appropriate. (Exhibit 89, p.34.) "This is the most
elementary task for any defense attorney in a capital case." (Exhibit 89, p.34.) Therefore,
trial counsel would have no idea of when this juror would vote to impose death.
Similar to Juror No. 83, trial counsel inexplicably failed to move to strike Juror
No. 102 for cause, and failed to exercise a peremptory challenge on him. This juror, like
Juror No. 83, was ranked a 7 on his questionnaire and a 6 in voir dire. Again, there is no
reasonable explanation for leaving a higher rated juror than those struck with
peremptories.
Choosing jurors who were more likely to vote for death than the jurors who the
defense was excusing represents an abandonment of any semblance of the Colorado
method. (Exhibit 90, p.19.) There can be no justification for such a choice, and choosing
a juror who is a virtual certain vote for death and excusing other jurors less likely to vote
for death resulted in an unconstitutionally biased, mitigation-impaired jury in this case.
Trial counsel utterly failed to "strip" jurors, i.e., ascertain their true feelings about
the death penalty, and utterly failed to ascertain if jurors could give meaningful
consideration to mitigation, as illustrated by the following examples.

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

282

01~:l4

Juror No.6
Juror No. 6 is an example of a juror who needs stripping because she is hiding
behind the cloak of manslaughter as an example of what is in her mind a "murder" which
would not warrant the death penalty. (Exhibit 89, pp.18-19.)
Trial counsel did not adequately strip this juror. He failed to determine how she
felt about the death penalty when there is no crime of passion involved, and should have
used the facts of the case at issue to do so. If trial counsel had used the facts alleged by
the State, and the juror responded by saying that under those facts everyone would get
death in her mind, she would be "substantially impaired in her ability to give meaningful
consideration to mitigation" and would have been challenged successfully for cause. It is
essential to keep in mind that the law mandates that no juror fail to give meaningful
consideration to mitigation. (Exhibit 89, p.2I.) This juror indicated she would not be able
to give meaningful consideration, when she said that childhood history and upbringing,
would not be "a major in her decision." Inexplicably, trial counsel ranked this juror as a

5 on the questionnaire and a 4 on voir dire. According to David Lane, "It is unknown
why these rankings were given as the identification questions were completely lacking."
(Exhibit 89, p.22.)

Juror No. 51
This juror provided "the classic juror answer, which requires stripping," when she
said the death penalty is appropriate in some circumstances, but not all. (Exhibit 89,
p.24.) Yet trial counsel made no effort to determine what those circumstances might be.
"Defense counsel does not have the foggiest idea what the juror means by this response,
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yet he does nothing to ascertain what the juror means. It is impossible to identify and
rank this juror given the abject failure by defense counsel to strip the juror and ascertain
what the juror's feelings are about the death penalty." (Exhibit 89, pp.24-25.) There is
also no effort to determine what sort of mitigation would be meaningful to this juror. "[I]t
was impossible to rank this juror and counsel had no idea what her views were on the
death penalty." (Exhibit 89, p.25.)

Juror No. 62
The State grossly misled this juror in defining the degree of attention that must be
given to mitigation as something she has to "listen to" but does not necessarily have to
"pay attention" to. (Exhibit 89, p.25.) Trial counsel failed to object. Trial counsel made
no effort to strip this juror:
Defense counsel never identifies or ranks this juror in terms of what she
believes regarding the death penalty. Clearly she is in favor of it, but no
effort is made to determine whether given the horrific facts of the Hall
case, this juror could really ever consider any verdict but death. There was
no effort to strip the juror or to assess whether in this case she was an
automatic death penalty juror. It appears likely that an automatic vote for
death upon conviction was approved by defense counsel.
(Exhibit 89, p.26.) In her questionnaire, this juror gave every indication that she would
not be able to give meaningful consideration to mitigating factors such as alcohol and

drug abuse, childhood trauma, and poor socio-economic status. She also said she would
use the death penalty as a deterrent, an "eye for an eye."

Juror No. 63
Trial counsel engaged in no stripping of this juror and failed to ascertain her
views on the death penalty.
In her questionnaire she indicates that she thinks the death penalty needs
to be enforced more often to be a good deterrent. (2125). If everything had
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been proven she could give the death penalty. (2128). Again, this is an
example of a juror giving an indication that if guilt is proven, death is a
virtual certainty. Counsel should have pushed the juror with stripping
questions such as "assume guilt is proven beyond all doubt, and it is a
cold-blooded, brutal kidnapping, rape murder of an absolutely blameless,
innocent victim. What do you think about the death penalty under those
circumstances?" If the juror indicates that under those circumstances, no
mitigation on earth would result in anything but a death penalty, the juror
should be challenged for cause as substantially impaired in her ability to
give meaningful consideration to mitigation. This never occurs and
defense counsel is never able to intelligently rank this juror.
(Exhibit p.89, p.28.) Trial counsel inexplicably ranked this juror a 4.
Juror No. 68
This juror indicated strong pro-death penalty feelings when he stated "the crime and
penalty match each other." He also stated that "if you kill someone then your life is on
the line at that point in time." (2237). This juror indicated that he would not be able to
consider mitigation. When asked "If a person rapes and murders and then claims he was
taking drugs at the time, do you think that deserves a lesser penalty," the juror answered
''No.'' (2237) According to David Lane, "This juror is clearly an automatic death penalty
juror and should be rated a 7." However, trial counsel shockingly rated him as 4 based
on his questionnaire and a 5/6 after voir dire. There is no reasonable explanation for this
rating.
Juror No. 93
Trial counsel should have move to strike Juror No. 93 for cause:
The juror on her questionnaire indicated that she was a ten out of ten in
her strength for the death penalty. She has "no problem with the death
penalty as long as I'm absolutely positive, no question in my mind the
guilt." (2715). In her questionnaire she apparently said that she believes in
an "eye for an eye." (2718). There is no effort made by defense counsel to
challenge an obvious 7 who will automatically vote for the death penalty
upon a conviction. There is no effort to strip the juror and tell her to
assume that Mr. Hall is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and she is quite
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certain of his guilt. She would almost certainly have said that in that case
she would impose the death penalty.
(Exhibit 89, pp.33-34.)

As illustrated by the above examples, trial counsel failed

miserably to strip jurors or to determine their abilities to give meaningful consideration to
mitigation.
Trial counsel also failed to insulate jurors who may have voted for life or isolate
those jurors who seemed likely to vote for death:
The concept of the "Jurors Bill of Rights" was developed by David
Wymore and the Colorado Public Defenders. This idea is designed to
empower weaker life giving jurors and cause pro-death penalty jurors to
not only back off, but to even have them protect life givers. It is designed
to "insulate and isolate" each juror from the pressures exerted by other
jurors. In essence, it instructs jurors that they are to scrupulously follow
the law and make a personal moral judgment based upon their own
reasoning and moral judgment as to whether death is the appropriate
punishment in a given case. In other words, the decision to execute is not
deemed a collective decision. It is the individualized determinations of
twelve separate jurors which is expressed through the verdict. This is
precisely what the law requires.
(Exhibit 89, pp.11-12.) Trial counsel did not understand the concept. Instead of properly
educating the jurors about insulating and isolating, trial counsel repeatedly engaged in
meaningless questioning about "bullying." (See e.g., Exhibit 89, pp.26, 34.)
Additionally, effective insulating/isolating can only occur after ajuror has been
identified, i.e., properly ranked.
4.

Conclusion

Trial counsel's performance during voir dire was shockingly inadequate, and their
attempts to use the Colorado Method were wholly ineffective due to their lack of
understanding of the method, their lack of understanding of the constitutional
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underpinnings of that method or any capital jury selection method, and their lack of
preparedness. Their failures led to the impaneling of a biased, mitigation-impaired jury.
GG.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Adequately Challenge Juror No. 60 For Cause

Trial counsel failed to adequately move to strike prospective Juror No. 60 for
cause. During the voir dire, the juror indicated she thought "they should get the death
penalty" if defendant "thought about it." (Tr., pp.2017-2018.) The juror flat out stated
that, once guilt was established, there was no issue left. (Tr., p.2020, L.l - p.8 ("What
else do you need to know [once guilt is established]?"); see Tr., p.2020-2021(stating
circumstances of birth, character, sympathy and mercy do not matter in deciding
punishment).) Trial counsel seemingly started to explore whether the juror would be an
automatic death penalty juror. (See Tr., pp.2020-2021.)

The prosecutor eventually

objected, and trial counsel attempted to explain that the juror was "substantially
mitigation impaired." Trial counsel moved to strike her for cause, which was denied.
When the Court asked for a definition of "mitigation impaired," trial counsel had no
ready answer. (Tr., p. 2032, Ls.12-24; p.2060, L.9 - p. 2062, L.17.) The Court then
denied their motion to strike the juror for cause. Furthennore, trial counsel stated they
would provide briefmg, which never happened. See Claim GG, supra, incorporated
herein by reference. Thus, trial counsel had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the
juror, when, if properly prepared, the motion to strike for cause would have been granted.
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HR.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Ensure That All Proceedings Were Recorded And That Mr. Hall Was
Present For All Proceedings

Numerous unrecorded proceedings were held in chambers without Mr. Hall's
presence. Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to protect
Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to be present and his due process right to meaningful
appellate and post-conviction review. The ABA Guidelines provide in part:
[C]ounsel at every stage must ensure that there is a complete record
respecting all claims that are made, including objections, motions,
statements of grounds, questioning of witnesses or venire members, oral
and written arguments of both sides, discussions among counsel and the
court, evidence proffered and received, rulings of the court, reasons given
by the court for its rulings, and any agreements reached between the
parties. If a court refuses to allow a proceeding to be recorded, counsel
should state the objection to the court's refusal, to the substance of the
court's ruling, and then at the first available opportunity make a record of
what transpired in the unrecorded proceeding.
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.8. See also Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357,
358 (1993). Proceedings that Mr. Hall is aware took place off the record and outside his
presence include:
•

An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed a note received from the jury
foreman during jury deliberations. (Tr., p. 5463, L. 25 - p. 5464, L. 11.
(noting that the jury foreperson was concerned that her privacy, I.e.,
identity, had been violated in open court).)

•

An unrecorded in-chambers conference with the Court and trial counsel in
which the parties discussed retaining attorney Rolf Kehne as a jury
consultant. (Tr., p. 2062, Ls. 3-8.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's
presence. (See also, Deposition of Amil Myshin, 9114/06, p.81, Ls.16-18
("So I went into Judge Neville's chambers and I said, 'I want to do this,'
and he said 'Okay."')

•

An unrecorded discussion between trial counsel and the Court in which
the parties discussed trial counsel's intention not to file a brief, and the
decision to not employ Mr. Kehne "from this point forward" as a jury
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consultant. (Tr., p. 2067, Ls. 10-20.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's
presence.
•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed expert access to Mr. Hall, use of
experts, and the defense's Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p. 530, L.9 - p. 535,
L. 20.) There was no mention of Mr. Hall's presence.

•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
the State in which the parties discussed the videotapes and transcripts of
the interrogations of Mr. Hall. (Tr., p. 359, L. 9 - p. 362, L.3.) Mr. Hall
was not present, apparently at the request of trial counsel. (Tr., p. 359, Ls.
3-12.)

•

An unrecorded, in-chambers conference with the Court, trial counsel, and
possibly the State in which the parties discussed the logistics and
substance of what portions of the videotapes would be shown and "the
issues that Defense was concerned about." (Tr., p. 431, Ls. 3-17.) There
was no mention of Mr. Hall's presence.

Erick Hall had the right, guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment, to be present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings where his
presence would contribute to the proceeding's fairness. See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S.
730 (1987).
II.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Object To The Lack Of A Willfulness Instruction Regarding The Elements
Of First Degree Murder

The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in
Claim A.2, supra. Jury instruction 13A listed the elements of first degree murder, but did
not include the elements that the killing be ''willful'' and "deliberate," only that it be
"premeditated" and committed with "malice aforethought." (R., p.693 (Jury Instruction
No. 13A).) The alternative for premeditation was that the killing occurred during the
perpetration of a felony. Idaho Code § 18-4003 specifies that "All murder which is ...
perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the
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first degree." Thus, omitting the willful and deliberate components in the instructions
was error.
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the omission, in violation of
the Sixth Amendment, because the omissions clearly render Instruction 13A an erroneous
statement of the law, and failing to object to the instruction led to a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510,
521 (1979); Polk v. Sandoval, _ F.3d _, 2007 WL 2597437 (9th Cir. 2007) (reversing
and remanding murder conviction on due process grounds where jury instruction on
premeditation relieved the state of proving elements three necessary elements of
premeditation, willfulness, and deliberation). While the subsequent instruction number
15 includes the terms willful and deliberate, the elements instruction does not.
Furthermore, while instruction 15 defines "deliberate," there is no definition of "willful"
in the instructions. The omissions clearly would have misled the jury into believing the
state need not demonstrate either deliberateness or willfulness to prove first degree
murder, thereby reducing the State's burden of proof.
As the Court observed in State v. Aragon, 107 Idaho 358, 363, 690 P.2d 293,298
(1984), there are distinct definitions associated with the terms willfulness, deliberation,
and premeditation. Each of these terms must be sufficiently defined to the jury in order
to make the distinction between first degree murder and second degree murder clear. Id.
(finding instructions did not blur the distinction between first and second degree murder).
On the one hand, the jury was informed of the definition of murder, and
that it involves killing with malice. Malice was defined as a "state of
mind" manifested by an intentional or deliberate act. The jury was
instructed that malice may be express or implied. These were proper
definitions of malice and its interrelationship with the definition of
murder.
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Further, the jury was instructed that if nothing more than malice, or the
intent to do any unlawful act, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
the crime could not be first degree murder. The jury was instructed that if
it could find beyond a reasonable doubt three other elements-willfulness,
deliberation and premeditation-then the defendant was guilty of first
degree murder. Malice, the intent to act feloniously, was properly
distinguished from willfulness, the intent to take life, premeditation,
conceived beforehand, and deliberation, done with reflection. The jury
was properly instructed on the additional elements to prove first degree
murder, and thus there was no error.
Id. 107

In contrast to Aragon, the jury in Mr. Hall's case was not properly or sufficiently
instructed regarding the elements that must be proven by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt to justify a first degree murder conviction. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hall
was prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to the erroneous instruction, and there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial
counsel objected to the omissions.
JJ.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Challenge the State's Presentation of DNA Evidence

Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony challenging the
testimony of Kathryn Colombo who testified for the State that there was only one
contributor to the DNA evidence taken from Ms. Henneman's body.
As noted elsewhere in this petition, to prepare for the State's evidence, expert
assistance is often necessary. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1
("Analyzing and interpreting such evidence is impossible without consulting expertsNotably, the jury in Aragon was instructed that malice is express ''when there is
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature",
while it is implied ''when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." Aragon,
107 Idaho at 361,690 P.2d at 297.
107
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whether pathologists, serologists, micro analysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists,
translators, or others.") In this case, trial counsel failed to challenge the DNA testimony
presented by the State through Kathryn Colombo.
The jury was left with the impression that there was only one male contributor to
the DNA sample, when it is likely that there were two contributors. While Ms. Colombo
testified that there was a "possibility" of a second male contributor to the DNA sample,
she downplayed that possibility to the extent it effectively did not exist. (Tr., p.4466,
1.25 - p.4467, L.4 ("It was over the stutter cut-off, but just barely."); p.4472, Ls.19-21
(" .. .it means that Erick Virgil Hall is the primary source of the DNA obtained from the
sperm fraction"); p.4478, 1.8 ("There's only one male primary source."); pp.4489, Ls.621; 4525, 1.23 - p.4526, 1.25); see also Exhibit 94 (Cellmark, Amended Report, dated
4/28/03).) Trial counsel's examination focused on the presence of a 13 th allele, an aspect

of DNA that could neither be attributed to Ms. Henneman nor Erick Hall.

While

Ms. Colombo acknowledged that the 13 th allele "could be the true nature of the sample,"
she effectively minimized its importance by repeatedly testifying that it could be a
"stutter artifact," a ''technical artifact," or "contamination." (Tr., p.4466, 1.20 - p.4467,
L.16.) Trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the State's expert to minimize the
probability of a second semen contributor by labeling it a mere "possibility" among

other unlikely possibilities. Trial counsel was aware of the problems with the DNA
evidence, and even acknowledged his belief that the presence of the 13 th allele indicated
"that there was somebody else involved." (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.68,
Ls.8-20.) In fact, trial counsel retained a DNA expert but for out-of-court consultation
only. (See Exhibit 95.) Trial counsel could have presented expert DNA testimony but
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inexplicably resorted to cross-examination without the assistance of, or the presentation
of evidence by, an independent defense DNA expert. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil
Myshin, p.205, L.3 - p.206, L.8; see also Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.216,
Ls.3-16 (explaining that the defense theory ''was that somebody else did it, or there was
somebody with Erick"); Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.357, Ls.17-20 (agreeing
that there was not much evidence beyond the DNA evidence which connected Mr. Hall to
the crime); p.358, Ls.13-23 (admitting he hoped that the jury would not find the DNA
evidence compelling); p.377, Ls.2-12 (admitting feeling the DNA evidence against
Mr. Hall was strong); p.388, Ls.11-25 (acknowledging that there ''was some abnonnality
with the DNA").)
The State's interpretation of the DNA evidence effectively excluded any other
contributor to the DNA sample from Ms. Henneman's body other than Erick Hall. As a
consequence, the jury had no reason to believe that anybody other than Mr. Hall was
responsible for the rape and murder of Ms. Henneman. Had trial counsel presented the
testimony of a DNA analyst to support their defense theory with more than an ineffective
cross-examination and argument, there is a reasonable probability that Mr. Hall would
not have been convicted of murder or sentenced to death.
In support of this claim, Mr. Hall submits the affidavit of Greg Hampikian, Ph.D.

Dr. Hampikian teaches at Boise State University and his expertise is in forensic biology
and DNA analysis. (Exhibit 96.)

After reviewing the data and the testimony,

Dr. Hampikian is of the opinion, "to a reasonable degree of medical probability," that

"the semen sample recovered from the victim includes DNA from more than one
male." (Exhibit 96.) Dr. Hampikian's analysis demonstrates that the 13th allele is a
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"real" DNA peak, and it indicates a second male contributor. Had trial counsel called an
expert to testify, the jury would have heard testimony similar to Dr. Hampikian's
conclusion: "The most direct interpretation of the DNA evidence presented at trial is that
a second male contributor is included in the semen sample recovered from the victim.
The best evidence of this is the 13 th allele at D5." (Exhibit 96.)
Trial counsel's failure to adequately consult with an expert at trial and failure to
call an expert to testify, left the jury with a muddled, confusing picture of the DNA
evidence at best and the belief that the 13 th allele was a meaningless bit of stutter or
contamination at worst, leaving Mr. Hall as the sole moral agent involved in the
homicide.

Mr. Hall asserts that he has satisfied both prongs of Strickland, and his

convictions and sentences should be vacated.
KK.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Eliciting
Evidence Of Other Bad Acts

Through careless cross-examination, I.e., by asking open-ended, non-leading
questions on cross, trial counsel elicitied evidence suggesting that Mr. Hall was suspected
of committing rapes or other crimes evidenced by DNA other than that of the victim in
the underlying case. (Tr., p. 4428, Ls. 9-13.)
Rachel Cutler, the lab manager for the Idaho State Police Forensic Services
Laboratory, testified that she received one envelope containing two boxes, each of which
contained saliva swabs from Mr. Hall. (Tr., p.4424, L.16 - p.4426, L.19.) She sent out
the swabs from one box to Cellmark for DNA testing.

On cross-examination, trial

counsel carelessly elicited the fact that the samples contained in the second box were
tested in another case:
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

Good morning.
Good morning.
What did you do with the other box?
I left it in the evidence envelope it arrived in.
And what happened to it after that?
It was analyzed in a separate case.
And stored then in the lab?
For a time.
Thank you.

(Tr., p.4428, Ls.5-16.) Trial counsel knew that Mr. Hall was charged in another rapemurder, and should have known that the second box would have been used for evidence
against Mr. Hall in that case. While perhaps appropriate in a case involving a defendant
not suspected in any other crime, asking that question in this case was careless and
constituted deficient perfonnance.
The answer elicited was damning. Clearly, exposing the jurors to evidence of
Mr. Hall's involvement in another crime-one requiring DNA, and thus likely another

rape or murder-is highly prejudicial at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial. There
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsels' elicitation of the highly prejudicial
evidence, the outcome of the trial and sentencing would have been different.
LL.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For The GuiltInnocence Phase Of Trial By Failing To Conduct An Adequate
Investigation Of The Possible Connection Between Lynn Henneman's
Murder And Patrick Hoffert's Suicide

Mr. Hall incorporates herein by reference Claims B.3.c and ii.
MM.

Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To
Object To Shackling Or Failing To Adequately Object To Evidence Of
Defendant's Custodial Status

Mr. Hall incorporates herein by reference Claims BB.
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V.

PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, respectfully prays this

Honorable Court:
1.

To allow further civil discovery as warranted by receipt and review of
pending discovery disclosures pursuant to the IRCP and ICR 57(b);

2.

For leave to amend the Final Amended Petition as more information
becomes available upon receipt of discovery;

3.

For an evidentiary hearing on the merits upon completion of discovery;

4.

For an order vacating the convictions and sentences imposed against
Mr. Hall;

5.

For such other, or further relief as, to the Court, seems just and equitable.

DATED this 5th of October, 2007.

I.w

D-

P~M.~

MARKJ.ACKLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

j)~!r( ..J~

PAULAM. SWENSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) 5S.

County of Ada

)

Erick Hall, being first duly swom. deposes and says:
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action: that I have read the foregoing
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the
contents thereof. and that the facts contained therein are tme and correct as I verily
believe based upon his review of the record, conversations with Petitioner.
DATED this __ day of October, 2007.

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED A.ND SWOR..N to before me this __ day of October, 1007.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing ____________
My commission expires _ _ _ __
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NOTARY SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF
(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following docwnent: Original Verification
Page with Notary Seal to Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Dated this ~ day of October, 2007.

PAULAM. SWENSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY
SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1

.'

VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO )
) ss.
County of Ada
)

Erick Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled action; that I have read the foregoing
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, and I know the
contents thereof, and that the facts contained therein are true and correct as I verily
believe based upon his review of the record, conversations with Petitioner.

IIfL

DATED this ~ day of October, 2007.

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
Petitioner

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

~ day of October, 2007.

FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF

•
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /AYOfOctober, 2007 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL
VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707

U.S. Mail
- - Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

_ _ U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

X

X

~la<~
BARBARA THOMAS
Administrative Assistant

NOTICE OF FILING OF ORIGINAL VERIFICATION PAGE WITH NOTARY
SEAL TO FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

2

OR\ G\NA L
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. # 4843

NQ~----~~~~~FILED
L ()>>]

?

A.M.______RM·......2"-----'_~_

OCT 19 2007

MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

----------------------)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT
97 TO THE FINAL AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following document: Exhibit 97 to Final
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Affidavit of Erick Virgil Hall, dated
October 18, 2007).
Dated this [1-fL-..day of October, 2007.

£,,~MLM-0~

P.N. AM. SWENSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

NOTICE OF FILING
I~

,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lq~ day of October, 2007 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 97 TO THE
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
lMSI
POBOX51
BOISE ID 83707
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

~

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
-_ _ Hand Delivery

-Z-O,,-

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

flt~h( . J~

PAULA M. SWENSEN

NOTICE OF FILING

MOLLY 1. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
MARKJ. ACKLEY, I.S.B. #6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

AFFIDAVIT OF
ERICK VIRGIL HALL

----------------------------)
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) ss
County of Ada.
)
Erick Virgil Hall, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. All matters set forth in this affidavit are based upon personal knowledge;
2. During the course of my trial in this case I wore a "leg brace" for all in court
appearances;
3. The "leg brace" was worn under my clothing and would lock, causing my leg to remain
in a stiff position when I stood up;
<'
..R.e\K{ £:' J4/
~ .1,:{1( To sit back down again, I had to push on a 9J.itt6n to unlock the brace - this would have
been noticeable to the jury;
t~
£. U//
5. The brace made clicking '!!lffl l'(UViilg noises; the jurors would have been able to hear
these noises every time I stood up.

AFFIDAVIT OF ERICK VIRGIL HALL

10; ljl/20.Q7 15: 39 FAX 208

DATED this

_

.. STATE APPELLATE PD
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'ik
Ii day of October, 2007.

AFFIDA VIT OF ERICK VlRGIl HALL
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OCT 292007
J. DAVID NAVARRO, CIeI1<
By M. STROMER
0CPUrY

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

[ffi (E © r? P\\!1 ~ [Q)
OCT 292007

Roger Bourne
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 2127
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

ADA CC'J!I!:V
PROSECUTING ATIORNEYS OFFICE

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,
vs.
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

Case No. SPOT0500155
STATE'S MOTION FOR
ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE
STATE'S RESPONSE TO FINAL
AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

---------------------------)
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and moves the Court for its order granting additional time to the State to
make the State's response to the final Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief.

The

undersigned is in the process of making response, but due to the length of the petition and the
nature of the issues involved, is unable to complete the response by the previously set date of
November 2, 2007. The State requests additional time, until Friday, December 7, 2007. The

STATE'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE STATE'S RESPONSE TO
fINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF (HALL), Page 1

gned has spoken to Mark Ackley of the office of the State Appellate Public Defender
about this motion. Mr. Ackley offers no objection.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

;?{; day of October 2007.

GREG H. BOWER
Ada County Prosecutor

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
delivered to Mark J. Ackley and Paula M. Swensen, Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders,
3647 Lake Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703, through the United States Mail, postage prepaid this

14L

day of October 2007.

'S MOTION FOR ADDITIONAL TIME TO MAKE STATE'S RESPONSE TO
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF (HALL), Page 2
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Session: Neville110907
Session: Neville110907
Session Date: 2007/11/09

Division: DC
Session Time: 08:35

Courtroom: CR501

Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Whiting, Laura
Clerk (s) :
Ellis, Janet
State Attorneys:
Haws, Joshua
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0004
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Defendant: STATE OF ID AHO
Co-D~fendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2007/11/09
11:21:15 - Operator
Recording:
11:21:15 - New case
, STATE OF ID AHO
11:21:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Tme as set for status conference.
11:22:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court would like to set November 15, 2007 @ 2:00 p.m. fo
r hearing on
11:23:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
petitioner's motion for permissive appeal and to allow Court
time to review
11:24:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
in camera the medical reports and then set December 19, 2007

01-381

Page 2

Session: Neville110907
@ 9:00 a.m. for
11:25:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
any other hearings that counsel were ready for.
11:26:11 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated State would probably file Motion to Dismi
ss, do not think
11:27:11 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
could argue that by Dec. 19th.
11:27:21 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated counsel stipulated to allow by Dec. 7th fo
r the State's
11:27:42 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
response.
11:28:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would keep the 19th open for what other matters counse
1 might have
11:29:52 - Operator
Stop recording:
11:33:14 - Operator
Recording:
11:33:14 - Record
, STATE OF ID AHO
11:33:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court will identify Thrusday, January 17, 2008 @ 1:30 p.
m. and continue
11:33:32 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
through to Friday, January 18, 2008 @ 9:00 for half the day.
11:34:46 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated would like to make a record of an objecti
on of
11:35:14 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
incorporating the State's Order for Juror Contact that incor
porates findings
11:38:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court has viewed the order incorporates the August 8th
11:39:46 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated objects to the State's argument that the
Court
11:40:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
incorporated.
11:40:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will protect the petitioner's record
11:40:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated received the Dodd documents as well as No
rma Jean Oliver
11:41:17 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
PSI transcript
11:41:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.

O~382

beSSlon: Neville110907

Page 3

Court noted that in Mr. Ackley's agenda
11:41:35 - Operator
Stop recording:

01a83

Session:
,
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Neville111507

Session: Nevillell1507
Session Date: 2007/11/15
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Wolf, Sue

Division: DC
Session Time:

Courtroom:

CR504

11:05

Clerk(s)
Ellis, Janet
St.a te At torneys:
Public Defender(s)
Prob.

Officer(s):

Court interpreter(s)

Case ID:

0002
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK VIRGIL
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
Co-Defendant(s)
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2007/11/15
15:00:42 - Operator
Recording:
15:00:42 - New case
STATE OF IDAHO
15:01:23 - Other: Owens, Nicole
present on behalf of petitioner
15:01:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court here on Petitioner's Motion for Permission to Appeal.
15:02:29 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson argued motion, will primarily rest on briefs sub
mitted.
Request
15:02:47 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Court consider the Court's order denying juror contact.
No
rule that
15:03:30 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
prohibits juror contact but believe have made showing to all
ow to go up on
15:04:07 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
appeal.
Also regarding Glen Elam, denial of that deposition
believe showing
15:04:31 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
made there are matters controlling, that would allow to go 0
n appeal.
15:05:03 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne believes State has said all that i t needs to say,

01383 A

Sess~on:
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believe that
15:05:35 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
allowing to go on appeal now would set back another year to
year and half.
15:05:51 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Regarding Mr. Elam, no showing made that Mr. Elam would have
anything new to
15:06:16
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
add.
15:06:20
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Regarding juror contact, i f this did not go on appeal now, a
nd gets reversed
15:06:59 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
by an appeals Court later would farther remove jurors and me
mories would
15:07:20 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
fade.
Need to speak with Mr. Elam.
15:07:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
In dealing with juror contact first, Court has not changed i
ts views.
Court
15:08:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
is comfortable with its views and rulings placed on the reco
rd on August 6th.
15:08:21 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
This is a matter of discretion.
Jurors were informed by th
is Court that
15:08:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
they could speak to who
they wanted to after the trial was
over that they
15:09:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
choose to talk to.
Jurors can be affected in their roles as
jurors by being
15:11:16 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
exposed to things not routinely seen in their normal everyda
y lives.
The
15:12:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
argument that Court has singled out counsel, the Court disag
rees with that
15:13:23 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
statement.
Court feels inappropriate to contact jurors with
out Court's
15:14:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
permjssion or knowledge.
Court done not think i t is appropr
iate to allow
15:15:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
jury contact in this case.
Court can't control the press.
In abscense of
15:16:56 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
any evidence that there was any juror misconduct or failure
to follow Court's
15:17:20 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
instruction, Court is comfortable with its prior rulings.
I
n respect to 2nd
15:17:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
part, of motion to have Glen Elam deposed.
Understanding he
was interviewed.
15:18:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Mr. Elam wouldn't sign affidavit requested.
Court has conc

01383~
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ern i f all of
15:21:02 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
defense staff becomes subject to interviews after every case
they may not
15:21:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
want to stay in their jobs.
Both Defense counsel were depos
ed, and
15:23:06 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
ultimately they are responsible for their investigators.
Co
urt will continue
15:23:37 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
earlier ruling and not allow deposition of Glen Elam.
In af
fidavit of Mr.
15:24:28 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Shaw, he states that Mr. Elam stated he could only sign an a
ffidavit of his
15:25:04 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
lead investigator advised he could do so.
Court understands
that Idaho
15:26:09 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
appellate rule 12,
Court denied Motion for permissive appe
al.
Stateds
15:28:18 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
petitoner's counsel free to file their own direct appeal wit
h supreme court.
15:28:38 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would also like to bring counsel back on December 17,
2007 @ 9:00 for
15:28:55 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
review of medical records.
15:29:43 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Request State prepare an order denying.
15:29:53 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Inquired i f Court would like an order denying deposition on
Glen Elam as well
15:30:10 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court indicated i t would.
15:30:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court trying to change schedule a bit in January.
15:31:20 - Operator
Stop recording:

01.383<:"

ORI
MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
LS.B. # 4843

MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

ERICK VIRGIL HALL,
Petitioner,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOT0500155

NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT
17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the Office of
the State Appellate Public Defender, files the following document: Exhibit 17 to Final
Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Third Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas,
dated September 26, 2007). The exhibit includes page 5, which was missing from the
exhibit submitted.

/\k
/

Dated this _)_ day of November, 2007.

£alMA/in l~G

PAULAM. SWENSEN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

1

01384

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

\~

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this \~ ~ay of November, 2007 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, was mailed,
postage prepaid, to the following:

ERICK VIRGIL HALL
INMATE # 33835
IMSI
POBOX 51
BOISE ID 83707
ROGER BOURNE
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S
OFFICE
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191
BOISE ID 83702

~U.S.Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
_ _ Hand Delivery

+-

U.S. Mail
Statehouse Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

1xvthahLL
lbmwu\ ~
BARBARA THOMAS
Administrative Assistant

NOTICE OF FILING OF EXHIBIT 17 TO THE FINAL AMENDED PETITION
FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF

2
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate Public Defender
State ofldaho
I.8.B. # 4843
MARK J. ACKLEY, LS.B. # 6330

PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender'
3647 Lake Harbor Lant
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-21l2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
ERICK VJRGn.. HALL,
Petitioner.

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. SPOTOS00155

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF'
DR. JAMES MERIKANGAS& M.D.

(CAPITAL CASE)

)

State of Idaho )
) ss.
County of Ada)

L James Merilcangas, M.D., beiDg competent tQ testify, state under penalty of peljury that

the following is true and correct to the best of my experience and knowledge:

BACKGROUND
1.

1 have .been retained by the Idaho State Appellate Public Defenders Office (SAPD) as an
expert in neurology antS psychiatry to review certain marten in the case of irick~. Hin

v. State of Idaho, Ada County case no. SPOTOSOOlS5, to re\'iew appropriate rec;ords and

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DR JAMBS :M:ER.IKANGAS

1
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tra.llSCI'ipts, to perfonn neurological and psyvbiaIric examinations, to recommend
appropriate neurological testing~ and to review and interPret the results of such testing.
2.

My education, employment and experience are set forth in my Cmriculum Vitae, which I
undtllri!tand has already been filed with the Court.

3.

I conducted a neurological and psychiatric evaluation of Erick: Hall on April 4, 2006~ at

the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. Erick was cooperative but somewhat subdued
during that examination. I then recommended an 1v.1RI scan of the brain and a. PBT scan
of the brain because of iudieations during the neurological examination of possible
congenital :malfo:ttIUltion of'the brain. The brain

SCat;1.$,

a cer\lical x-ray. ewd standard

blood work were a1ao indicated by Brick's histotY of difficulty with hand.eye motor
coordination, problcIlli with visual perception, multiple head injuries, blackouts. memory
diificu.lties, and l1lOOO swings,

The blood work included tc:st5 for thyroid functi.~

sypbilis and blood sugar levels. The reasoDS for th~ specific testing recommended are

fully set forth in my Second Affidavit, dated October 14, 2006. The recommended
testing was completed on Februuy IS and 21. 2007.

I conducted a second examination. of Erick on September 13,2007, at the Twin

Falb Adult Detention Facility. at whiGh time I noted that Erick was abnoxmally

grandiose, euphoric, and hypomanic.
TESTING CONDUCTED AN]) MATERIALS REVIEWED

4.

In addition to various materials previQua1y reviewed by me

a$

set forth in my Second

Affidavit. I reviewed the results of the following testing:
a" Magnetic resonance im.aging (MRI) ~ of the brain, with and. without contrast.
The MRl scan is a blain in1age prod:u.ced with radio waves and magnetism. It is a
standard procedure fbr exllWining the anatomy of the brain aru;l is used to evaluate

TIllRD AFPIDAVIT OF DR. JAMES MERIKANGAS
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brain damase, brain injury or brttin disease. The MIU scan givw cross s¢ctional
views of the brain based upon the chemical structural relationship of brain tissue.
b. Positron emission tomography (PET) scan. Tbe PET scan, like an MRI, produces
cross seclional views of !be brain, but the picture is generated with the use of, a
radioactive isotope, and the scan provides an image of th~ btldn basEd Oil ~
metabolism rather than simply on brain anatomy_ The PET scan. therefore, gives
a picture of the brain <'functioning" rather than simply its shape.
c. Venereal Disease Research LaboratorylRapid Plasma Reagin (VDRURPR). This
is a teGt for sypbilis, which can affect brain development if presell.t be:tbre b~
and can cause br.Un dam.age and PSyehO$;A$ if acquired later in life.
d. Thyroid testing. The thyroid controls Metabolism of the body and the brain.

Thyroid function tests are a routine part of the evaluation of mood and thought
diso~ and are also used to evaluate high blood pressure. The T3~ T4, 'I7 and
TSH blood tests are used to evaluate specifi~ aspects of thyroid fUnction.
e. Five-hour gluCOiC tole.ra.nce test. This glucose tolerance test measures both high
and low blood sugar. Sugar (glucose) provides the energy for brain functioning
and ill the brain's only fuel. Hypoglycemia (low blood sUgm') can produce the
same type of brain damage that deprivation of oxygen would. produce:. or

deprivation of thiamin which is required for metAboliSllL Hyperglycemia (high
blood sugar) oan cause a d.ecreued levil of COllSCio'USD.eS8 or confusio~ impair
cognitive function, cause mood fluctuation, and increase depression and anxiety.
The five-bour glucose tolerance test is used in diasnosing diabetes and reactive
hypogl~ It requites the administration of glucose, and multiple blood tests
over the five hours, to determine how quickly the glucose is cleared from the
blood.
f.

5-

Complete C-Spine including obliques. This is a series of x-rays of the cerviCal
spine (the neck area).

In addition to various materials previously by me as set forth in lnY Secxmd Affidavit, and
to assist we in better understa:llding Eriok's history, I reviewed the follo\ying family

member's affidavits:

a. Affidavit ofDeanna.}ean (McCmckcn) Horrnatl, dated April 10. 2006
b. Affidav~ of Jean ffall McCra.;ken. dated April 9. 2006
c.
d.
e.
f.

.A:6ida'Vlt of John Au~t Thompson, dated April 9. 2006

Affidavit of Frank «(~ankie") Alvin Charles McCracken, dated April 9 2006
'

Affidavit of Kimberly A. Bacon. dated April 9, 2006
Affidavit ofKmlneth S. Do~ dated April 9. 2006
g. Affidavit of Frank Owen McCracken. Sr.~ dated April 7, 2006

THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF DR. JM4ES MERlKANGAS
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h_ Affidavit of Tiffaney Lcandra Conner, ~ April 8, 2006
i. Affidavit of Slla\Vltra MeCn.eken Homnring, dated April 7, 2006
J. Affidavit ofTamata McCracken, dated April 7, 2006
k. Affidavit ofSbannon Pambnm. dated September 4, 2007

METHODOLOGY" PATmNT msTORY
6.

Hwnan behavior is extremely complex. and is influenced by D.llItle!'OUS factors, including

genetics. family upbringing, positive and negative lite experience&, and the physical and
chemical malee-up of the brain. The brain itse1fis higbly complex awl can be damaged at

any stage of developmtmt and at tmy stage of life. Damage can be overt or subtle, and
damage will affect behalviQi to ~ dCgrcG3 depending not just upon the extent of the

damage, but also on the location of the damage. Deformation may exist at birth or may
be cauaed later by il.lnels, tra.uma, and aloohol or drug usc. Even subtle damage to the

brain may c&wse significant physical, emotional, psychiatric aDd bch&vioml problems.
Because of the complexity of the brain and of hulnan behavior. oourology and
neuropsychiatry must take into account the patient's complete hittory. Specific tests are
useful. of CO'UI'Se, in discovering specific brain d~e (altb.ou.gh negative teSUlts are not
always dispositive of lack of damage). However,

det~g

tho extcmt of the damage,

the eause of the damage, and the effects of the damage on behavior is a c:on:xplicatcd

undertaking which requires nClUlologlsts and neu:ropsychiatrists to take into

accQUllt

results from ll1ultipJe tesu. family blWkgroUDd, ~ a patient" s phycicallllld mental health

history.
Thus, Brick's personal history is extremely relevant in assessing and interpreting
his test res.u1ts, includin: the :MRI an~ PET scan results. .History is especially relevant in
trying to ascett.ai11 the eause of bnnn dmlage. Brick's history is replete with mqwn

potential Ca1UJeS of or indications ofbrain damage. Erick birth weight was only 4 pounds,
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14 ounCe$. Based on his family history~ there is reason to believe that Erick's mother

drank alcohol while pregnant with him. Erick was developmentally delayed. and was
diagnosed as mildly mentally retarded as a child.

He was unable to oope with

kindergarten, had a very poor attention span. and required constant direction and

supervision to complete tasks. Brick was _ emotionally di~turbed child, was frail and

underoQu.riahOO.. He heanl VOiCCi as a child, and his behavior was described as different
end odd. Brick was repeatedly and severtily pbysically abused as • ehild by multiple
family members. Brick has a history of alcohol, cocain~ and methamphetamine abuse.

Additionally, Erick has a history af multiple head injuries, a wen-established
ea.use ofbx-a.in darna.Se. As a child. Erick fell offbis bicycle, hit the back ofms head and
lost consciousness. Following that incident and fur several years following the incident,
Erick complained of severe headacllesl and neck and eye pain. Brick's brother would
often hit bi:1ll 80 .bard that Erick would be knocked -unconscious. Erick once feU off a roof.

He landed. in a rose garden. but fell forward and hit his head on a rode gidewalk. He fell
out of a pickup truck~ and off a hay 'trailer. His siblings and extQJlded fiunily would throw

rocks at Erick~s head.
7.

In my professional opinion, 8lld to a reasonable degree of medieal certainty, Erick's
hiaiory warranted a complete neurological examination. Had I l.>een CQIlSultcd prior to
Erick's sentencing trial, I would have undoubtedly recommended the same neurological
testing that I recommended duriug the C'\.11'reUt post-conviction proceedings.
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NEUROLOGICAL FINDINGS
8.

Mapetic resollaD.ee imaging (MlU)
The MRI scan! of Brick's brain showed anatomical damage. Specifically, the MRIs
sbDwed (a) the presence (foci) of white matter byperintMlSity on Brick',

brain. (b)

prominenco of the ventricles of Erick's brain, and (0) an abnonnally thin corpus
callosum.

(8)

Whitp Matter Hyperintgitv.

Erick's MRI showod dama.ge to his brain. Specifically it showed the presence of foci of
white matter hyperintensity, called lesions. The presenoe of 1~ indicates a di~
itate, and are particularly troubling when found in a. 36-year-old.

What is white matte.r hyperlntenslty? Generally, there are two types of brain
matter, grey matter and white matter. Grey matter Tefer& mainly to the cerebral cortex,
which is the convoluted, contound exterior of the brain. Grey matter contaiuli the boditi8

of the nerve cells. White miJUer oormects the various grey matter areas of the brain and.

eanies nerve impulses between nerve cells in different parts of the brain. White matter iB
coated. with myelin, a fatty insulation. Lesions of white matter hyperintensity describe a
condition where the myelin has broken. d<)WD, exposing the underlying white matter.

White matter is analogoU$ to

el~trica.l

wiring, with the myelin being the insulation.

When the insulation breaks down, the wiring beoomes exposee4 and does DOt conduct
electricity well. Thus, the fact that Erick bas white m.a~ lesiOllSJ indicates that his
brain's circuitry is not functioning properly) i.e., messages arc not sent efficiently from
one part of his brain to another.
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While it is common to see white matter lesions in certain categories of pe1'SOm, it
is associated with a diBease state. For example, white matter lesions are associated with

diseases'such as high blood pressur~ vascular disease) and other diseases found in the
c;ldedy.

White matter lesioM C8Jl also the result of

l.l1iilni

dl:ugs like cocaine or

methaxnphetaminc. As discussed above, Erick has a bi~ory of using these dIugs.
The presence ofwmte matter lesions may affect behavior. The behavioral effects
vary dependlng on the location oftbe lesions and the cause oftha abnormality. In Erick's
cas~ the white matter lesiQD.S are located in his temporal and frontal lobes.

The temporal lobe is lQ(i8.ted beneath and behind. the frontal lobe. It is involved in
the processing of auditory sensation and. perception, and contains the hippocampus. an

area of the braID asiOCiated with memory formation.. Temporal lobe damage can result in
(1) distuWance of auditQxy sensation and perception, (2) diatwbancc of selective attention

'of auditory and \fisual input; (3) c1isorders ofviliual perception. (4) impaired or~on
and catQgorization of verbal material, (~) disturbance of language comprehensio~ (6)

impaired long-term memory. (7) altered par1iOtla1ity and affective behavil)r. and (8)
altered sexual behavior.

The frontal lobes are OQIlsidex-eO. our lWlotional control center and home to our
personality. Most importantIYt the frontal lobes are involved in impnlse controL There i£
no other part of me brain where lesioI)$ can. cause such a wide variety of symptoms. The
:6:ontal lobes are involved in motor function, pIOblem solving, spontaneity. memory.

language, initiation, judgment, impulse control. and social and sexual behavior. Frontal
lobe damage can result in (1) distUIbed motor function, (2) suppressed. spontaneous facial
movements. (3) iclJibited or excessivQ sp~ (4) difficulty in interpreting feedback from
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the env1:roJlInent, (5) perseveration on a response, (6) risk taking, (J) impaired asSOCiated
leaming. i.e. impaired use of extemal cues to help guide beMvior, (8) dramatic change in

social behavior, (9) and abnormal sexual behavior.
This is particularly signi:6.eant in Erick's coso, because of the nature of the

conviction against him, i.e., a crime involving the sexual homicide of a stnUlger. and
other past allegations.

The damaged regions of his brain are aasoeiated with sexual

behavior and impullc control. This.finding, especially in conjunction with his family and
locial history. provides a possible explanation olbis criminal behaviors in this "Me.
(b)

fromin~ of"gntricl~

Erick's MRI alab showed damage to his. vmtricular system.

The v1m.triculat

sysrom consists of four oommunicating cavities (ventricles) in the brain that are filled
with cerebrospinal fluid and are eoJl~UOUS with the central canal of the Spinal cord.
Eriok~s

ventricles are abnonnally prOmlnant. Large ven.tricles

ar&

caused by either too

much pteSS1lIt!l inside the brain or atrOphy of the brain. A1rOphy is the loss of brain tissue

and ea'USe'S impairment. A12heimer's disease, fbr exampto1 is associated with significant
brain a1rophy, and one would see enlarged ventricles because of the atrophy_ In other
words, when the btain sht:iI:iks, the fluid cavitieli (ventrioles) becom~ larger.
In Illy professional. opinion, Brick's ventrieles are enlarged beca~c his brain is

atrophied. In other words, Erick's ventricles are enlarged because he has lost brain
tissue. Enlargement of the ventricles can exist at birt:b, occur later in life because of

disease, or can be the result of head it\juries. Given Erick'i history, it is likely his

fJIllarged ventricles are the result of head injuries. Damage resulting from head injuries is
cumulative; meaning, sevc:nl minot head il\Jurie& can have the same result as one major
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head nyury. Thus, Erick's enlarged ventricles are likely the result of his combined head

ilJjuries.
(c)

Ihin Conmi Qillosum.
Erick's MR1 showQfj d.amage to thv QQIpus callo8Utn. The corpus callosum is the

~t band of

:tibel-s connecting the left and right cereb.ral homisphcres of the human

brain. It is l10mlally the largest white matter structure in the brain, and much of the interhetnispherio eonuntmication:in the brain is conductedacroaa the corpus caU06Wll.

Erick's COIpus callosum is abnormally thin or narrow. Thin corpus callosa are
associated with Fcrtal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder (,FABD). FASD is an Unlbrella term
describing the range of effects t1uU can ()OCut in an individual who was prenatally

exposed to alcohol. Prenatal exprurure to alcohol is a w~ll known cause of behavioral,
cognitive. and psyehologicall'toblems, and i$ also associated with learning disabilities.

FASD $)'Illptoms Ir11so incl* poor judgment and poor impulse control.
FASD is consistent with reports that Erick's mother drank. during her pregnancies,
Erick'J! low birth weight. E.rick's history of behavioral and mood problems, Brick's
shortened philtnlIn, and Brick's history of learning disabiliti. and childhood mild mental

nrtardation. Given

Erick'~

history and the results of the MRI. it is my professional

opinion that Brick FASD is the likely cause QfErick's a.bnormally thin corpua oallosum.
FASD is c01l8istent with Erick's problems Vl.ith impul$e control and aggressive behavior
and, again, offern a possible explanation fOf his criminal w;tivity.
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9.

Positron Emission TODlOp'a:phy (PET)
The PET scan gives a· picture of the brain', metabolic activity lovel (or
functioning) in the varlous areas of the brain.

Eriek's PET scan showed functional

damagtJ. First, there was a severe decrease in activity in the medial temporal regions
bilatc.7ally extending to the tips of the t~ poles. Second. there was a moderate

deereas. in. activity extomling from the insular regions bilaterally into the posterior
aspects of both frontal lobes. The decreased metabolic activity level in those

aI'eQ

indicates damage to those areas ofErlck:is brain.
The cause of this decreaso in Erick's brain activity is likely a result olms multiple

head injuries. Howevet. oxygen deprivation. high ft;vers., iufectiOM or measles can also

cause these abnormalities. Regm-dles$ of the eause, abnormalities in these areas of the
brain are associated with aggreuive impulsive behavior. poor executive f\lnetionill& poor
judgm.ent and low intelligence. The dirnjnisbad. activity in these areas of Rrick>s brain is
consistent with problems, with impulse eonttol and aggressive behavior, and provides a
pouible finther explanation for his criminal activity

10.

Syphilis Test
Mr. Hall tested neptive fO. syphilis.

11.

Tbyroid Tests
Mr. Hall tc8ted within nonna1limiv. for thyroid. t\mcijl))l.,

12.

Glucose Tolerance Testiu&
Erick tested a:J hyPerglycemic. Further testing for the possibility of diabotos is indicated.

13.

Cervic:al X-Ray
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There was some mild spondylitic change at C4-S with anterior hypetbtJpbic ostoophytic
splll'ring. There

Wa.! sO:tnc

m.i.nima1 posterior osteophytic spurring, but no ruurowing of

the neural foramina on the oblique views. These may be the result of neck injuries

associated with Brick's head injuries or other physical trauIlla.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
14.

Erick's brain is anatomically and functionally abnormal Erick has anatomical damage to

his frontal and remporal1obes, and an aJ;JllODI18l1y developed corpus callosum. Erick's
braiD is also functionally impaired in the temporal lobe regions.

It i5 my profes$ional

opinion to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Erick' 5 sexual bohaviOI'I and

difficultie:; with impulae control and the exercise of good judgment are consistent with
the brain damage identified by the brain scans. Based on the directive of Mr. Hall' $
attorneys, I have not spoken to Mr. Hall about tho eIime itself: However, in light of the
evidence preiented at trial and aswmln8 8Uilt based on the jw;y's verdict, it is readily

apparent that the specific da:mage to Brick'lI brain could accuunt for his alleged actions
that DvlJDin8 and alleged prior oriminal behavior.

The results oftbe brain scans are consistent with Eriok's bigtory of head injuries.

pervasive developmental deficits, and other childhood deficits, disorders. and
mimeatment.

Moreover~

Eri"k's background would calU¢ him. to develop mUltiple and

serious emotional triggers.

While persons with undamaaed brains may have those

triggers and. not react violently, it is much more difficult for a person with brain

damage-particub.rly brain damage affecting jropulse control-to resist th$ urge to react
violently. While brain damage do(l$ not excuse Erick's violent behavior, it may explain
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and mitigate his actions. Erick's brain simply does not function like a healthy adult's

brain., and his behavillt, therefore, should be judged accordingly.
'

DATED this )-

,-

-\.,0.

day of September. 2007.

_.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before m~ this
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Session: Neville121907
Session Date: 2007/12/19
Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Reporter: Hirmer, Jeanne

Division: DC
Session Time: 08:49

Courtroom: CR501

Clerk(s)
Ellis, .Janet
State Attorneys:
Public Defender(s) :
Prob. Officer(s):
Court interpreter(s):

Case ID: 0002
Case Number: SPOT0500155D
Plaintiff: HALL, ERICK
Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Defendant: STATE OF IDAHO
CO-Defendant(s) :
Pers. Attorney:
State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Public Defender:

2007/12/19
09:32:46 - Operator
Recording:
09:32:46 - New case
, STATE OF IDAHO
09:33:29 - Other: OWEN, NICOL
present on behalf of petitioner as well.
09:33:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court prepared to sign an order submitted by the Court. The
Court has had
09:35:25 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
orgnized the medical records.
The bulk of the records are f
rom Intermountain
09:36:45 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Medical Hospital, and most is discoverable, but whether admi
tted is subject
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SessiGn: Neville121907
09:37:03 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
to argument and rules of evidence.
Court also has a brief 1
etter from Dr.
09:37:35 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Heyrend stating he has no records that his associate has it.
The Court also
09:38:15 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
received letter from social security office and their stand
on releasing
09:38:54 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
records.
09:39:20 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated spoke with Mr. Ellsberry and talked about
policies.
Ms.
09:39:55 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Swenson stated that Ms. Oliver could sign a release of those
records and
09:40:22 - plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
would request that the Court sign an order to do so.
09:40:50 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court responded
09:41:24 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated that once receive the medical records fro
m the Court may
09:41:43 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
have an idea on whether social security records would be red
undant or would
09:42:05 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
be necessary.
09:42:38 - Judge: Neville r Thomas F.
The Court was surprised by in house counsel for social secur
ity would stated
09:42:57 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
that privacy would trump a death penalty case.
Court stated
major features
09:44:24 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
of the records would be relevent some redactions would need
to be made.
09:45:01 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Going to the PSI for April Sebastian, mostly not relevent.
09:46:53 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court would still like counsel to leave open the afternoon 0
f January 17th
09:47:34 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
and the entire day of January 18th for this case.
09:48:19 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
The Court notes Motion for limited appearance in the H030062
4
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09:48:57 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson responded re: handling trial counsel to be avail
able.
09:50:04 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated will advise Ms. Bennetts that the Court wi
11 take up Hanlon
09:50:40 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
matter as well.
09:50:46 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
09:50:48 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Mr. Bourne stated have not filed State's response to Amended
Petition.
09:51:14 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Believe will be able to file today the response with notoriz
ed affidavit.
09:52:03 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Believe that Mr. Ackley may want to respond to that and that
would cause
09:52:24 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
State to respond to that.
09:52:44 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Might be able to take up some of the claims on that day that
are not affected
09:52:58 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
by the medical records.
09:53:06 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson stated don't believe would be able to go forward
to address the
09:53:28 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Motion to Dismiss. Do not want to piece meal this. Assume
State's answer
09:54:04 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
would be lengthy
09:54:08 - State Attorney: BOURNE, ROGER
Close to 100 pages.
09:54:18 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Would like to set out 6 weeks after disclosure of the record
s. Will also
09:54:49 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
need to contact Dr. Merikangas once State has contacted thei
r expert and
09:55:08 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
filed the affidavit.
09:55:12 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court response
09:56:49 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
Ms. Swenson responded, would ask that on the documents, an 0
rder what is
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09:57:19 - Plaintiff Attorney: SWENSON, PAULA
being disclosed and what is not being disclosed for appeal.
09:57:39 - Judge: Neville, Thomas F.
Court will consider.
09:58:12 - Operator
Stop recording:
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